Viktor Yushchenko

Two Viktors and Two “Signals”

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 20 Sep 2011 12:03:16 -0500

A Kyiv court was set to sentence opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko to a lengthy prison sentence last week but unexpectedly the trial was postponed to September 27 after the US and EU sent strong warnings to the Viktor Yanukovych administration to halt these politically motivated trials. Not coincidentally the postponement is until only two days before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw where the EU would have been embarrassed if Tymoshenko had by then received a lengthy prison sentence.

If the court only pardons her, the issue will not be resolved and negotiations will not be completed. The EU has demanded that Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka free and rehabilitate (i.e. give them no criminal record) political prisoners and the EU has the same demand in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s negotiations for a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) are dependent on Tymoshenko and other opposition leaders walking away from the court with no sentence and no criminal record so that ex-political prisoners (the same is true in both Ukraine and Belarus) can participate in future elections. If opposition leaders are not allowed to participate in Belarus and Ukraine, the EU has stated that it will not recognize these elections.

For the second time in five years Kyiv’s domestic policies are again undermining Euro-Atlantic integration when Ukraine has received a “signal” of an open door from NATO or the EU.

At numerous international conferences in the last two decades I have heard Ukrainian politicians and officials plead “Give us a signal” to NATO and the EU and we will then do reforms. I have never understood why a country needs a “signal” to do reforms that are for the good of the country.

All post-communist countries began their reforms before they received “signals” from the EU. Poland, for example, launched its reforms in 1989-1990 and joined the EU in 2004 while Croatia began its reforms in 2000 and will join next year. Georgia has never received any “signals” from the EU and since the 2003 Rose Revolution has implemented countless reforms and largely eliminated corruption.

But, what Ukrainian politicians and officials ignore is that Ukraine has received two “signals” in the last five years from NATO and the EU – and on both occasions has failed to grasp these opportunities.

In 2006, Ukraine received a “signal” from the Bush administration and NATO that it could join a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Riga summit that year. This could have led to NATO membership by 2010, the last year of Yushchenko’s first term in office. As in Eastern Europe, NATO membership would have put Ukraine on the path to EU membership.

In 2009-2011, Ukraine received a “signal” from the EU that it could receive a DCFTA as part of the Association Agreement. The DCFTA is not the equivalent of EU membership (which is not on offer to Ukraine) but it would integrate Ukraine into the EU.

Both Viktors (Yushchenko and Yanukovych) did not prioritize these two “signals.” The question is why and what does show for policy makers?

Ukraine’s elites on both sides of the country’s major political fence do not prioritize national interests. In 2006 and 2010-2011 the most important objectives of both Viktors was personal conflict, revenge, and personal enrichment (that is, corruption especially in the energy sector).

In 2006, Yushchenko prioritized not blocking Tymoshenko returning to head the government over an important state visit by President Bush in June and entry into a NATO MAP in November. A rather easy requirement that Yushchenko had to accomplish after the March 2006 elections was to establish an “orange” government and coalition.

In 2010-2011, Yanukovych prioritized personal revenge against Tymoshenko, who was arrested on politically motivated charges and has been in prison since August 5, over the EU’s DCFTA. Tymoshenko’s 2007-2010 government removed the opaque RosUkrEnergo gas intermediary from the 2009 gas contract. RUE was a major cash cow for the ‘gas lobby’ that received important positions in Yanukovych’s presidential administration and government.

The EU has warned Yanukovych that Tymoshenko's imprisonment will derail the DCFTA, particularly as after negotiations are completed it has then to be ratified by the European Parliament and all 27 member states. The European Peoples Party (EPP), which has been the most vocal critic of democratic regression in Ukraine and Tymoshenko's arrest (her Fatherland party is an associate member of the EPP) has elected leaders in 17 of the EU’s 27 member states.

A second factor is that Ukraine’s elites operate within a short term framework while major foreign policy decisions such as the NATO MAP or EU’s DCFTA are medium to long term state projects. Therefore, domestic policies are never integrated with declared foreign policy objectives.

As a consequence, the West has become exasperated by the empty foreign policy declarations of elites for “returning to Europe” which are never matched by domestic reforms and a real (not virtual) battle against corruption. This, in turn, has led to Ukraine fatigue in the West under both Viktors.

Under Yushchenko, the West became totally exasperated by the inability of “orange” elites to work together and in 2008-2009, the last two years of Yushchenko’s term in office, by constant quarrelling between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko and unstable “orange” governments and coalitions.

Under Yanukovych the West has become exasperated by the flawed attempt at uniting “Putinism” with European integration.

In Eastern Europe countries acted as “super-Europeans” on the way to EU membership, fulfilling every demand made by Brussels, and then only relaxed their reforms after they joined the EU. The Yanukovych administration apparently believes it should approach this issues in the opposite manner by showing that they are poor Europeans on the path to the DCFTA while consoling Brussels with the words “Don’t worry we will become “super-Europeans” once we are inside.

As every policy maker in international affairs knows, the greatest leverage any international organization has upon a country’s reforms is when that country remains outside that body. That is why the EU laments the fact they let in Bulgaria and Romania too early. Leverage is far less after country’s are inside international organization; neither the EU, NATO, or the Council of Europe has a mechanism to expel members if they become “bad Europeans.”

Therefore, the problem for Ukraine is not the need for a “signal” from the West to launch reforms but the quality of elites on both sides of the major political divide that Ukrainian voters elect. After two decades as an independent state, Ukrainian voters have yet to elect leaders who are genuinely committed to Euro-Atlantic integration. Both Viktors received “signals” and failed to use them for the good of their countries.

