Hugo Chavez

Chavez Confronted With Alternative

Ana Palacio — Fri, 24 Dec 2010 12:40:04 -0600

The law that marginalizes the new Venezuelan Parliament, which will be formed on January 5 2011, and enables Hugo Chávez to legislate unchecked for 18 months, together with other measures the current National Assembly is fast-tracking in the final days of its term, offers a revealing insight into Venezuela’s political climate. On the one hand, the Chavez elite transpires anxiety about its future. On the other hand, the greatest challenge of the opposition in consolidating as a real power alternative is to persevere in strengthening its political parties, while maintaining unity without losing control and steadfastness. All this in the context of economic maelstrom and social crisis.

Although the official justification for the decree powers is emergency management of recent floods, its duration and scope hide the intention to violate the basic rule of law and democratic principles. This became obvious during the outburst of Hugo Chavez at the opposition when the law was passed: “you will not be able to pass a single [law].” The National Assembly, the natural legislative body according to the Venezuelan Constitution, may delegate these competences temporarily to the President for him to issue decrees having the force of law. But wherever the rule of law exists, the delegation is valid only through a mandate, and the power of the current National Assembly expires on January 4. The scope of this delegation is tantamount to total relinquishment of National Assembly’s institutional powers. The law covers infrastructure, transport, public services, housing, regional regulation,development policy, the use of urban and rural land, finance and taxation, even law enforcement and legal protection, defence, international cooperation and the socio-economic system. The almost defunct National Assembly, in a display of zeal better suited for a more noble cause, is in a hurry to pass measures which in all likelihood will close the only TV channel critical of the regime, allow censorship of Facebook and Twitter, and curtail university independence and academic freedom.

Chávez has enough support in the next Parliament to pass any proposal except those needing reinforced majority, including the delegation of legislative powers. He has already progressively put in place a well-tested system to stifle all critical opinion in the majority of the media. Hence, the logical explanation for most of the measures is the tense edginess of Chavez and his cardinals and their attempts to provoke an aggressive reaction by the opposition. The truth of the matter is that Chavez’s nomenklatura – with the President in the lead – is ill at ease. A reflection of an autocratic regime shrouding itself in democratic garment, its uneasiness comes out as provocation.

This is the only explanation for the legislation depriving any deputy of his election certificate if he changes his political affiliation: Chavez fears defection from his ranks. Only this logic can explain another proposal by the pro-Chávez elite Deputies: to extend Presidential decree powers to two years – one year more than Chavez had asked for – which would have meant that next presidentialelections (scheduled for December 2012) would fall within the decree powers period.This unease is no doubt related to the failure of the Nuestroamericano “21st century Socialism” – the backbone of the Chavez party rhetoric. Failure of grand projects, from pharaohnic gas-pipeline infrastructure, or the idea of turning sucre into common currency – all of them have perished on paper – to the Alba Community whose only sign of existence, for the time being, is its foreseeable interference, depending on the ongoing negotiations, with long-term projects like Mercosur. Chile, Brazil or Mexico, with Social-Democratic governments of Lagos, Bachelet and Lula, or Liberal Conservatives like Calderón and Piñera, have all demonstrated the effectiveness of their economic and social policies. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s economic indicators bear witness to a disaster. Examples abound. Official inflation rate is over 30 per cent. The country has a doubtful privilege of being the odd-man-out (except Haiti) in the widespread growth in Latin-American economies. The state-owned PDVSA has lost one third of oil production – an open secret still denied officially. All this reflects a society where the only winners are the members (more numerous with every passing day) of the socalled “Boligarchy,” living comfortable lives off the public purse. This privileged group includes highranking army officers who, nonetheless, do not show open support for the recent radicalisation measures taken by the regime. This leads to the conclusion that, as their peers in the rest of Latin America, Venezuela’s high-ranking military are making a realistic assessment of their future: they will not support a regime which might place them on the radar of international justice, making them de facto outcasts in a globalised world. Furthermore, from the social point of view, to the general impoverishment of Venezuelan society one must add an alarming increase in people’s feeling of insecurity. This, coupled with the policy of expropriations and a crack-down on freedoms, already affects wide swathes of the population, and these effects will gradually increase.

