Iraq

Obama may pick Lute for European command

Jorge Benitez — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 09:21:49 -0600

From Gregge Jaffe, the Washington Post: The Obama administration is considering nominating retired Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute as the next commander of the U.S. European Command, a move that could stir controversy among some senior military officials who have clashed with Lute over war policy.

Lute, who retired from the military in 2010, is currently serving as an unofficial “war czar” coordinating policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Obama administration. He previously served in a similar position under President George W. Bush and has won plaudits from both administrations for his loyalty and his willingness to challenge and prod the Pentagon.

White House officials said that they are not close to a decision on who will replace Adm. James Stavridis, who is scheduled to step down as the top U.S. commander in Europe this summer. . . .

Two Pentagon officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing personnel decisions, said Lute is a top candidate for the job.

The move to bring a general out of retirement for a four-star job would be unusual and somewhat unpopular in the military, where it could be interpreted as a sign that the current crop of active-duty generals are not up to the task.

When Lute first moved to the White House in 2007, it was widely assumed that he would be promoted to a major four-star position. But Lute clashed with then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who resisted efforts to promote Lute. Mullen and Gates stepped down from their positions last year, potentially clearing the way for Lute to get a top military job. . . .

Unlike most senior Army generals, Lute has not led U.S. troops in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The position of U.S. European commander is one of the military’s most prestigious commands, but these days is focused as much on diplomacy as traditional military matters.

The next commander in Europe will play a major role in sustaining support for the Afghan war from America’s war-weary NATO allies. Last week, France indicated that it will pull out its combat troops a year early. (photo: Valdrin Xhemaz/EPA)

Post-American Iraq: Forgotten Piece of Land?

Anna Borshchevskaya — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 15:52:51 -0600

The last convoy of US soldiers pulled out of Iraq on December 18, 2011, leaving Iraqis with mixed feelings: pride in gained sovereignty, but anxiety about sectarian violence and the inability of Iraq’s security forces to maintain peace on their own.

While publically Iraqis may have supported the withdrawal, in private, they often expressed reservations. Intelligence analysts shared their concerns, arguing that the withdrawal would leave a vacuum that sectarian militias would fill. Further, without troops in the country, the United States would retain little diplomatic leverage in Iraq.

Such a scenario appears most likely given the security and political trends in Iraq months prior to US withdrawal.

Sunni-Shiite Violence

The security situation in Iraq has been deteriorating for months as Sunni insurgent groups and Shi’ite militia were carrying out almost daily attacks. Four days after the last American soldier departed, a wave of bombings killed 72 people in Baghdad. Subsequent attacks targeted Shi’ite religious commemorations. According to the Associated Press, 160 people died as the result of violence in Iraq since the beginning of 2012.

As Iraq analyst Michael Rubin has noted, Iraqis—up to and including Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf—may have wanted the American departure, but had second thoughts as its deadline loomed. There was a sharp divergence between Iraqi public demands for withdrawal and their private entreaties for the US troops to remain a little longer.

In addition to sectarian violence, a political crisis broke out between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki‘s Shi’ite-led government and Ayad Allawi’s secular and Sunni Islamist-backed Iraqiya bloc just days after the US withdrawl, compounding political deadlock. Inability to break the deadlock reduces confidence in the Iraqi government’s and its security forces‘ ability to govern independently and democratically.

Prior to the crisis, Iraqiya boycotted the parliament and cabinet in protest of Maliki’s consolidation of power, especially over state security forces. The crisis erupted when Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq called on al-Maliki to step down or face a vote of no confidence, while al-Maliki’s government issued an arrest warrant against Iraq’s top Sunni politician, Vice President (and Iraqiya member) Tariq al-Hashimi, on terrorism charges, including the accusation that he ran hit squads targeting government officials.

The Kurdish Wildcard

While al-Hashemi fled to the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, Iraqi security forces have since detained at least 89 members of Iraqiya on terrorism charges. While there may be some truth to Maliki’s charges, Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi added fuel to the sectarian fire when he accused al-Maliki of targeting minority Sunni politicians in an effort to hold onto power through creating a political crisis.

Al-Hashemi agreed to stand a trial, but insists he can only recieve a fair trial outside of Baghdad. For its part, the Kurdish leadership has refused to give him up unless Baghdad agrees to his demands. This represents a reversal, as Iraqi Kurds—wth the exception of outgoing Prime Minister Barham Salih—have since liberation cooperated more closely with Shi‘ite parties than with their Sunni counterparts, many of whose ties to Baathist parties draw Kurdish suspicions.