Taras Kuzio is an Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Visiting Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, in Washington D.C. He edits Ukraine Analyst. Photo credit: ITAR-TASS.

A Thaw in Ukraine?

Adrian Karatnycky — Mon, 11 Apr 2011 12:24:28 -0500

The recent indictment of former President Leonid Kuchma for abuse of power in the case of the murder in 2000 of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze has sent shockwaves through the Ukrainian body politic.

Indeed, the opening of a criminal process against a former patron of current President Viktor Yanukovych is something few expected, as Kuchma was protected from prosecution during the five-year presidency Viktor Yushchenko. Neither Yulia Tymoshenko nor Yushchenko, two politicians whose rise to power was fueled by public discontent over the Gongadze murder, proved capable of doing what has occurred under President Yanukovych.

For some, the charges are said to be a part of an arcane and cynical plot that will eventually find Kuchma innocent and put the matter to rest. But that is unlikely. The resurrection of this case, its public humiliation of Kuchma, and the renewed spotlight on crimes that occurred during his reign is having the opposite effect. It is raising Ukrainian—and international—demands that a transparent and fair process occur. Any hint of a coverup will only undermine Yanukovych’s image and this is something his advisors certainly understand. As importantly, the international community knows that of over 140,000 cases brought to trial in Ukraine last year a little over a hundred ended in acquittals. Thus, the news for President Kuchma appears grim, as does the accumulating weight of evidence.

Taken on its own, the launching of a case against President Kuchma, a pillar of Ukraine’s establishment, defies reason and requires the weaving complex conspiracy theories involving motives, such as revenge by Yanukovych for Kuchma’s alleged abandonment during the Orange Revolution or the coveting of the vast fortune the Kuchma family has accumulated.

But recent trends point to another explanation. There are clear signals of the beginning of a political thaw that reflects a return to the policy course many expected at the outset of the Yanukovych presidency. These early hopes, however, were dashed by signs of authoritarian behavior by police against protestors, the launching of criminal cases against former Prime Minister Tymoshenko and other opposition leaders, and security service efforts to intimidate university rectors and leaders of NGOs.

Such authoritarian acts obscured positive policies in the areas of deregulation, tax policy, the opening of corruption cases against ruling party officials and political allies of the president, the downsizing of government, fiscal stability, and the establishment of a more effective administrative system. Authoritarian policies also strained relations with Europe at a time when Ukraine’s leadership is singalling that it is firmly committed to a deep and comprehensive free trade area with Europe and an association agreement despite Russian financial incentives and other blandishments.

As a result of this commitment to a pro-European course, we are seeing unmistakable signs of modest political liberalization and a policy shift aimed at reducing domestic Ukrainian political tensions.

The appointment to the Yanukovych administration of respected journalist Darka Chepak-- a founding member of the “Stop Censorship” movement-- as the president’s press spokesman and the naming of Maryna Stavniychuk, former top legal aide to President Yushchenko and a respected member of the Venice Commission (a European rule of law monitor), as a key advisor underscore this shift.

Other signs of the thaw include recent government responsiveness to the demands of mass protests by students angry at the introduction of new fees, small entrepreneurs dismayed by tax code revisions, and educators angry at cutbacks.

The chastising of the highly divisive Russophile education minister Dmytro Tabachnyk for his dismal relations with educators as well as the Yanukovych’s clear support for testing as the sole criterion for entrance into institutions of higher learning opens the door to his possible dismissal. Such a move—couple with Yanukovych’s recent reiteration on April 7^th that Ukrainian will remain as the sole state language for the country—would represent a further course correction, a move away from policies provoking tensions between the country’s Ukrainian-speaking West and Russophone East.

Yet another unmistakable signal is the improvement of the media environment at state owned Channel One TV, for years a government propaganda vehicle. Now the channel is offering prime time news programs hosted by one of Ukraine’s most respected journalists, Savik Shuster who consistently gives equal time to civil society and opposition leaders.

The recent flurry of prime time appearances by opposition leader Tymoshenko on channels friendly to the government as well as on independent tv stations and the decision to allow her to travel to Brussels while under a pending criminal case is another sign of change. So, too, was passage with Yanukovych’s support of Ukraine’s first comprehensive freedom of information legislation.

In this context the opening of a criminal case against President Kuchma seems less of anomaly and more a part of a pattern by President Yanukovych to restore the trust of his people, of Europe and of the US as he seeks to move his country closer to European integration.

The new trends in Kiev, however, are far from irreversible. Just as was the case under the Orange government, there are powerful rent-seeking interest groups that continue to use their presence in and influence over the government to advance their narrow interests. Their avarice needs to be controlled and pushed back as much as do efforts to resort to “old school” political intimidation. At the same time positive trends need to be understood and encouraged when they emerge. Thus, just as when he was sharply criticized by Western leaders as Ukraine began straying from democratic practices, President Yanukovych now should be saluted for the recent steps he has undertaken in the political sphere, though they are modest in scope. And Ukraine’s President should be encouraged to continue his government’s hard look at the crimes of the Kuchma era as well to deepen his attacks on corruption by political allies in Kiev and in the Crimea.

As importantly, Yanukovych and Ukraine should be given clear-cut signals by the international community that such positive trends by Ukraine will open the door to full-fledged integration into the European Union.

