SAG

A Leaner NATO Needs a Tighter Focus

Hans Binnendijk — Fri, 03 Feb 2012 10:20:17 -0600

U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have an opportunity this weekend as they address the Munich Security Conference to suggest ways to stabilize NATO’s ailing defense capabilities.

European nations have slashed their defense budgets to record low levels without much regard for NATO’s overall defense requirements. And last week the United States announced that it would remove two of its four Brigade Combat Teams from Europe.

Those European reductions are beginning to weaken NATO’s core military capabilities. Most European defense cuts have been across the board, creating the potential for hollow forces with low readiness and low sustainability levels. More recently key allies like the British and Dutch have eliminated entire military categories such as carrier aviation and armor.

The alliance is certainly not doomed. In 2011, Europe still had two million personnel under arms and spent about €215 billion on defense; those numbers are declining. NATO emerged victorious in Libya without losing a man; and maritime operations are having a positive impact against pirates and terrorists. The Afghanistan coalition was shaken recently with France’s decision to withdraw early, but NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has since said that the United States and its allies would step back from a combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013.

The real long-term risk to NATO is that gaps will appear in the European force structure that the United States won’t be able to fill, and that the alliance will be unable to act in a future crisis. That risk needs to be faced squarely at the NATO summit in Chicago in May.

Panetta and Clinton might consider a five-part plan to deal with this looming problem. First, NATO needs to define more precisely what military capabilities are needed to meet its three agreed tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation has been unable to design such a “must have” priority list.

The U.S. National Defense University has just completed a major study on this which might serve as a starting point for prioritization. Skilled military personnel, technology and deployable capability are more important than massed armies and large installations.

Ideally, at the Chicago summit, heads of state would pledge that as they consider their national defense budgets, they would protect these “must have” military capabilities. They might also pledge to build back beyond this minimal requirement after the economic recession has passed.

Second, NATO must take a bolder approach to Rasmussen’s concept of Smart Defense. The alliance has identified some 16 current multinational defense projects where military assets are pooled or shared by several nations. That is a good start, but it will not deal with the magnitude of this crisis. The level of specialization and cooperation needs to be raised to the mission level in order to maximize efficiency and political attractiveness. Clusters of willing nations might form what has been called “mission focus groups” that prepare for certain types of missions, such as fighting piracy, policing the air and special operations. Those nations would self-organize under the general guidance of the NATO secretary general. Rewiring the alliance around a mission focus group concept may be a bridge too far for Chicago, but the concept should considered there.

Third, the United States European Command, Eucom, needs reorientation. During the past decade, U.S. forces in Europe have followed a “lily pad” strategy by which they sit waiting to jump to another theater. Given the nature of NATO’s coming capabilities crisis and U.S. reductions, Eucom needs to work more closely with its European allies to maintain European skills and trans-Atlantic interoperability.

A recent American decision to dedicate a U.S. based Brigade Combat Team to work with the NATO Response Force is precisely the kind of close U.S.-European military interaction that is needed.

Fourth, NATO’s partners need to play enhanced roles and even consider dividing some of the labor with NATO. For example, the European Union might agree to take the lead on certain missions, such as peacekeeping in Africa. Russia might form a close cooperative arrangement with NATO on counterterrorism. Historically non-aligned European nations like Sweden and Finland might integrate even more with NATO for missions like Baltic defense. The most capable partners can be closely associated with Smart Defense efforts and take a leadership role in training and education.

Finally, to reassure our Eastern allies, NATO needs to exercise its contingency plans for so-called Article 5 missions using U.S.-based forces and to retain its current nuclear posture in Europe. With NATO’s conventional capabilities in decline, this is no time to remove the remaining handful of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe that both reassure allies and deter potential adversaries. Any future nuclear reductions need to be part of a broad negotiation with Russia.

NATO must keep up its guard even in times of austerity. It may also need to lower its level of ambition and focus on priority missions. These five measures can maximize military efficiencies and maintain basic confidence that the Alliance will be able to deal with the uncertain challenges that lie ahead.

Hans Binnendijk is vice president for Research and Applied Learning at the National Defense University, and member of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group. These views are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government. This essay originally appeared on The New York Times.

