Donald Rumsfeld

Learning the right lessons from Libya

Jorge Benitez — Tue, 30 Aug 2011 16:07:41 -0500

From Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy: The rebel victory in Libya is likely to gladden the hearts of liberal interventionists, who will see the NATO-aided triumph as vindicating the idea that great powers have the right and the responsibility to come to the aid of victims of tyrannical oppression. Add to that the general enthusiasm-which I share-for the broad effort to create more open and democratic orders in the Middle East, and it seems likely that the Wilsonian project that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has long embraced will get a shot in the arm. The debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan will be discounted, and the "Libyan model" (whatever that is) will become the latest strategic fad du jour. . . .

As I've noted before, we still don't know how the "Libyan revolution" is going to turn out. Even if Qaddafi set a very low standard for effective or just governance, the end-result of his ouster may not be as gratifying as we hope. More importantly, we also ought to guard against the common tendency to draw big policy conclusions from a single case, especially when we don't have good theories to help us understand the differences between different outcomes. . . .

But notice one danger here: even when circumstances aren't propitious, advocates of intervention can fall prey to wishful thinking and convince themselves that they have figured out how to do these things properly, thereby avoiding the disasters that have befallen others. Right now, some people are undoubtedly thinking that the right combination of special forces, drones, local allies, and multilateral support are the magic formula for success. They may be right but I wouldn't assume it blindly and I wouldn't ignore the possibility that others will start thinking about ways to make sure the U.S. and its allies can't repeat this sort of thing elsewhere. Donald Rumsfeld was pretty sure he knew how the United States could avoid costly quagmires-go in light and get out early-the only problem was that getting in turned out to be the easy part. And don't be surprised if a few countries conclude that the real lesson of the Libyan intervention was that Muammar al-Qaddafi blundered when he agreed to end his WMD programs and open up to the outside world. I'm glad he did, but I suspect that leaders in Iran and North Korea will draw their own conclusions. (photo: Getty)

The Peril of Deep Defense Cuts

Jorge Benitez — Fri, 01 Jul 2011 10:28:47 -0500

From Donald Rumsfeld, the Wall Street Journal: Today Leon Panetta will take the oath to become our nation's 23rd secretary of defense. After he walks through the Pentagon's river entrance and up the oak-paneled stairwell to his office, the weight of managing a three million-person department during wartime will sink in. And Mr. Panetta's tenure begins just as President Obama and bipartisan majorities in Congress are insisting on deep cuts to defense spending. It will be tempting to accede to the White House's proposal to carve out $400 billion, if not more, from the national security budget by 2023. It would also be a grievous mistake. . . .

To be sure, there are savings to be found in the defense budget. Mr. Panetta might start by opposing any and all congressional earmarks, past and future. More than $80 billion in unnecessary spending for pet projects has been shoved down the Pentagon's throat over the last decade.

Mr. Panetta should also reinvigorate the effort to reposition our forces away from unnecessary Cold War defensive garrisons to smaller, forward bases. Until 2005, for example, America was paying $225 million annually to station aircraft in Iceland to monitor threatening Soviet bombers and submarines that hadn't been around for over a decade. The Bush administration initiated a number of repositioning initiatives in Asia and Europe that have since flagged. The longer we provide a security blanket courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer, the longer we delay the day when European and other allies begin serious investments in their own defense capabilities. . . .

The U.S. taxpayer is also subsidizing a bloated and broken personnel system for nearly 800,000 Defense Department civilians. Since 9/11, the number of active duty military has increased 4%, while the number of civilians has increased nearly 50%. More recently, the Pentagon decided to increase its acquisition corps to 30,000 from 20,000 civilians. The last thing the nation needs are new and expensive bureaucrats managing fewer programs. The Obama administration should consider a commitment to reduce the DoD civilian work force by 10% through attrition. . . .

Our country has taken an ax to our national security budget—both the Defense Department and the intelligence community—after every war of the 20th century. And every time we later regretted it. . . .