Adrian Karatnycky is Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the US and coordinator of its Ukraine-North America Dialogue.

Yanukovych Report Card: One Year of Power

Adrian Karatnycky — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 10:24:58 -0600

On the first anniversary of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, it is entirely appropriate to offer an overall report card on the performance of Ukraine’s new leader and his government team. This article attempts to do so by comparing the actions and policies of Yanukovych and his Prime Minister Mykola Azarov with the state of affairs under the divided rule of President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in 2009. Given constitutional changes between the two sets of leaders, this article will in effect contrast the Yanukovych presidency with the Yushcheno-Tymoshenko leadership.

In the hyper-polarized environment that is Ukrainian politics, such attempts may seem futile to some. And I have no doubt that many partisan readers are inclined to see the two sets of leaders in black and white terms. But I do hope objective readers will find this effort a useful and honest exercise at assessing the strengths and weaknesses of both presidents and governments. At the very least, I offer this anniversary review as a means of stimulating intelligent discussion and civil debate.

I have no doubt that even the most objective readers are sure to take issue with some of the discrete grades and judgments in this report card on 26 dimensions of policy and practice. Nevertheless, I hope the overall averages and the scores in the five broad categories I have adopted for this report card—Economic Policy, Foreign Relations, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Culture and Education— helps us get a handle on where Ukraine stands under the leadership of Yanukovych and on how much Ukraine has and hasn’t changed.

Overall Findings

The overall findings show a cumulative average grade of B-minus for Yanukovych’s rule in power, in contrast to a grade of C for 2009 under the divided rule of Yushchenko-Tymoshenko. However, the grades in each of the five categories reveal more substantial differences: there are marked improvements in economic policy and economic performance under the Yanukovych presidency; a notable though not dramatic deterioration in democratic practices and human rights under the new leadership; somewhat better results in foreign relations, significantly better performance in the functioning and effectiveness of government; and poorer performance in the broad sphere of culture, education, and language policy.

With this summary, let’s take a closer, annotated look at the scores in the five major categories. In each subcategory grade, the better performance is noted in bold and italicized form.

The Economy and Economic Policy

	Yanukovych/Azarov	Yuschenko/Tymoshenko
	2010-11	2009-10

Privatization	B	D
Fiscal Responsibility	B+	C
Economic Growth	B	D
Inflation	B	B
Tax Policy	C	D
Pension Reform	Inc.	F

Average Grade	B	C-

Economic performance and policy have seen a marked improvement in the last year. In part this is a consequence of real policy improvements, and the global economic rebound. Whatever the reasons, the first year of the Yanukovych presidency has represented a real turnaround from the disastrous economic state of affairs of 2009.

Under President Yanukovych, serious efforts at privatization have once again begun. Even with questions presented by the way the tender for the privatization of Ukrtelecom was handled, a sale that generates serious new revenues for a strapped government is better than no privatization at all. More importantly, there are signs that the government is moving toward opening up shale gas exploration to private sector participation. All this is a far better performance than the stasis under Yushchenko-Tymoshenko.

Even serious critics of the new government believe that revenue projections in the new budget represent a serious step forward from 2009. The fact that the IMF resumed its cooperation with Ukraine in 2010 is a further sign of a more responsible fiscal approach.

Serious improvements in GDP performance also cannot be disputed. Like the Yanukovych team or not, you cannot deny that a 15 percent decline, among Europe’s worst performances in 2009, is far worse than growth of 4.2 percent in 2010.

Inflation is moderately high in 2010, but generally under control as was the case in 2009.

Pension reform is likely to be ambitious if one is to judge by soundings coming from Yanukovych and the government. However, until action is taken, the Yanukovych team gets an incomplete. By contrast, the previous government showed no political will in addressing the problems posed by a corrupted pension system that paid huge dividends for a select few and refused to address the growing gap between revenues and expenditures in a system that unrealistically encourages women to retire at 55.

Democracy and Human Rights

	Yanukovych/Azarov	Yuschenko/Tymoshenko
	2010-11	2009-10

Elections and Political Parties	B-	A-
Adherence to Constitution	C	B
Media Freedoms	B-	B
Civil Society / Assembly	B-	B
Judicial System	C	C

Average Grade	C+	B

Overall, the last year has seen a measurable though modest decline in democratic practices and human rights.

The 2010 presidential race under President Yushchenko was open, competitive and was judged to be free and fair. Local elections during the Yanukovych were a step away from best practices. In some cities very close results failed to trigger rigorous recounts as courts shied away from protecting the public’s democratic rights. The process, moreover, was not helped by the fact that the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc was off the ballot in Western Ukraine, in part as a result of questionable legal decisions and in part because of internal disputes inside the BYUT camp. Political party freedoms were not advanced by the perception that anti-corruption cases are restricting the ability of Ms. Tymoshenko to move freely about the country to promote her party’s popularity.

A constitutional court decision returning significant executive power to President Yanukovych and in effect contradicting court rulings that consecrated the reverse under President Yushchenko eroded faith in constitutional practices and undermined confidence in the apolitical nature of judicial decisions. But then again, in 2000, George Bush won the US presidency from Al Gore in a Supreme Court decision that reflected the political divide in the highest court of one of the world’s longest lasting and stable democracies.

In the media and public information sphere, there was less of an erosion than partisans might think. News programs have become less hard-hitting than in 2009, but immensely popular political talk shows, which go on for hours in prime time afford all Ukrainians who care significant access to opposition views. And a new law on public access to information, at the very least, gives reporters and citizens broader legal rights to information about government activity and policymaking.