All this notwithstanding, one needs to look for the main cause of Chavista’s nervousness in the opposition. After years of internal divisions and ill-judged proposals, it is now coming together, thanks to the gradual strengthening of parties and their unity, into a viable alternative to the government. The opposition won last September’s legislative elections by the number of votes, although this has not been translated into a proportional number of Deputies in the National Assembly because of a peculiar electoral system. That same National Assembly which the new law now aims to bypass. In other words, in addition to a solid core of Chavez supporters (one third of the population), the elections also demonstrated the existence of a no-less-solid (and numerically slightly greater) core of anti-Chavistas, plus approximately thirty per cent of non-voters. Better organization and presence by opposition parties, especially in the cities (the rural areas still represent a substantial challenge, as voting results have shown), a message of unity, the call for effective government to counter blatant mismanagement, an attitude of sober restraint – all stood in stark contrast to those drastic initiatives, general stoppages and large-scale demonstrations which had hindered voters in the past. This opposition strategy managed to mobilize a majority of voters who overcame the unspoken fear that permeates Venezuelan society and went to polling booths in spite of the many threats and numerous enticing privileges attached to a vote for pro-Chávez elite candidates.

Examples of other transitions in the region (and overcoming Chavism is a true transition) are there. Although perseverance on the road to greater strength, unity, resolve and cool steadfastness is fraughtwith difficulties, it is nonetheless a necessary pre-condition for a consolidation of opposition forces as an alternative with real possibilities of winning the next presidential elections, even in the context of weakened – when not perverted – democratic institutions and curtailing of public freedoms which Chávez is so deplorably introducing in Venezuela.

Ana Palacio, an Atlantic Council Board member, is former foreign minister of Spain. This column was originally pubished in Spanish by ABC; this is the exclusive English language publication.

Will the U.S. Lose Europe to Russia?

Jorge Benitez — Tue, 26 Oct 2010 07:59:35 -0500

From John Vinocur, the International Herald Tribune: Germany and France, meeting with Russia in Deauville, northern France, last week, signaled that they planned to make such three-cornered get-togethers on international foreign policy and security matters routine, and even extend them to inviting other “partners” — pointing, according to diplomats from two countries, to Turkey becoming a future participant.

That can look like an effort to deal with European security concerns in a manner that keeps NATO, at least in part, at a distance. And it could seem a formula making it easier for Russia to play off — absolutely no novelty here — the European allies against the United States, or NATO and the European Union, against one another.

But there’s more detail in the theoretical Euro-Atlantic apostasy department: Add Chancellor Angela Merkel’s proposal, made in June, that the European Union and Russia establish their own Political and Security Committee, and President Nicolas Sarkozy’s intention, enunciated in Deauville, to establish an E.U.-Russia economic space “with common security concepts. ...”

At the same time, the U.S. reset with Russia and the administration’s willingness to treat President Dmitri A. Medvedev as a potential Western-oriented partner has given the Germans and French the sense they were free to act on the basis of their own interpretations of the changes in Moscow.

In this European view, the United States has become significantly dependent on Russia through its maintenance of military supply routes to Afghanistan and its heightened pressure, albeit in wavering measure, on Iran. Because the reset is portrayed by the administration to be a U.S. foreign policy success, criticism from Washington of Russia is at a minimum.

Consider this irony: the more Russia makes entry into the E.U.’s decision-making processes on security issues a seeming condition for deals the French and/or Germans want (think, for example, of France’s proposed sale to Moscow of Mistral attack vessels), the more the impression takes hold that the administration’s focus for complaint about the situation has been off-loaded onto the Europeans.

Example: Ivo H. Daalder, the United States’ permanent representative at NATO, gave a speech in Paris last week in which he skipped over the Russians’ maneuvering, but described as “baffling” and “very strange” that “NATO doesn’t have a real strategic partnership with the E.U.”

True enough. On the other hand, Russia is getting a whole series of passes: Ten days ago, when Mr. Medvedev offered Hugo Chávez of Venezuela help to build the country’s first nuclear power station, the State Department expressed concern about technology migrating to “countries that should not have that technology” — but added (bafflingly), that the relationship between Venezuela and Russia (for years Iran’s supplier of nuclear wherewithal) “is not of concern to us.” (photo: Getty)

Russia may sell S-300 missiles to Venezuela, instead of Iran - analyst

Jorge Benitez — Fri, 15 Oct 2010 10:38:55 -0500

From RIA Novosti: Russia's S-300 air defense systems, which Moscow refused to deliver to Iran following a new round of UN sanctions against the Islamic Republic, could be sold to Venezuela instead, a Russian arms trade expert said on Friday. ...