Defense spending is now 19% of federal outlays and declining. This is the lowest percentage since before World War II. At 4.7% of GDP, the defense budget is dwarfed by the cost of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, which exceed 10% of GDP. Even if President Obama tomorrow brought home each and every troop in Iraq and Afghanistan, tore down the Pentagon, shuttered the CIA and the national security agencies of government, and pink-slipped the three million men and women defending the country, it would not solve America's financial woes.

Mr. Rumsfeld was secretary of defense from 1975 to 1977 and from 2001 to 2006. (graphic: David Klein/Wall Street Journal)

Political Gridlock at NATO

Jorge Benitez — Fri, 10 Jun 2011 05:50:13 -0500

From Con Coughling, the Wall Street Journal: Many European powers, such as Germany, insist the NATO mission should be confined to the humanitarian objectives set out in U.N. resolution 1973, namely to protect innocent civilians and establish a cease-fire. But their position is at odds with Britain, France and the U.S., which have publicly declared that the military campaign must continue until Gadhafi is removed from power, an objective that is not included in the original U.N. mandate.

This glaring disconnect between those who back humanitarian intervention and those who seek regime change has had a significant impact on NATO's military response, with only a handful of nations prepared to commit their forces to conduct combat operations against the Libya.

In addition, NATO's capacity to wage an effective military campaign has been significantly weakened by President Barack Obama's decision to withdraw U.S. warplanes from combat operations after the opening air sorties in March succeeded in knocking out Gadhafi's air-defense systems.

This means that the bulk of the combat sorties flown against Libya are being undertaken by a handful of countries that Donald Rumsfeld, the former U.S. Defense Secretary, might describe as a "coalition of the willing." And while countries such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Holland, Qatar and Jordan have made useful contributions to NATO's combat operations, the lion's share of the bombing missions are being carried out by Britain and France, which between them have flown around 75% of the total sorties launched since March.

The heavy reliance on British and French warplanes raises problems of its own. The operational effectiveness of Britain's Royal Air Force has been undermined by the government's recent decision to impose severe cuts on the defence budget, which has severely reduced the number of aircraft available for operations in Libya.

The French, meanwhile, continue to operate under two separate command structures despite French President Nicolas Sarkozy's repeated assurances that France would become fully integrated into NATO's command structure. French warplanes based in Italy report to NATO's command headquarters in Naples while aircraft flying sorties off the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle report directly to French military commanders in Paris.

The deep divisions among key member states is also having a harmful effect on the way NATO commands the Libyan operation. NATO's command structure is highly bureaucratic at the best of times, with every member nation allowed a say in how the alliance prosecutes a military campaign, even those that have refused to participate. Consequently whenever NATO officers in Naples identify a potential bombing target, it must first be referred to one of the three "targeting boards" that convenes three time each day to assess the next stage of the bombing offensive.

This allows countries that are not even participating in the combat sorties to voice their objections in the form of a "red card" if they believe a potential target falls outside the scope of the U.N. resolution. Thus any mission that was deemed to be targeting Col. Gadhafi directly will be ruled out on the grounds that it does not have U.N. backing.

Mr. Coughlin is the executive foreign editor of London's Daily Telegraph. (photo: Reuters)

NATO allies concerned over US troop cuts in Europe

Jorge Benitez — Sun, 06 Mar 2011 06:33:20 -0600

From Spencer Kimball, Deutsche Welle: According to Washington, radical Islam had replaced Soviet communism as the existential threat to American interests. To combat this new enemy, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld initiated an exodus of US soldiers from historic posts in western Europe. But critics warned that the restructuring would undermine NATO's ability to live up to its security responsibilities both inside and outside of Europe.

"The Rumsfeld plan … was the decision to reduce US force levels - then at 100,000 - down to 60,000," Ian Brzezinski told Deutsche Welle. Brzezinski, an analyst with the Atlantic Council, is a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy.

"While the plan was being implemented, European Command weighed in ... and said if we execute this plan we're going to have trouble living up to currently defined responsibilities, including Article 5 responsibilities," he said.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty requires the Alliance to come to the aid of member-states if their territory comes under attack.

In response to the concerns expressed by commanders, Gates - Rumsfeld's successor - put the plan on hold in 2007. However, newly announced budget cuts at the Pentagon could put troop reductions back on the table. Experts believe the changing role of NATO in a post-Cold War world will ultimately dictate the number and structure of US soldiers in Europe. ...