Civil society continued to show significant vibrancy during 2010, despite the more apparent interest shown in its activities by the State Security service, the SBU. Protests proliferated, as students, opposition parties, and small business leaders protested vigorously around the country, the latter with some effect on tax policy, suggesting freedom of assembly remains strong and resistant to government encroachment.

Alas, the judicial system continues to suffer from external political influence, high levels of alleged corruption, and laws on the books since the dark days of Soviet rule. But that is hardly different from the state of affairs prior to President Yanukovych’s coming to office. The one difference, here, is that before judges maneuvered between the competing interests of Ms. Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko, and legal gridlock ruled.

Foreign Relations

	Yanukovych/Azarov	Yuschenko/Tymoshenko
	2010-11	2009-10

Russia	B-	D
EU	B-	C
IMF	B+	D
US	B+	C
Foreign Investment	C	C-

Average Grade	B-	C-

Overall, Ukraine has seen measurable improvements in its international relations. President Yanukovych has been a frequent flyer with numerous trips to Asia, the EU, the US and Russia. In part this improvement is occasioned by the sense in foreign capitals that there is one place where policy is made in Ukraine. This contrasts positively to the fatigue and exasperation that greeted the endless efforts of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to undermine one another at home and abroad.

After the deep concessions made by Ukraine to Russia as a result of the prolongation of the Russo-Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet agreement, many feared that Yanukovych is ready to erode Ukraine’s sovereignty. Instead, he has spent the last year pursuing pragmatic relations with Russia, without surrendering national interest. By contrast, in 2009, Ukraine’s relations with Russia suffered from excessively harsh and escalating rhetoric emanating from both Presidents and from excessive concessions made by Ukraine in a far-reaching gas deal between the two country’s prime ministers, Vladimir Putin and Yulia Tymoshenko.

Relations with the European Union have improved in practical terms under the Yanukovych team as free trade and open visa regime discussions move forward. Greater progress, however, has been stifled by setbacks in human rights and the negative reaction from Europe that has greeted the widescale legal cases against a broad swath of the former Tymoshenko government.

The resumption of IMF funding and cooperation under the Yanukovych presidency represents an important turnaround in relations with the world’s major international financial institutions.

US-Ukraine relations are on an upswing. Ukraine’s contributions to international nuclear security, its openness to US participation in shale gas exploration, and its own reset of relations with Russia are welcomed in Washington. While criticisms of human rights erosions have increased, the overall state of relations is significantly better than during the last dysfunctional year of Orange rule, when Ukraine fatigue prevailed.

Alas, there is little improvement as yet in the flow of foreign investment into Ukraine as corporate raids, weak enforcement of shareholder rights and property rights continue to trump a market that offers potential for high returns.

Government Reform

	Yanukovych/Azarov	Yuschenko/Tymoshenko
	2010-11	2009-10

Stability	B+	B-
Effective Chain of Command	A-	D
Corruption	C	C
Anti-Corruption Efforts	B	D
Administrative Reform	B	F

Average Grade	B	C-

Overall, the area of government reform has seen significant improvement under Yanukovych. Policymaking and decision-making is more clear cut. Government rule in more stable, marred primarily by a partly unnecessary polarization in language and national identity policy. The chain of command is clear cut and effective. Corruption remains an endemic and generic problem at all levels, as it did under Orange rule. Serious anti-corruption campaigns have targeted pro- and anti-government officials, alike, though the latter campaigns are marred by the growing international perception that they are motivated by the desire to attack political opponents. Still, Yanukovych appears committed to attacking a system which shakes down citizens and the private sector from top to bottom.

At the same time, the government deserves high marks for its commitment to administrative reform and its determination to pare down the size of government. Fewer bureaucrats means a more rational use of personnel, and, perhaps, a reduction of intrusive inspections of small business that retard productivity and give greater scope for corruption. This contrasts favorably with the failure to claw back at a growing government bureaucracy during the Yushchenko years.

Culture and Education

	Yanukovych/Azarov	Yuschenko/Tymoshenko
	2010-11	2009-10

National Unity / Identity	C	C
Educational Policy	D	B
Ukrainian Language	C	B-
Promotion of Culture	B-	B
Euro 2012	A-	C+

Average Grade	C	B-

If not for the disastrous educational policies pursued by Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk, his efforts at eroding university autonomy and his needless polarization of relations between Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers, the Yanukovych presidency would have a higher grade in this sphere.

National unity continues to be undermined by the absence of an intelligent narrative that encompasses both the Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking communities. Under Yushchenko, Ukraine pursued a Right-bank narrative with the celebration of polarizing movements such as the OUN. Under President Yanukovych, the narrative has tilted toward the right bank, and appointments of a Communist to head the Institute of National Memory suggest a tilt in the direction of the Soviet narrative. Both approaches have undermined the shaping of a unifying narrative which would emphasize the suffering that Ukraine’s inhabitants have met as a result of the historical absence of statehood and emphasize the strong desire for autonomy that was present in both the Right and Left banks of Ukrainian politics through the centuries.

On the language sphere there is less than meets the eye, as efforts to make Russian the second state language appear unlikely. Moreover, Eastern Ukrainians continue to give preference to Russian, a fact left unchanged by the Ukrainization efforts of President Yushchenko.

On the cultural sphere, few state leaders could compete with President Yushchenko’s interest in folk culture and the arts.