The Euro Crisis and Foreign Policy: Europe Has an Idea

Sven Biscop — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 14:27:50 -0600

The core idea of the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy is that lasting peace and stability can only exist where governments guarantee their citizens security, prosperity, freedom, and equality. Where governments do not provide their citizens with these core public goods, tensions will arise, instability and repression will follow, and citizens will eventually revolt and regimes implode, violently or peacefully, as most recently demonstrated by the Arab Spring but also, for example, by the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore the best way to guarantee the peace and stability of the EU is to stimulate governments outside the EU to similarly provide for their citizens.

But what of the EU itself?

Since WWII a distinctive European model of society has emerged: a combination of democracy, the market economy, and government intervention to ensure the fair functioning of the market and to provide those public goods which the market does not generate. When this “social contract” is seen to be respected, it generates a sense of purpose and feeling of community. When it is perceived to be threatened, however, it leads to disenchantment with the EU, as the Euro-crisis forcibly demonstrates.

Debates and negotiations about the Euro-crisis between Member states and the EU institutions are of course highly political, but only insofar as burden-sharing between Member states is concerned: who has to pay for whom? The real substance of the debate, i.e. how to save the Euro, which measures to take, is presented as a technical, even technocratic issue, devoid of political or ideological choices. The medicine is known; it is just a matter of convincing the unwilling patient to swallow it. Certainly the purpose cannot be doubted: the Euro must be saved.

But is that really true? Of course the Euro must be saved – but not as an end in itself. The Euro also is a political project and a symbol of European integration, but first of all it is but a means – a means to enhance the security, prosperity, freedom and equality of European citizens. When they are under threat, by massive youth unemployment for example, the answer cannot be to take away unemployment benefits from the young while simultaneously cutting the salaries of the parents who have to take charge of them. Austerity measures should read cutting abuse of the social system without cutting the system as such, as well as investing in growth, shoring up families’ buying power, and increasing revenue by addressing those who until now contributed too little. Austerity cannot just be about the size of the budget – the key is how the budget is spent.

If however under the banner of austerity the Euro is saved in such a manner that the prosperity and equality of European citizens are destroyed, the end result will be counterproductive for the European project as such. The internal social contract will be broken and citizens will no longer feel committed to the Union and the governments that did not respect it. Great internal instability, possibly for years to come, will be the result. Saving the Euro the wrong way is as bad for the Union as not saving it at all.

It is equally bad for the position of the EU as an international actor. The strategic narrative of EU foreign policy cannot be maintained once the internal social contract, on the promotion of which it is based, is broken, for it will then no longer be credible, neither inside nor outside the EU. The EU will have lost its “soft power”. For sure, being a model for others to emulate is not sufficient, for too many, swayed by nationalism, radicalism, fundamentalism or just cynicism, simply no longer see Europe as a model. Attractiveness alone does not generate “soft power” – the EU must be seen to act upon its strategy. But for a proactive strategy to be possible, preserving and even deepening the social model within the Union does constitute an indispensable prerequisite.

If the EU does not manage to maintain its distinctive social model, its foreign policy will soon loose its distinctiveness as well, and Europe will become one international actor among others, and a weak one at that. Europe will simply no longer be Europe.

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is director of the Europe in the World Programme at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, and member of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group.

Is This David Cameron's Munich?

Julian Lindley-French — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 13:50:18 -0600

It is not without historical irony that the only other country to stand with Britain over the Fiscal Compact at yesterday's EU Summit was the Czech Republic which Chamberlain sold out to Hitler at Munich in 1938. Last night Martin Callanan, the leader of British Conservatives in the European Parliament accused the Prime Minister of “appeasement”. Other Tory Euro-sceptics have accused Cameron of a “retreat” from his 9 December stand when he refused to permit other EU member-states to use the European Court of Justice to enforce the new Fiscal Compact so beloved of Chancellor Merkel.

2012 is not 1938 and on the face of it a mechanism for enforcing greater fiscal discipline amongst the Eurozone members based on stringent austerity is something over which Britain and Germany should be able to agree. The problem is that Cameron seems to have got nothing in return for his ‘adjustment’ which is either shabby politicking, bad negotiating or both. Concessions are never offered in EU negotiations without something in return. London claims that it has secured German ‘assurances’ that Berlin will not press ahead with any new financial services tax. I spoke this morning to my Berlin contacts and as far as they are concerned Berlin has given no such ‘assurances’. Neville Chamberlain of course infamously returned from Munich with ‘assurances’.