Many Europeans are concerned that conventional territorial defense will fall by the wayside as America's strategic eye gazes increasingly upon the Mideast and Central Asia. For the new NATO members, American troops continue to act as a hedge against what they see as Moscow's unpredictable foreign policy.

"The nations that have been most concerned about the credibility of Article 5 are the Central Europeans," Brzezinksi said."People remember that Estonia had a cyber attack that originated in Russia, and which most believe was organized by the Russian government. ..."

"Poland and the Baltic States have a stronger fear of Russia's political influence and a possible confrontation," [the German Council on Foreign Relations' Henning] Riecke said. "For them it remains very important that American troops are stationed in Europe. These are scenarios that are not at the top of the list of possible risks, but you can't just sweep them under the carpet." (photo: David Robinson/EUCOM)

Losing New Europe, Too?

James Joyner — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 07:51:58 -0500

Back in 2003, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously noted that while "Old Europe" (particularly France and Germany) was hard to work with, America could count on "New Europe." Fast forward to 2009 and we may have reversed polarity.

A piece in the current Economist notes that "After two decades of sometimes fervent Atlanticism in the ex-communist world, disillusionment (some would call it realism) is growing."

At its height the bond between eastern Europe and America was based, like the best marriages, on a mixture of emotion and mutual support. The romance dates from the cold war: when western Europe was sometimes squishy in dealing with the Soviet empire, America was robust. When the Iron Curtain fell, ex-dissidents and retired cold warriors found they had plenty in common. America pushed for the expansion of NATO, guaranteeing the east Europeans’ security. In return, ex-communist countries loyally supported America, particularly in providing troops for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It cites the recently released Transatlantic Trends survey by the German Marshall Fund, which shows that things have changed radically.

The ascent of Barack Obama has boosted America’s image in most countries, but only modestly in places like Poland and Romania. Among policymakers in the east, the dismay is tangible. In July, 22 senior figures from the region, including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, wrote a public letter bemoaning the decline in transatlantic ties.

One reason is that the Obama administration is rethinking a planned missile-defence system, which would have placed ten interceptor rockets in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic, in order to guard against Iranian missile attacks on America and much of Europe. That infuriated Russia, which saw the bases as a blatant push into its front yard. Changing the scheme—probably using seaborne interceptors—risks looking like a climb-down to suit Russian interests.

Poland is also worried that a promised battery of Patriot air-defence missiles, originally to protect the interceptors, may now be only a temporary loan of dummy rockets for training purposes—“just a sales exercise”, says an official in Warsaw, crossly. America says it never intended to station real rockets there permanently.

The administration also botched its participation in Poland’s 70th anniversary commemoration of the start of the second world war on September 1st. Other countries, including Russia and Germany, sent top people. America, initially, offered only a retired Clinton-era official. William Perry, who was a notable sceptic about NATO expansion. After squawks of dismay, Jim Jones, the national security adviser, went too. But Poles sensed a snub.

We shall see how long the Obama-inspired uptick in relations between the United States and its traditional allies lasts. Aside from the strains in the "Special Relationship" constantly reported in the British press, there's good reason to think that we're in for a good run. After all, the Iraq War — the catalyst for the initial strain — is fast moving toward closure and U.S. pique over the meager Continental contribution to Afghanistan will be academic if the U.S., too, decides that war is no longer worth the cost.

The downturn with New Europe is understandable, too. Obama is almost certainly going to side with Russia over Poland on missile defense — not out of appeasement to Moscow but because Democrats have traditionally thought the project a boondoggle. Certainly Georgia can't feel rewarded for its fealty to the United States, having grudgingly gone to war in Iraq only to see its ally stand by while its sovereign territory was invaded. And Russia is now making a naked power grab in Ukraine with nary a peep from Washington.

The eagerness of "New Europe" to side with the U.S. came from the combination of the cold shoulder they were receiving from their Western neighbors and the warm rhetoric from across the Atlantic. But it now seems obvious that the talk will not be backed with action at the cost of risking war with Russia, especially for those states in its "near abroad" that have not yet been admitted into the NATO club. That realization obviously and reasonably puts a damper on "New Europe's" enthusiasm.