By contrast, preparations for the Euro 2012 soccer championship have gathered dramatic steam as stadiums and roads are being built at an impressive pace. Allegations of cronyism in the awarding of infrastructure contracts persist, a fact largely unchanged from the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko years.

Conclusions

Overall, on the basis of this survey, the first year of the Yanukovych presidency represented a modest step forward for Ukraine. In some areas—government effectiveness, an improving economy, international relations, and administrative reforms—the progress over the last year has been tangible. In others - the state of the judiciary and human rights - serious problems require urgent attention.

If Yanukovych uses the next year to address growing international concerns about negative trends in the democracy sphere, places greater emphasis on building national unity between East and West by removing officials who polarize education needlessly, introduces a new generation of young managers into a pared-down government, tackles corruption in a way that allays worries about politically-motivated persecution, and addresses a criminal justice system largely unreformed since the Soviet era, he will be able to move from the real progress on the economy and effective governance, toward the shaping of a modern, European state. Having established a clear chain of command and made highly public declarations of his intention to transform Ukraine into a state that intends to be an integral part of the European Union, he has taken on a high stakes burden. And by concentrating power in the executive, he has let everyone in Ukraine and around the world know that he bears ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of his plans.

Adrian Karatnycky is Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council of the U.S. and an advisor to European and North American businesses. For over a decade he headed the US NGO Freedom House, directing its annual survey of Freedom in the World and developing its Nations in Transit, its pioneering annual assessment of the reform post-Communist world.

The A to F grade scale is, quite obviously, adapted from modified US and European Union academic usage. It is intended to roughly correspond to the 5 to 1 scale employed in Ukraine and other Eastern European states.

Stepan Bandera: Hero of Ukraine?

Alexander Motyl — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 08:31:37 -0500

Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s decision to confer the title of Hero of Ukraine on nationalist leader Stepan Bandera on Jan. 22 has unleashed a storm of outrage inside and outside Ukraine. Critics accuse Yushchenko of whitewashing a Nazi-era fascist and betraying the ideals of the Orange Revolution that brought him to power. Some hint darkly at a resurgence of fascism in Ukraine.

As always, the reality is more complicated. Just who was Bandera and what does he represent?

Bandera headed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, a nationalist movement that emerged in 1929 and took root in the Ukrainian-inhabited lands of eastern Poland in the 1930s. Neither Bandera nor the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was fascist, although both had fascist inclinations — particularly in 1940 and 1941. Fascists run or aspire to run existing nations. Nationalists, in contrast, aspire to create nations. Fascists are always authoritarians and chauvinists; nationalists can be liberals, democrats, Communists, authoritarians or fascists. Nationalists and fascists sometimes look alike, especially to conceptually challenged analysts, but their differences are greater than their similarities.

Like the Algerian nationalists in the National Liberation Front, the Palestinian nationalists in the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Jewish nationalists in the Irgun, the Ukrainian nationalists were unconditionally committed to national liberation and independent statehood. All four movements had hierarchical structures, authoritarian leanings and strong leaders and engaged in violence and terrorism against their perceived enemies. Bandera was the Ukrainian version of Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, not Adolf Hitler.

Bandera hoped for an alliance with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. But the Nazis failed to oblige, cracking down on the nationalists in mid-1941, imprisoning Bandera in Sachsenhausen and inadvertently saving him and his supporters from a collaborationist and possibly fascist fate. In the years that followed, the nationalists did fight both the Germans and the Soviets, but they also fought and killed thousands of Poles and participated in anti-Jewish actions. The nationalists abandoned their fascist leanings in the mid-1940s and then spearheaded a vicious anti-Soviet struggle through the mid-1950s. Bandera himself was assassinated by a Soviet agent in Munich in 1959.

Soviet propaganda always demonized the nationalists — not for their violations of human rights, of course, but because of their unconditional opposition to Stalinist rule. By the same token, Russians picked up on official cues and frequently insulted Ukrainians who dared to speak their own language or show any signs of nationalist pride by referring to them derogatorily as “Banderas.”

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, all of the newly independent states began questioning the Soviet historical narrative and constructing their own histories. What Soviet historians had assiduously ignored or distorted became the object of research, discussion and debate. The term Russian chauvinists had used derogatorily — “Banderas”— became a term of praise, much in the way that blacks appropriated the “N-word.”

For many Russians, the quest for historical memory meant accepting Stalin and Stalinism as qualified goods. For non-Russians, the quest for historical memory became inextricably connected to the search for an anti-Soviet identity. The former Soviet republics have focused on the violent, forced conditions under which they were incorporated into the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, as well as the destruction they experienced under Lenin and Stalin, the repression and stagnation they experienced under Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev and the opportunity for freedom they seized under Mikhail Gorbachev.

For Ukrainians, these discoveries were particularly painful. The Communist Party had done a particularly thorough job of destroying Ukrainian historical memory, but at the same time Ukraine experienced astounding human losses in the first half of the 20th century. Unsurprisingly, Ukrainian historians centered on the Great Famine of 1932-33, the Holodomor, which took some 4 million lives. Although the issue of whether the Holodomor should be classified as “genocide” has always been debatable, the tide has recently shifted. The emerging consensus is that the famine was part of Stalin’s deliberate campaign against Ukrainians.