Since formally gaining federalism from Baghdad in 2004, Iraqi Kurds have fiercely guarded their autonomy, catapulting themselves from among Iraq’s poorest regions into its most affluent and secure areas. The Kurds may use their role as mediator to extract futher concessions on disputed territories not only in and around Kirkuk, but also around Mosul and through the Diyala governorate. Allawi’s coalition of Sunni Islamists and more secular former Baathists simply have more concessions to offer. Too much involvement in these disputes may also jeopardize Kurdistan’s relative stability and security. Maliki’s government may retaliate by seeking to undermine the Kurdish oil investment, and may also withhold Iraqi Kurdistan’s share of the greater Iraqi oil revenues.

Will there be Early Elections?

There is a tendency among Western diplomats to advocate for broad-based coalitions. These may look good on paper, but they are a recipe for inefficient government and they erode the accountability of political leaders. While Human Rights Watch, citing Maliki’s crackdown on opposition, has described Iraq as a “budding police state," Maliki’s government was elected democratically—a rarity in the Middle East, and Maliki may simply be taking the steps necessary to implement the agenda of his backers.

Still, events bear watching. No longer needing to appease Western officials with armies on the ground, Maliki still should abide by the Iraqi constitution. Should Iraqiya sponsor a no-confidence vote, Maliki’s government may collapse. This would be a risky strategy for Allawi, however, whose ties to neighboring Arab states draw Iraqi suspicion and who previously was unable to former a coalition despite winning a plurality of seats in parliament. It was in this context that the Iraqi Foreign Ministry issued a statement chastising Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for his meddling in Iraqi internal affairs. Indeed, one reason why Allawi and Hashemi may be playing the boycott card is simply because they do not have confidence that they could triumph politically.

Could the Arab Spring Come to Iraq?

Partly inspired by the Arab Spring events, Iraqi protesters have become increasingly vocal, even if their demands are less drastic than their equivalents in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Most Iraqis, be they Arabs or Kurds, have taken to the streets in both Baghdad and in Iraqi Kurdistan to demand improved services and a crackdown on government corruption.

While Human Rights Watch has warned about decreasing freedoms in Iraq, Maliki may figure he is immune from an Arab Spring replay. Iraqis are scarred by violence and decades of war and sanctions. Just as exhaustion led Algerians to stand aloof as protests swept the region, Maliki may figure that fears of state failure and civil war will keep Iraqi dissatisfaction with his government in check.

One thing is clear: In no immediate scenario does Iraq emerge as strong, secure, and stable. Without political stability and security, Iraqi’s rich natural resources and oil wealth will not translate into progress and development. Iraq may not fail immediately, but it appears doomed to slowly flounder with a trajectory toward sustained violence if not state failure. After more than nine years of war, nearly 5,000 coalition casualties and tens of thousand of Iraqi deaths, Iraq is losing all too quickly its hard-fought freedom and future.

Anna Borshchevskaya is assistant director of the Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center. This essay was first published in the Euro Atlantic Quarterly from the Slovak Atlantic Commission. Photo credit: AP Photo.

Haditha Marine Sentence Triumph of Rights Over Justice

James Joyner — Thu, 26 Jan 2012 11:28:03 -0600

When Marine Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich was handed a suspended sentence of three months on Wednesday for his role as squad leader of a group that massacred 24 unarmed Iraqis in Haditha six years ago, it naturally sparked an outrage. To many here in the U.S., in Iraq, and in the Muslim world writ large, this will likely be seen as the U.S. military excusing a heinous crime. But we should instead look at this, even if it is difficult to do so, as the price we pay for a justice system that prioritizes the rights of the accused over a desire to punish criminals.

Wuterich was the last remaining Haditha Marine still in criminal jeopardy and thus the last hope for Iraqis and others seeking justice for the victims. Khalid Salma, a Haditha city councilor and lawyer for the victims declared the light sentence "an assault on the blood of Iraqis." Reasonably, he said he believes that a three month sentence might be appropriate for "small crimes." But killing 24 innocent people, and only receiving a punishment of three months? This is an assault on humanity."

Though he was sentenced to three months confinement -- along with reduction in rank to private -- Wuterich will actually serve no jail time at all as part of his arrangement. He pled guilty only to dereliction of duty and has issued a public statement apologizing to the victims' families for their loss but denying that he ever fired a shot or intended for any civilians to be killed.