Relations with "Old Europe," meanwhile, will return to what they have been for the postwar period: a mature engagement between peers that will ebb and flow as the situation warrants. Such a relationship can withstand sharp disagreements, angry words, and hurt feelings. Resentments and rifts will occasionally arise but they will be temporary. Our shared values and interests, however, are permanent.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council. Illustration by Peter Schrank for The Economist.

The Military the Country Needs

Derek Reveron — Sun, 22 Feb 2009 10:07:32 -0600

In response to a soldier’s question in 2004 about lacking the appropriate training and equipment for counterinsurgency in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quipped, “you go to war with the army you have.” That may be true, but it is the secretary of Defense’s responsibility for determining the type of military the country needs. When President Obama presents the fiscal year 2010 budget on Tuesday, we’ll see what kind of military Secretary Gates thinks the United States needs.

Gates’ views on military force structure are relatively well known. His 2008 National Defense Strategy guides thinking about how the military is developed and employed. As I argued in a previous New Atlanticist piece, Gates sees it as a “blueprint to succeed in the years to come.” The strategy is a very readable and useful document to understand U.S. defense priorities, defense assumptions about the world, and needed changes. The continuities from past administrations are evident. The military still finds a core mission in defending the United States and achieving success in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there is a tension between fighting and winning today’s wars versus preparing for possible wars of the future. Underlying the future size and shape of the U.S. military are three schools of thought: traditionalist, modernist, and post-modernist.

The traditionalist school sees challenges in peer competitors requiring preparation for high-end warfare reminiscent of D-Day and the Battle of Midway. Today, China is typically singled out as the likely peer competitor for the United States (it was Japan in the early 1990s). Traditionalists charge that preparation for major war against another military power is the proper use of the military and should guide defense planning. Traditionalists object to soft uses of the military and worry that “feel good” operations undermine the military’s warfighting ethos. This is the Defense Department’s predisposition, but Gates is challenging the bureaucracy to plan for the most likely types of operations and not necessarily the most destructive.

Within the traditionalist school resides the modernist school. It sees preparing for and prevailing in major war as the military’s sole purpose, but the key distinction is the role of technology. For the traditionalist, mass through personnel numbers is a principle of war. For the modernist, technology replaces mass. A modernist’s military is dominated by high-end weapon systems like F-22, the Army’s Future Combat System, and the Navy’s electric rail-gun. Modernists object to the high levels of manpower required for stability and engagement operations because they negatively impact acquisition accounts.

During the 1990s, the technologists prevailed in defense debates; technology could make warfighting more efficient. While quick “victories” in Iraq and Afghanistan validated the modernist way of war, subsequent insurgencies challenged their relevance. Based on pre-decisional decisions, their favorite weapon systems are likely to face cuts. F-22 has already fallen from a planned 800 to just 200. Gates has already called for the military departments to develop 75 percent solutions and not the 99 percent solutions it favors.

A third school of thought is undergoing a revival. Post-modernists see the security environment dominated by weak states and non-state actors. With this view, the military should be optimized for small wars, counterinsurgency, and reconstruction operations. For post-modernists, it is better to address underlying conditions or confront local crises before they become regional ones. They don’t see any peer competitor over the next two decades and the importance of prevailing in today’s conflicts is essential to having a future. This school seems to have Secretary Gates’ ear, as he’s recognized that he already has a military with the ability to kick down the door but lacks the capacity to clean up the mess afterwards.

In spite of the economic downturn and large budget deficits, defense is unlikely to face major cuts. With two important operations ongoing and security assistance programs with 149 countries, the U.S. military is in high demand. President Obama’s strategic outlook does not suggest this will change. And with the inability or unwillingness of allies and partners to increase contributions to international security, the post-modernists are likely to guide future defense spending to get Gates’ balanced force structure. The obvious winner will be the ground pounder that will be better prepared for the next deployment. The obvious loser will be the modernists who seek to dissuade the next major war.

Derek Reveron is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. These views are his own. Photo from Reuters Pictures.