Attention also centered on the villains of Soviet propaganda — Bandera and the nationalists. Most Ukrainian historians are actually quite objective in their treatment of the movement, seeing both its virtues and all too many sins. Contemporary Ukrainian nationalists who lionize Bandera generally do so because he represents an unconditional devotion to Ukrainian independence and rejection of all things Soviet. Putin’s attempts to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty only enhanced Bandera’s attractiveness among Ukrainian nationalists.

Of course, this brief reading of Ukrainian history is one-sided, and a full account would entail both the good and the bad things that Bandera did. But one-sided readings are not unusual, especially among insecure nations struggling to retain their newfound independence. In their national narratives, Algerians overlook the massacres of French by Algerian nationalists, Palestinians overlook the violence against Israelis, and Israelis overlook the expulsion of Palestinians. Even self-confident Americans remember President Harry Truman for his successful conclusion of World War II, conveniently downplaying the controversial decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Bandera became especially popular as the noble ideals of the 2004 Orange Revolution were progressively tarnished by the heroes of that revolution, Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The more unpopular Yushchenko became, the more he promoted Bandera and the nationalists in the hope that some of their idealistic glow would rub off on him. Unfortunately, Yushchenko’s ill-considered conferral of Hero of Ukraine status on Bandera threw a wrench into a more or less even-tempered discussion of the nationalists and their legacy. Yushchenko’s critics — among them Putin and other top Russian officials who have indirectly rehabilitated Stalin — added fuel to the fire with their irresponsible accusations of fascism. At this point, a sensible discussion is almost impossible in the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding Bandera.

The objective, even-handed accounts of Ukrainian historians, who see Bandera in all his complexity, will eventually seep into the public realm, but only after Ukrainian identity is consolidated and Ukrainian fears of a neo-imperial Russia subside. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych could promote this shift by unifying the country around a common identity and history, vigorously protecting Ukrainian interests vis-a-vis Moscow and eschewing Yushchenko’s proclivity for provocation. Europe could help by opening its doors to Ukraine, and Russia can assist by rejecting Stalinism. And we should not forget about Western historians in this equation, who can do their part by refraining from simple-minded analyses.

Alexander J. Motyl [email], an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. This essay first appeared in the Moscow Times. Photo credit: Reuters Pictures.

Ukraine Election: A Yushchenko Post-Mortem

Adrian Karatnycky — Tue, 19 Jan 2010 17:27:16 -0600

Orange Revolution hero Viktor Yushchenko has been rejected decisively by Ukraine's voters in the January 17th vote. However, this repudiation should not prevent us from seeing some his enduring successes, even as we acknowledge his failings.

To his credit, Yushchenko was determined not to govern the country in the fashion of his authoritarian predecessor--Leonid Kuchma. As a result, in practice, he respected the independence of Ukraine's political division of power, did not encourage the massive redistribution of wealth to his inner circle. He did not arbitrarily interfere in the decisions taken by the judicial system, did not systemically use the security services as his personal or political plaything, and exerted less influence on the media than some of their oligarch owners.

Even when he had unchallenged power in the first months of his presidency, he chose restraint.

For him the maidan was not a revolution, but an affirmation of the orderly functioning of Ukraine's proto-democratic institutions. This "liberal," "limited government" approach meant that democracy and pluralism deepened in the country At the same time, not only was he a believer in limited power, he was a poor custodian of the considerable limited powers of the presidency. This lack of effectiveness and the gap between soaring rhetoric and performance led him to lose the support of the public. Moreover, For an elite and society accustomed to strong and authoritarian presidential rule, he was viewed as weak and irresolute. This made it increasingly difficult to achieve any of his vaultingly ambitious aims.

What kind of legacy will Yush leave behind? His main legacy is that his style of limited rule will continue, space for media freedoms will persist, institutional pluralism will endure, and political diversity in will survive . All these factors have deepened Ukraine's democracy. At the same time, excessive pluralism in the absence of political consensus in society has led to stasis, deadlock, and the absence of true reform. Yushchenko changed the way power is exercised in Ukraine and in doing so made it harder – if not impossible – for him to achieve his high-minded aims of nation-building.

In the remaining weeks of his presidency President Yushchenko must work to guarantee a free and fair Feb. 7th election. Ukraine cannot have confusion after the second round. And even if the second round vote and result is close, as long as the vote is free and fair, it must be the President's responsibility to ensure that the people's will is enforced and that all sides agree to the orderly transfer of power to the winner.

Adrian Karatnycky [email], an Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow, is Managing Partner at the Myrmidon Group LLC and co-director and co-founder of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter.

Media Coverage:

Disappointed voters put end to Yushchenko career – Kyiv Post, Mark Rachkevych

Ukraine Presidential Election 2010 Blog Series:

Ukraine Elections: Let's Not Get Carried Away – Nikolas Gvosdev
Re-Introducing Viktor Yanukovych – Adrian Karatnycky
EU Energy Security May Depend on Ukraine Election Runoff – Alexandros Petersen
Ukraine Election: A Yushchenko Post-Mortem – Adrian Karatnycky
Ukraine Presidential Results: Calling it Right – Adrian Karatnycky
Yanukovych Comes Out On Top, But Tymoshenko Has Momentum – Damon Wilson
Ukraine Election Day: First Thoughts – Adrian Karatnycky
A Glass Half Full: Contemplating a Yanukovych Presidency – Nikolas Gvosdev
Ukraine's Anti-Orange Election – Alexander J. Motyl
Ukraine Election Backgrounder – Adrian Karatnycky

2010 Election Analysis:

Ukraine Election Day: First Thoughts

Adrian Karatnycky — Sun, 17 Jan 2010 14:03:55 -0600

The signs are pointing to a relatively clear, free and fair first round in Ukraine's presidential elections. As of 3 p.m. Kyiv time, turnout was 46 percent, with no dramatic regional anomalies that would suggest ballot stuffing or ballot rigging. Opora, an activist group with a high degree of credibility and independence, is reporting no serious violations and an atmosphere of general tolerance and professionalism as the vote proceeds.