However, Britain should have concerns and at the very least Cameron must understand the wider implications of yesterday’s concession should the new Compact ever become a ratified treaty (big if). A precedent has now been established whereby the powers of a German-led EU can now be dramatically increased without the need for a new treaty agreed by all EU member-states. In principle this means that ‘pioneer groups’ can press ahead in all areas of EU ‘competence’, such as defence with a precedent now established for the bypassing of national vetoes.

Cameron also appears to have accepted the principle of a Britain politically subordinate to Germany and France when they choose to act in the guise of the EU. He has partly justified this on Germany’s “fierce” determination to push through the Compact. Since when did German “fierceness” define British policy? If that is indeed the case then London has changed its position not out of pragmatism or principle, but out of weakness.

What all of this reveals is the lack of a Cameron political strategy for Europe other than to keep his increasingly wretched coalition together. What is he actually trying to achieve in Europe? His belief that Britain can influence the single market from outside the Eurozone is dangerous folly. Fiscal Union will sooner or later close the political space that Britain has hitherto occupied. At some point Britain will have to decide; join the Euro (or its survivor currency) or leave the EU. The alternative is more taxation without representation.

The trouble is that whilst Cameron is usually tactically savvy he is strategically crass. Even on 9 December he sold his stand as being solely to safeguard Britain’s financial industry when the political principles at stake and upon which he should have stood were far, far bigger. He simply does not see the bigger picture. Consequently, there is a danger that even if there is a back-room ‘deal’ with Germany it will be seen by other Europeans as the abandonment of all political principle in the face of German pressure; the worst kind of wobbly weakness.

Publicly Cameron places much emphasis on legal redress. Foreign Secretary William Hague said over the weekend that, “If the use of the EU treaties at any point threatens Britain's fundamental rights under the EU treaties, or damages our vital interests such as the single market, then we would have to take action about that, including legal action”. This morning I went to the web-site of the same European Court of Justice (ECJ) who will be charged with ensuring fair play. Page 86 of the 2010 Annual Report should make for sober reading in Whitehall’s shabby corridors. Under the heading “Actions for Failure of a Member State to Fulfill its Obligations 2006-2010” it shows the UK in breach 21 times, Germany in breach 54 times and France in breach 63 times. Unless the ECJ really places justice above politics (which would be a first) some will be more equal before European law than others.

That said, given the dangers of a catastrophic Euro collapse Cameron’s ‘pragmatic scepticism’ should for the moment be given the benefit of the doubt. However, he must be held to account when he says he will be watching developments “like a hawk’’. Time and again I have heard British Prime Ministers cover retreat with such empty rhetoric. The dangers of a Eurozone collapse are very real and radical action is indeed needed, but not at the cost of turning the Union into an Imperium and Britain into a satellite of Germany.

Sadly, the most worrying of precedents is that henceforth Realpolitik will be the currency of change in the EU and much of it driven by German domestic opinion.

Is this Cameron’s Munich? No, not yet…but it could become so.

Julian Lindley-French is Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy, Fellow of Respublica in London, Associate Fellow of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council. He is also a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the NATO Defence College in Rome. This essay first appeared on his personal blog, Lindley-French's Blog Blast. Photo credit: Getty Images.

Managing US-Russian Relations During the Year of Political Transitions: A Perspective from Moscow

Jeremy Liu — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 13:42:52 -0600

On January 27, the Atlantic Council held an off-the-record discussion on developments in Russia and in US-Russian relations with Dr. Sergey Rogov, the director for the Institute for US and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Ambassador Richard Burt, Senior Advisor at McLarty Associates and member of the Atlantic Council's Board of Directors, participated in the discussion, which was moderated by Dr. Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council and a member of its Strategic Advisors Group.

Remarks made in this discussion reflected on how the Cold War and subsequent developments continue to affect US-Russian relations, the reset and where it may go, how domestic developments in Russia and the United States, including the elections that take place in 2012, may affect relations, and other current and upcoming issues. These included the rise of Asia, other geostrategic trends, and how they affect the relationship and perceptions of it in capitals; nuclear weapons, common proliferation concerns, and ballistic missile defense; Russia’s WTO accession, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and human rights, and prospects for economic cooperation; and Afghanistan.