The November 19, 2005, incident sparked bitter controversy here in the United States. Early media reports and a preliminary military investigation portrayed the incident as a premeditated murder spree in retribution for the death of Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas, who was killed by an IED. Democratic Representative Frank Murtha, himself a retired Marine Reserve colonel, called the incident "cold-blooded murder" and accused military brass of and "covering up" the incident.

Eight marines were charged in December 2006 for the incident but a formal Article 32 investigation -- a hearing to determine whether a court martial is appropriate -- found that there was no grand plan to murder innocents or for execution-style killings. Rather, a group of angry, exhausted, and frightened Marines simply did not care whether the people they were killing were combatants. Charges were eventually dropped against six defendants. A seventh, First Lieutenant Andrew Grayson, who was charged with covering up the incident after the fact, was acquitted. That left only Wunderich, the immediate leader of the men who killed the victims, who was charged with negligent homicide.

A December 2011 New York Times investigation, based on some 400 pages of interrogations -- many classified and which had for some reason been left behind in an Iraqi junkyard when American troops departed the country -- only added fuel to the outrage. They portrayed a culture where the killing of civilians became routine, described as "a cost of doing business" by Marine Major General Steve Johnson, the commander of American forces in Anbar Province at the time. So much so that the initial reports of 24 civilians killed by his Marines was considered neither surprising nor cause for investigation by higher-ups in -heater, who shrugged it off as another day in the war.

Brian Rooney, the attorney for Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Chessani, the highest-ranking Marine charged in the case declared before his charges were dropped, "If it's a grey area, fog-of-war, you can't put yourself in a Marine's situation where he's legitimately trying to do the best he can." It's a popular view in this country and long has been; the same sentiments were prevalent during the war in Vietnam, when many back home viewed incidents like the My Lai massacre as terrible but understandable.

The Iraq War, even more so than Vietnam, pitted American forces against unconventional combatants who at times gladly used civilians -- including women and children -- to carry out attacks. James Mattis, now the four-star head of Central Command and then the two-star commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force, noted in dismissing the charges against two of the accused that the country was "fighting a shadowy enemy who hides among the innocent people, does not comply with any aspect of the law of war, and routinely targets and intentionally draws fire toward civilians."

Even so, it's hard to write off the killing of a 76-year-old man in a wheelchair or the calm execution of six children huddled in a room as "the fog of war." No, it was a war crime, pure and simple.

But this wasn't ultimately a case of Marines protecting their own and disregarding the lives of slain Iraqis. While some commanders in Iraq were indeed callous about the attack early in the investigation, there was eventually a real investigation and the filing of formal charges against eight of the leaders and perpetrators.

Even though we now have a pretty good idea what happened that day, it's incredibly hard to prove it in court without the active cooperation of reliable witnesses. Alas, as the Associated Press reports, "The prosecution was also hampered by squad mates who acknowledged they had lied to investigators initially and later testified in exchange for having their cases dropped, bringing into question their credibility." And the few Iraqi survivors declined to testify, fearing for their safety.

While Wuterich admits to telling his men to "shoot first and ask questions later," he claims "the intent wasn't that they would shoot civilians, it was that they would not hesitate in the face of the enemy." While that strains credulity, it opens room for reasonable doubt.

Sergeant Sanick Dela Cruz testified that Wuterich shot people at close range and told him, "if anyone asks, the Iraqis were running away from the car and the Iraqi army shot them." But, again, the fact that Cruz himself admitted to taking part in the killings -- and urinated on the skull of one of the dead Iraqis -- but was given immunity in exchange for his testimony could surely have diminished his credibility.

In the end, then, prosecutors apparently reckoned that a plea bargain to a relatively minor crime, but one that would end Wuterich's Marine career in disgrace, was the best they could do.

Awis Fahmi Hussein, who survived the attacks, lamented, "I was expecting that the American judiciary would sentence this person to life in prison and that he would appear and confess in front of the whole world that he committed this crime, so that America could show itself as democratic and fair."

Unsatisfying as it seems, a democratic outcome is exactly what we got. In an authoritarian society -- probably even in today's post-Saddam Iraq -- governments will happily sentence citizens to jail to slake the public thirst for justice. In a liberal democracy, however, we put a very high burden on the state in taking away the liberty of a citizen accused of a crime.