This is reassuring as it will mark the 4th nationwide poll since the Orange Revolution that has been held in similarly open, free and fair circumstances.

While outgoing President Yushchenko is likely to finish a weak 4th of 5th, he will be remembered for protecting due electoral process and never succumbing to the temptation of pressuring the mass media.

Early information from independent exit polling confirms that Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko are headed by a second round runoff with Yanukovych holding a nine percent lead.

Exit polls show Yanukovych and Tymoshenko entering the second round, with Yanukovych holding a lead of between 4.3 to 9.7 percent. This gives Yanukovych the better chance to prevail in the second round, but it also means Yanukovych's lead is not insurmountable and the winner will likely prevail by a narrow margin.

Adrian Karatnycky [email], an Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow, is Managing Partner at the Myrmidon Group LLC and co-director and co-founder of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter.

Ukraine Presidential Election 2010 Blog Series:

Ukraine Elections: Let's Not Get Carried Away – Nikolas Gvosdev
Re-Introducing Viktor Yanukovych – Adrian Karatnycky
EU Energy Security May Depend on Ukraine Election Runoff – Alexandros Petersen
Ukraine Election: A Yushchenko Post-Mortem – Adrian Karatnycky
Ukraine Presidential Results: Calling it Right – Adrian Karatnycky
Yanukovych Comes Out On Top, But Tymoshenko Has Momentum – Damon Wilson
Ukraine Election Day: First Thoughts – Adrian Karatnycky
A Glass Half Full: Contemplating a Yanukovych Presidency – Nikolas Gvosdev
Ukraine's Anti-Orange Election – Alexander J. Motyl
Ukraine Election Backgrounder – Adrian Karatnycky

2010 Election Analysis:

A Glass Half Full: Contemplating a Yanukovych Presidency

Nikolas Gvosdev — Fri, 15 Jan 2010 11:33:21 -0600

President Viktor Yushchenko has little chance of engineering a last-minute election victory; after Ukrainians go to the polls this Sunday, the most likely outcome will be a February run-off pitting the two former prime ministers against each other: Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Some are portraying this contest as a choice between a "European future" versus a return to the "Russian past."

If Yanukovych should prevail, does this mean that Ukraine has been "lost" to the West?

Well, for starters, integration with the Euro-Atlantic community is on hold for the foreseeable future. The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was the high-water mark—pledging eventual membership for Ukraine in the alliance at some unspecified, distant point in the future. Since that time, there has been no push—particularly by the Western European continental members of NATO—to try and bring that "future" any closer to realization. The expansion of the European Union is also stalled; in short, the EU doesn't want to bring in large new members that will be net recipients (rather than net contributors) into the coffers of the Union. The observation that the EU will seriously consider Ukraine's bid for membership only when Ukraine's economy is capable of providing European-level living standards for the population is right on the mark. An election-day victory by either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych doesn't change these realities.

So is Ukraine's only other alternative to rush back into Moscow's waiting embrace? Not necessarily. Yanukovych is generally considered more pro-Russian than Tymoshenko (although Tymoshenko's new pragmatic persona indicates that she is also prepared to cut deals with the Kremlin), but if we take him at his word, there are definitive limits. His remarks, published on Ukrainian Christmas, lay out the following: no membership in any alliance, including the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization; potential participation in the Common Economic Space, but on the basis of the "three plus one" initiative, not full membership and full integration; and a renegotiation of the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas agreement, which he described as being unprofitable to Ukraine.

Does this provide some opportunities for the West? It certainly does.

Keeping Ukraine's economic links with Europe open and growing should remain a priority, by maintaining Ukraine's status as an intermediary between the EU and the Common Economic Space, so as to prevent Ukraine's full absorption into Moscow's economic sphere. And helping to ensure that Ukraine's neutrality is a robust one — meaning a state that has no foreign forces based on its territory. If NATO expansion is effectively off the table, can this not help facilitate the transfer of the remaining units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet when the lease expires in 2017? (A separate issue here is ensuring that the Crimea has sufficient new economic opportunities by that point to make up the inevitable shortfall that comes whenever a major military base is moved away.)

Ukraine's elections don't have to be seen as a zero-sum contest. And it seems that whether Yanukoyvch or Tymoshenko wins, there will be a new realism in Kyiv. Nabi Abdullaev, writing in today's Moscow Times, even sounds a note of optimism. What may result is a workable modus vivendi where "Ukraine's inevitable integration with Europe - a priority announced by all of the presidential candidates - would not be made at the expense of Russia's national interests."

In the end, this outcome may the best not only for the West and Russia, but for Ukrainians as well.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev [email], an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. AP Photo.