Featuring

Dr. Sergey Rogov
Director, Institute for US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

With discussant

Ambassador Richard Burt
Senior Advisor, McLarty Associates

Moderated by

Dr. Harlan Ullman
Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council

Deterring Iran: The Return to American Statecraft

Julian Lindley-French — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 12:11:02 -0600

On the tomb of Tamburlaine, King of Persia, there is a dread inscription, “When I rise, the world will tremble”. Faced with Tehran’s seeming determination to develop nuclear weapons the march towards confrontation this week quickened. After threats from Iran to close the oil-vital Straits of Hormuz an American aircraft carrier was joined in the Gulf by British and French warships. Sabres are rattling. The EU placed a ban on all new oil contracts with Iran and froze the assets of the Iranian Central Bank. Whilst not overtly supporting US and EU moves the Chinese Ambassador to London signalled Beijing’s concern that should Iran not develop nuclear weapons. And, on 29th January, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) will arrive in Iran “to resolve all outstanding substantive issues”.

So, war is imminent. No. Forget the pattern of the last fifteen years. There will be no sudden missile strikes just yet. Deterring Iran will take a lot more than old-fashioned sabre-rattling or Cruise compulsion. Now is the time for the five elements of good old-fashioned American statecraft: the formal and clear enunciation of reasoned and reasonable goals upon which to construct a political coalition; the legitimisation of those goals through the United Nations Security Council, including the use of “all necessary means” if Iran does not comply; the formalisation of process via a grouping that will include the major global and regional players; the crafting of a clear set of criteria for the application of all elements of coercion on the spectrum from diplomatic to military action; and the building of a popular coalition through effective strategic communications, much of it via social media.

However, America is of itself insufficient to prevail. The unipolar moment has truly passed. Hard though it is to believe Europeans must also re-learn the art of strategic statecraft lost in the daily haggle that is the EU. Indeed, whilst the EU may have notched up its sanctions regime, there is little or no appetite amongst European allies to move beyond that. After ten years of Afghanistan and Iraq Europe is retreating behind the thin walls of a rhetorical fortress. Even the most pressing of dangers are unlikely to shift the focus from not-saving the Euro with only Britain and France to any meaningful extent still left in the military business.

The US is moving away from a terrorism-related, global policing mission creep back to a much more traditional strategy of strike and punish. Fortress Europe/Strike America is in essence a new strategic modesty driven by precipitous economic decline and reinforced by the rise of China and others onto the world stage no longer willing to accept Western liberal criteria as the basis for global security governance. Threaten military action too soon and America will find itself isolated. Act too late and the world will have changed for the immeasurably worse. Iran does pose a strategic threat.

However, for credible pressure to be built on Tehran whilst agreement within the West is the sine qua non such a ‘plan’ (I cannot stand ‘road-map’ as they never go anywhere) must also be worked up with an unlikely coalition including China, India, Russia and critically the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Israel’s critical stake can of course only be uttered in hushed Washington corridors, but managing Tel Aviv will for obvious reasons be critical to American statecraft.

In short, Iran is the first real test of a new world order in which institutions such as the United Nations whilst important to the legitimisation of all attempts to coerce Iran to desist will be secondary to the great power politics that is driving systemic change. In that context Europe must decide if it still in the game or merely the powerless led. There is a world beyond the Euro.

The alternative is stark. Iran will get the ‘bomb’ steering a course through the wide gap that today exists in credible and effective global security governance. If Iran succeeds then the world will be very different from the instant Tehran announces its membership of the nuclear club. Indeed, it is hard to see either Israel or Saudi Arabia accepting such a step change in Iran’s power. The old rationalism of mutually-assured destruction that suffused the Cold War will have little place in the Middle East. The clock is very clearly ticking towards conflict.

To many Americans this call for American statecraft will sound European, woolly and messy, but it is simply reality; the consequence of the world in which the West must now enact its strategic business - patient politics of give-and-take. For, as Christopher Marlowe writes in his epic Tamburlaine the Great, “Wilt thou have war, then shake the blade; if peace, restore it to my hands again, And I will sheathe it, and confirm the same”.