Wuterich and several of his squad mates are almost certainly guilty of war crimes. That he got such a light sentence and the others got off Scot free will doubtless rub salt in the wounds of families who sought justice, And this outcome may well harm America's image in a part of the world where it is already poor. But, ultimately, preserving the fairness and impartiality of the American legal system is more important, and we should be glad that it won out. That's a painful and difficult compromise to make, but the fact that it's difficult and it happened anyway is exactly why we should be glad we live in a liberal democracy. If we were to lower the bar to make it easier to convict those we "know" are guilty, we would also make it easier to unjustly imprison the innocent.

From O.J. Simpson to Casey Anthony to the hundreds of cases that don't garner national attention, the America court system routinely exonerates people that "everyone knows" are guilty of murder. Even more frequently, people accused of major crimes are allowed to plea down to lesser ones when prosecutors fear they won't be able to convict or otherwise don't want to risk going to trial.

That's not satisfying. It's probably not even justice. But it beats the alternative.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council. This essay was originally published on The Atlantic. Photo credit: AP Photo.

How the World Could—And Maybe Should—Intervene in Syria

Jorge Benitez — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 17:40:54 -0600

From Anne-Marie Slaughter, the Atlantic: A full-fledged civil war in Syria could quickly become a proxy war between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and/or at least some NATO countries on one side against Iran, Russia, Hizbollah, and possibly Iraq and Hamas on the other. That is a deeply dangerous and destabilizing prospect. Streams of refugees will burden and potentially disrupt local politics in Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the Druze in Lebanon might join in on the side of their respective Syrian cousins. The economy of the entire region would be badly disrupted, even independent of any impact on oil prices. And Syria itself would be devastated, inviting the same power struggles and sectarian violence we see in Iraq today.

Still, intervention makes sense only if it actually has a higher chance of making things better than making them worse. In the Syrian case, a number of conditions would have to be met to satisfy this test. First, the Syrian opposition itself would have to call for some kind of armed intervention. Groups of protesters in different towns have requested international help, but the Syrian National Council would have to make a formal request. Second, the Arab League would have to endorse this request by a substantial majority vote.

Third, the actual intervention proposed would in fact have to be limited to protection of civilians through buffer zones and humanitarian cordons around specific cities, perhaps accompanied by airstrikes against Syrian army tanks moving against those cities. It could not, as in Libya, take the form of active help to the opposition in their effort to topple the government. Instead, the Arab League should work with the opposition and members of the business community and the army within Syria to craft a political transition plan that would create some kind of unity government and a timetable for elections.

Today, the Arab League proposed a plan for Assad to step down and be followed by his vice president and the formation of a national unity government followed by elections; the Syrian government dismissed it out of hand as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and "flagrant interference in internal affairs." The Arab League should next try to invite both members of the opposition and members of the Syrian business community and various minorities to work on a plan that would come from Syrian citizens as well as the League.

Fourth, the intervention would have to receive the authorization of a majority of the members of the UN Security Council -- Russia, actively arming Assad, will probably never go along, no matter how necessary -- as an exercise of the responsibility to protect doctrine, with clear limits to how and against whom force could be used built into the resolution. Finally, Turkish and Arab troops would have to take the lead in creating zones to protect civilians, backed by NATO logistics and intelligence support if necessary.

Anne-Marie Slaughter is the Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. She was previously the director of policy planning for the U.S. State Department and dean of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. (photo: Al Jazeera)

Michele Dunne on US Withdrawal from Iraq

Jason Harmala — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 17:38:28 -0600

Michele Dunne, director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, took part in a virtual US News and World Report debate on "Did the US Withdraw from Iraq Too Soon?"

Dunne's contribution "Withdrawal Served Obama's Electoral Agenda" can be found below

Jackson Diehl wrote in January 2007 what I consider the best column ever published on the invasion of Iraq. Expressing frustration at the Bush administration’s repeated promises that the country would be stabilized in six to 12 months, Diehl asked why Iraq should operate on Washington’s timetable. “One day, on its own time, Iraq will reach equilibrium,” Diehl predicted, adding that the United States should want to be present at that point to help shape the deal that emerged, and should reconfigure its mission to adapt to the clock that was running in Iraq. It is a lesson that the United States has still not absorbed.

[See pictures of soldiers returning home from Iraq.]

Knowing that Americans would expect Iraq to become a success within a few years—and that this most likely would not happen—was one reason why I was not in favor of the 2003 invasion. But invade we did, and the question at hand now is whether US forces staying longer than eight years would have made a difference in how stable, peaceful, and democratic Iraq ultimately will be.