Ukraine Presidential Election 2010 Blog Series:

Ukraine Elections: Let's Not Get Carried Away – Nikolas Gvosdev
Re-Introducing Viktor Yanukovych – Adrian Karatnycky
EU Energy Security May Depend on Ukraine Election Runoff – Alexandros Petersen
Ukraine Election: A Yushchenko Post-Mortem – Adrian Karatnycky
Ukraine Presidential Results: Calling it Right – Adrian Karatnycky
Yanukovych Comes Out On Top, But Tymoshenko Has Momentum – Damon Wilson
Ukraine Election Day: First Thoughts – Adrian Karatnycky
A Glass Half Full: Contemplating a Yanukovych Presidency – Nikolas Gvosdev
Ukraine's Anti-Orange Election – Alexander J. Motyl
Ukraine Election Backgrounder – Adrian Karatnycky

2010 Election Analysis:

Ukraine's Anti-Orange Election

Alexander Motyl — Fri, 15 Jan 2010 06:32:50 -0600

As Ukrainians go to the polls on Sunday to elect a new president, Western observers should interpret the outcome in light of how the U.S. premier political scientist distinguished between good and bad government.

Back in 1968, in his now classic work Political Order in Changing Societies, the late Samuel P. Huntington, best known perhaps for his Clash of Civilizations thesis, claimed: “The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. … A government with a low level of institutionalization is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government.” After all, concluded Huntington, “The function of government is to govern.”

Ukraine has been a prime example of the acuity of Huntington’s insights. Ever since the Orange Revolution of late 2004 ushered in a democratic, pro-Western government in Kiev, Ukraine has suffered from incessant infighting and deadlock that have led some observers to suggest that it has become so weak as to approximate a failed state. President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the heroes of the revolution, never fail to sabotage each other’s policies and forge alliances with the anti-Orange leader, Viktor Yanukovych. The destructive cycle of sabotage and betrayal has demoralized the population, increased corruption, strengthened the Kremlin’s position in the country and promoted “Ukraine fatigue” in the West.

The upcoming presidential election could break the cycle and place Ukraine on the path to a stronger government. Most polls and analysts suggest that Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will garner the most votes in the first round and will then face each other in a runoff three weeks later. Yushchenko’s almost certain departure from political prominence will immediately produce three stabilizing Huntingtonian effects.

First, as Ukraine’s equivalent of former U.S. President George W. Bush, Yushchenko has come to be despised even by his supporters. Things have gotten so bad that everything he touches is deemed a bad idea. Just as Bush didn’t deserve all the opprobrium that was heaped upon him in his second term, so too Yushchenko isn’t quite the incompetent leader that he’s made out to be. But perceptions matter, and his departure will refocus the public’s attention from his person to issues and policies.

Second, Yushchenko’s relationship with Tymoshenko has become self-destructive. He vetoes every one of her policies, and she counters by undermining his. Regardless of who is right and who is wrong and just why these two former allies have turned into mortal enemies, the fact is that Yushchenko’s departure will depersonalize Ukraine’s politics. This will clearly help lower the temperature in the country.

What will happen if Tymoshenko wins the second round? Her party will then control the presidency, the parliament and the Constitutional Court, giving her enormous powers. Moreover, Yanukovych will likely fall from grace and his party will almost certainly experience a deep crisis. Many Ukrainians fear that Tymoshenko, given her large personal ambitions, will try to establish a dictatorship, but their fears are greatly exaggerated. Dictators need strong and large state bureaucracies, armies and secret police in order to rule, and Ukraine has none of these. An all-powerful Tymoshenko will not be able to become a dictator, but she will also have no one to blame if she fails to fix the economy and establish a strong government.

If Yanukovych wins, he will control the presidency and the Constitutional Court, but Tymoshenko will, in all likelihood, remain the prime minister. Their power struggle will likely continue — at least until parliamentary elections give one or the other an advantage in the parliament. But their incentives to cooperate over policy will also be greater than at present. There will be no third partner to court, and whether the outcome is cold war or cold peace, some kind of detente over measures that address the economic and political crisis is likely.

Finally, whoever wins will likely change Ukraine’s constitution, which as currently constructed virtually guarantees perpetual conflicts between the president and prime minister. Experts generally agree that a presidential system is worse than a parliamentary one, but they also agree that a mixed presidential-parliamentary system such as Ukraine’s is by far the worst.

In the end, a Huntingtonian interpretation of Ukraine leads to cautious optimism about positive governmental change in the country. Establishing a strong government in Kiev will clearly be in Ukraine’s best interests, and it will also help strengthen the country’s relations with the West. The United States and Europe could help resolve Ukraine’s strategic dilemma of being located in the no-man’s land between a hostile Russia and a weak Europe, while the European Union could pursue a relationship with Ukraine that is at least as close as its relationship with Russia.

Meanwhile, before Ukraine’s next president takes the oath of office, he or she would do well to read Huntington.

Alexander J. Motyl [email], an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. This essay first appeared in the Moscow Times.

Ukraine Presidential Election 2010 Blog Series:

Ukraine Elections: Let's Not Get Carried Away – Nikolas Gvosdev
Re-Introducing Viktor Yanukovych – Adrian Karatnycky
EU Energy Security May Depend on Ukraine Election Runoff – Alexandros Petersen
Ukraine Election: A Yushchenko Post-Mortem – Adrian Karatnycky
Ukraine Presidential Results: Calling it Right – Adrian Karatnycky
Yanukovych Comes Out On Top, But Tymoshenko Has Momentum – Damon Wilson
Ukraine Election Day: First Thoughts – Adrian Karatnycky
A Glass Half Full: Contemplating a Yanukovych Presidency – Nikolas Gvosdev
Ukraine's Anti-Orange Election – Alexander J. Motyl
Ukraine Election Backgrounder – Adrian Karatnycky