Atlantic Council SAG Members Nominated for Duke of Westminster's Medal for Military Literature

Jason Harmala — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 09:53:50 -0600

The Oxford Handbook of War, edited by Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group members Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer, has been nominated for the prestigious Duke of Westminster’s Medal for Military Literature awarded by the Royal United Services Institute.

The 736 page volume from Oxford University Press features contributions of forty leading thinkers, policy-makers and practitioners from across the globe - Brazil, China, Europe, India, and the United States--including chapters from the British and Dutch Chiefs of Defense Staff, as well as a former US Ambassador to NATO and NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

The Handbook explores the history, theory, ethics and practice of war. The Handbook first considers the fundamental causes of war, before reflecting on the moral and legal aspects of war. Theories on the practice of war lead into an analysis of the strategic conduct of war and non Western ways of war. The heart of the Handbook is a compelling analysis of the military conduct of war which is juxtaposed with consideration of technology, economy, industry, and war. In conclusion the volume looks to the future of this apparently perennial feature of human interaction.

Why Britain Can Never Accept German Leadership

Julian Lindley-French — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 10:28:47 -0600

Britain will never accept German leadership even though Germany will emerge from the economic crisis as Europe’s leading power. History is still far too close for that ever to happen.

When I made that assertion in my in my blog of last week from the No Snow Meeting in Lithuania, with its heavy Churchillian overtones, some of you rightly gave me flak (excuse the pun) over that statement because in isolation it came across as German-bashing. So let me expand on my analysis but put it in a more positive context and explain why a new political partnership between Britain and Germany is vital for both Germany and Europe. Indeed, with another Eurozone kerfuffle about to happen it is important that Berlin accepts and understands that any attempt to shackle Britain will fail.

There are three essential factors: economic, political and military.

Economic: Britain is too powerful and too different an economic actor to accept sole German charge of Europe’s economic future. A range of respected economic commentators, including Goldman Sachs and the Paris School of Economics, suggest that by 2025 the British economy will be significantly bigger than that of France and not much smaller than that of Germany.

Political: Germany, ever haunted by its Nazi past, will rightly seek to exercise leadership via the European Union. In such circumstances the European Commission would become a kind of civil service with the European Council reduced to a weak version of the US Senate or British House of Lords. So many countries will be indebted to Berlin that German leadership will reach into the national political and economic life of other European countries far more extensively than, say, the Americans during the Cold War. Indeed, the EU’s writ runs far wider than NATO’s. There must be a loyal opposition to Germany and that can only be Britain.

Military: As Germany becomes more powerful it will become less military – history again. The security and defense of Europe could well be put at risk. This is not least because the US is signaling the beginning of a partial withdrawal from Europe. Thus, the defense of Europe is dangerously weak even as dangerous change takes place around Europe’s borders. As they look beyond Afghanistan both the US and UK will shift away from a continental strategy focused on Europe towards a maritime strategy that goes beyond Europe. The British for a whole host of military-strategic, intelligence and cultural reasons will follow the Americans whatever happens in Europe. At least this will also mean that at least one European country retaining a commitment to big defense, whatever the short-term cuts to the British defense budget.

Germany will champion a new continental strategy, probably in the guise of a new European strategic culture that will be military-lite in the extreme. The fact and nature of German power will thus cede the defense leadership of Europe to the British. And, indeed the French, if London and Paris can learn to stop scoring ridiculously cheap political points off each other. Germany will thus need Britain to lead the serious defense of Europe.

Therefore, Germany needs London to have the political vision and ambition to forge a political partnership with Berlin that would itself legitimize German leadership across much of Europe. That is indeed the private message I am getting from all my trips of late across Europe and why the prospect of Britain disengaging from the EU causes so much concern. Thankfully, there is quite a lot happening behind the scenes that may lead to such a political accommodation.

If not, a decisive shift in the European political balance of power towards Berlin would inevitably push Britain towards the EU exit. Indeed, by accepting German leadership Britain would be tacitly accepting a European Imperium. Britain would over time be reduced to super-Belgium; forced to render unto Caesar what Caesar wanted, not what Caesar deserved nor indeed needed. By Britain standing firm Germany is and must be forced to deal with London as a Great Power, not another European satellite, however irritating that may appear to some in Berlin.