While I admit to experiencing a sense of relief at seeing US troops leave Iraq before Christmas 2011, there is a nagging fear inside my head that we should have stayed a bit longer, albeit in much smaller numbers and in a training and advisory capacity. The Obama administration went through the motions of reaching an agreement with the Iraqi government to extend the U.S. presence into 2012, but without much energy or conviction. Leaving the initiative to reach such an agreement up to a government as beset by troubles as that of Nouri al-Maliki was like leaving the initiative to get a driver’s license up to your ADHD-diagnosed 16 year old—you can sit back, do little, and pretty much be assured that it won’t come about but that you won’t have to bear the blame.

[Mort Zuckerman: Barack Obama's Middle East Miscalculation.]

The brief but horrific sectarian bloodletting that followed the U.S. withdrawal in December has already created doubts as to whether the United States was wise to have devoted so little effort to a longer drawdown of forces. It served President Obama’s electoral agenda to have all US forces out before the campaign began and, after all, if you believe that we never should have invaded, shouldn’t you believe that the sooner we leave, the better? I hope for the sake of Iraqis—and of the vulnerable American diplomats and other civilians who remain--that this turns out to be true. But I am beset by doubts.

France and Turkey Compete for Middle East Influence

Jorge Benitez — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 18:38:29 -0600

From Soner Cagaptay, the Bangkok Post: As Egyptians and Tunisians vote to replace ousted despots and the Syrian government teeters on the brink, two old imperial powers are competing to exert their political influence over Arab countries in upheaval.

And they are not America and Russia. After years of cold-war competition over the Middle East and North Africa, it is now France and Turkey that are vying for lucrative business ties and the chance to mould a new generation of leaders in lands that they once controlled. . . .

[O]ne thing has become obvious to the Turks: Paris won't allow Turkey into the European Union or let it become a powerful player in a French-led Mediterranean region.

Turkey's newly activist foreign policy has therefore shifted away from Europe. The ruling Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP., is now cultivating ties with former Ottoman lands that were ignored for much of the 20th century. Of the 33 new Turkish diplomatic missions opened in the past decade, 18 are in Muslim and African countries.

This has resulted in new commercial and political ties, often at the expense of Turkey's ties with Europe.

In 1999, the European Union accounted for over 56% of Turkish trade; in 2011, it was just 41%. Over the same period, Islamic countries' share of Turkish trade climbed to 20% from 12%. . . .

As France's business ties with the old secular elite fray, its influence is waning.

It remains a military and cultural power, and will continue to attract Arab elites, even Islamist ones, seeking weapons and luxury goods. However, France will find it hard to market its brand of secularism across the region or match Turkey's grass-roots business networks, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where Turkey already has significant clout.

Even so, the road ahead will be rocky. Turkey ruled the Arab Middle East until World War I, and it must now be careful about how its messages are perceived there.

Arabs might be drawn to fellow Muslims, but like the French, the Turks are former imperial masters.

Arabs are pressing for democracy, and if Turkey behaves like a new imperial power, this approach will backfire.

At a recent conference at Zirve University, a gleaming private school in Gaziantep financed by the local businesses that have made Turkey a regional economic powerhouse, Arab liberals and Islamists from various countries disagreed on most matters but agreed on one thing: that Turkey is welcome in the Middle East but should not dominate it. . . .

Turkey may have the upper hand in soft power, but France has more hard power, as the recent war in Libya and its veto power at the United Nations make clear.

And despite Turkey's phenomenal growth since 2002, the French economy is more than twice the size of Turkey's, and France is still dominant in North Africa.

Turkey's relative stability at a time when the region is in upheaval is attracting investment from less-stable neighbors like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Ultimately, political stability and regional clout are Turkey's hard cash, and its economic growth will depend on both.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (photo: Dünya Bülteni) (via Real Clear World)

Barack Obama’s new defence plans neglect Europe at their peril

Jorge Benitez — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 13:46:15 -0600

From the Economist: Perhaps the least remarked upon part of the new strategy is the seemingly bleak future for American forces in Europe. . . .

The number of European-based American soldiers has already fallen from 213,000 in 1989 to only about 41,000 today. It has already been agreed that one of the US Army Europe’s four combat brigades will return to America by 2015. Its commander, Lieut-General Mark Hertling, has recommended a unit and a schedule. However, the Pentagon may now want more, running the risk of downgrading the United States European Command (EUCOM) into little more than a hollowed out headquarters. General Hertling says “there is a tension between the budget and national security and my worry would be that forces will be eliminated that ensure American interests are protected. Once eliminated, they are hard to regenerate. . . .”