"Russia is looking for a buyer of five battalions of S-300PMU-1 air defense systems ordered by Iran, which are worth $800 million, and Venezuela could become such a buyer," said Igor Korotchenko, head of a Moscow-based think tank on the international arms trade.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who is currently on a visit to Russia, earlier said his country was interested in buying different types of Russian-made air defense systems to create a multilayered air defense network.

Venezuela has already purchased 12 Tor-M1 air defense systems, a number of ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and Igla-S portable short-range air defense systems from Russia. (photo: Mikhail Fomichev/RIA Novosti)

Russia Considers Caribbean Based Bombers

James Joyner — Sat, 14 Mar 2009 06:13:29 -0500

A senior Russian general says his country is contemplating basing strategic bombers in the Caribbean, either on a Venezuelan island or Cuba. AP's David Nowak:

A Russian Air Force chief said Saturday that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has offered an island as a temporary base for strategic Russian bombers, the Interfax news agency reported. The chief of staff of Russia's long range aviation, Maj. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, also said Cuba could be used to base the aircraft, Interfax reported.

The Kremlin, however, said the situation was hypothetical. "The military is speaking about technical possibilities, that's all," Alexei Pavlov, a Kremlin official, told the Associated Press. "If there will be a development of the situation, then we can comment," he said.

Zhikharev said Chavez had offered "a whole island with an airdrome, which we can use as a temporary base for strategic bombers," the agency reported. "If there is a corresponding political decision, then the use of the island ... by the Russian Air Force is possible." Interfax reported he said earlier that Cuba has air bases with four or five runways long enough for the huge bombers and could be used to host the long-range planes.

[...]

Independent military analyst Alexander Golts said from a strategic point of view there was nothing for Russia to gain from basing long-range craft within relatively short range of U.S. shores. "It has no military sense. The bombers don't need any base. This is just a retaliatory gesture," Golts said, saying Russia wanted to hit back after U.S. ships patrolled Black Sea waters.

Venezuela has fifteen islands off its coast, with Isla Margarita being the most famous.

I'm sure Golts' assessment is right here. The Soviets did not have permanent bases in the area during the Cold War, so the strategic rationale for doing so now is hard to fathom. Most likely, this is just a selective leak to the press to tweak the Obama administration.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council. Photo from Reuters Pictures.

Quote of the Day: Comrade Bush - Chavez

Neil Leslie — Thu, 16 Oct 2008 16:09:56 -0500

"Bush is to the left of me now. Comrade Bush announced he will buy shares in private banks." - President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela

The Venezuelan President mocked the current U.S. administration after George W. Bush announced that the U.S. government would take equity in American banks despite his repeated criticism of Venezuela's socialist programs. TIME

Hugo Chavez Visits China, Expected to Seek Arms

Peter Cassata — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 17:03:26 -0500

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez arrived in China for a state visit with President Hu Jintao. CNN reported that Chavez is expected to push for an arms deal that would see Venezuela buy K-8 training planes from China. A potential deal would follow news last week that Venezuela will purchase antiaircraft systems and fighter jets from Russia in 2010.

Russian Navy Sets Sail for Venezuela

Neil Leslie — Mon, 22 Sep 2008 05:56:27 -0500

Four Russian warships have set sail for Venezuela from their home base of Severomorsk in the Arctic. The fleet, which includes the nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great), is expected to undertake joint naval operations with Venezuela this November, reports BBC. Russian Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said the ships set sail at 1000 local time (0600 GMT), and would travel 15,000 nautical miles to reach their destination.

The fleet will follow in the wake of two Russian bombers that landed in Venezuela last week. The U.S. views the planned manoeuvres with suspicion, and sees Moscow's decision to create stronger ties with Venezuela as part of their worsening relations with the two countries.

Russian Bombers Land In Venezuela

Neil Leslie — Thu, 11 Sep 2008 07:20:25 -0500

Two Russian Tu-160 Bombers have arrived in Venezuela to conduct training exercises according to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, reports BBC. This comes after news that Russia plans to send a naval fleet to conduct training operations in Venezuela's territorial waters this November. Mr Chavez has developed close relations with Russia over the past months, purchasing Russian arms and supporting Moscow's position on Georgia.

Referring to the Russian bombers, Mr Chavez joked, "I'm going to fly one of those beasts."