However, to realize such a political partnership London must re-discover grand strategy. In effect, Britain must become to Germany what France has been for many years to the US: difficult but necessary. Whitehall’s acquiescence to Washington might have bought Britain important access to key American defense assets, but it has too often come at the price of strategic subservience and an appallingly risk-averse, strategic political culture. That must end.

No Snow in Lithuania

Julian Lindley-French — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 09:45:19 -0600

The Snow Meeting is famous. Every January Lithuania brings together prime ministers, foreign and defence ministers from across what is increasingly referred to as the Nordic Baltic region, together with senior American, French, and German officials and commentators. The British were of course not there. Shame. Thankfully, Blogonaut Friendly-Clinch was in full Churchillian flow at one point asserting that “Britain would NEVER accept German leadership” (adopt suitable Churchillian tones). The old man would have been proud of me.

As I draft this I am gazing across a wistful winter lake at a real-life, make-believe castle dusted by the late snow of an unusually warm Lithuanian winter. We did the rounds of the usual suspect subjects – one feels the warm breath of Russia always in Lithuania, NATO was no-goed, although for once I may have come up with a good idea for the forthcoming Chicago Summit by suggesting the Strategic Concept be reinforced by a Strategic Contract. The European Onion was peeled, skinned and dissected…again, and much time was spent considering America’s retreat from Europe. The Grim Banker sat silent in the corner.

However, what really struck me was the significance of a Nordic Baltic Grouping. What could it possibly mean? The “Nordic-Baltic 8”, or NB8 as it known in the awful parlance of international wonkery, sounds like a group of wrongly-convicted political prisoners. On the face of it there is little in common between them other than a large expanse of water – the Baltic Sea…and perhaps yet another European idea in search of a bureaucracy. Three reasons:

The first is Germany. All roads lead to Berlin. The many new bridge, road and railway projects discussed all had one thing in common – Germany. To appropriately mix my metaphors Berlin is cementing its political leadership of Europe by hard-wiring Germany into the physical centre of Europe. The Nordic Baltic 8 flank Germany to the north. As such the ‘8’ have very little to do with balancing Russia, which was seen more irritant than threat, but influencing Germany. The old East-West European axis is being replaced by a new North-South axis with Germany the 'pivot' (this month's fashionable word in the strategy boutiques).

The second reason is energy and here Russia will be an issue. Massive oil and gas reserves are being discovered in the Barents Sea and Greenland, still nominally Danish. An arc of energy will soon stretch from Canada to Russia via the ‘High North’. The Nordic region in particular will become the epicentre of the new energy geopolitics. This could also lead to renewed tensions with Russia, both in terms of competition over the exploitation of said resources and because over time Europe could well be weaned off Russian energy. The Kremlin needs high oil and gas incomes to maintain its grip. If Russia sneezes the Baltic States catch cold.

The third reason represents nothing less than a revolution in strategic affairs and will turn the world on its head. As the Arctic ice melts the fabled North West Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific will become real, linked to a new North East Passage via Northern Norway. This change to global trading and energy shipping patterns will be so profound as to revolutionise the way the world makes money. Norway’s North Cape will become the new Cape of Good Hope. Canada’s Baffin Island will become the new Cape Horn. The Middle East will be by-passed together with much of the piracy-strewn Indian and Pacific Oceans. In time China, Japan, Russia and Central Asia might well look north for their ports and trade routes, rather than south and east.

So, implicit in this modest meeting of modest people in a beautiful place was not just another regional wrangle, but the forthcoming revolution in strategic affairs that will do much to define the twenty-first century world. This makes America’s decision to retreat from Europe all the more silly, just as it makes Europe’s decision to retreat from strategic reality all the more dangerous. Indeed, the world will not just ‘pivot’ on Asia, it will also ‘pivot’ on the two High Norths of Continental North America and Europe; the new Super-Highways for the ‘Global Commons’. A meaningful US-European strategic partnership will be critical to the security of both.

Therefore, the transatlantic relationship will be as important in the twenty-first century as it was in the twentieth and the Nordic-Baltic states will be on the front-line. When I come to the Baltic States I am always reminded why we need NATO and the European Union, which is today little apparent in the old, tired West of Europe. The proud, decent people of Lithuania deserve our support and our solidarity.

Or maybe it is just that the cold, clear air of Europe’s east clears my befuddled strategic brain. Shame there was no real snow though.