The thinking behind the “rebalancing” looks flawed for several reasons. The first is that far from being on oasis of stability, EUCOM’s 51-country region covers some pretty flammable trouble spots, among them Georgia’s border with Russia, Kosovo’s border with Serbia and Turkey’s border with Iraq and Syria. Israel is also within EUCOM. There are less conventional security threats too, from terrorists moving between safe havens to cyber attacks.

The second is that—quite apart from possible flashpoints in its own region—Europe is closer to many of the fights that American forces may be committed to in the future than bases in the United States. US Army Europe currently has two of its four brigades in Afghanistan—the 170th Infantry Brigade in Mazar-i-Sharif and the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Paktika, one of the most violent provinces in the country. . . .

The third is that the new strategy places great emphasis on military-to-military co-operation with other countries. The best way of enhancing that is for American soldiers to train with their counterparts from other nations. General Hertling says that after training, the command’s second priority is to enter into effective partnerships with the many different countries in its region. “By sharing ideas, tactics and procedures,” he says, “you build trust with partners.” During the final readiness exercise before deployment to Afghanistan, the 172nd trained with troops from nine other countries, the same ones, notes the general, whom they would later find themselves fighting alongside. . . .

While the feeble defence effort of too many NATO members riles Americans, the organisation remains the only vehicle that reliably provides partners when America wants to do something and does not want to do it on its own. Mr Obama’s strategic guidance risks talking up the importance of partners while undermining the effectiveness of the command that does more than any other to make those partnerships work in America’s interest. (photo: Economist)

Threats to Watch in 2012

Arnaud de Borchgrave — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 09:16:52 -0600

On Dec. 18, 2010, a police slap of a vegetable-cum-fruit peddler in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid triggered an "Arab Spring" that no one had forecast and that quickly spawned a long, dark Arab winter.

Before the end of January 2011, violent unrest had spread to Egypt. By Feb. 11, after 18 days of riots, the 30-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak ended. Less than a week later, Libya exploded. And on Oct. 20, Moammar Gadhafi, Libya's dictator for 42 years, was mauled and killed by angry revolutionaries.

The top military man in Tripoli is Abdelkrim El Haj, the former al-Qaida operative in Libya who was captured during Gadhafi's regime, turned over to the United States, renditioned to, and tortured by, Thai authorities. He now says he isn't holding the United States accountable but expects "those responsible to be brought to trial."

Former close U.S. ally Egypt will soon fall under the sway of an Islamist Parliament (40 percent Muslim Brotherhood, 25 percent Salafist, or Muslim extremist). Liquor is already out of Cairo stores and can now only be sold to foreigners from locations yet to be determined. Tourism, once 15 percent of national revenue, is down to 5 percent.

The outlook for a Palestinian state is darker still than before. Palestinian extremists are in the ascendancy again as some 340,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank keep expanding and strengthening defenses. They have no intention of leaving or of living under Palestinian sovereignty. A good bet for 2012: a third intifada.

In Iraq, the last U.S. troops have left but some 14,000 Americans remain -- half of them assigned to the largest U.S. Embassy in the world with diplomatic passports and the other half, private security contractors. Already, the threat of sectarian civil war looms between Sunni and the Shiite Muslims now in power.

In today's Iraq, Iran and its Shiite allies, have more influence than the United States. And 2012 should tell whether the $1 trillion U.S. war effort and its 4,400 killed in action and 33,000 wounded (plus an estimated 100,000 Iraqis killed) was the disaster forecast by some prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion.

The end of 2014 is also the end to U.S. military involvement in the Afghan war. What happens after that is the big unknown.

The United States has the clock and Taliban have the time. The Afghan army will require $7 billion-$10 billion a year in U.S. aid to fight on. Will Congress continue to vote such big numbers? It didn't in Vietnam in 1975 -- and resistance to a Communist takeover folded.

Iran is the big unknown in the black swan aviary.

U.S. President Barack Obama, his new generals at the Department of Defense and intelligence chiefs at 17 agencies are firmly aligned against Israeli pre-emption against Iran's nuclear facilities. The key ones are underground and even with Israel's new, U.S.-made deep penetration ordnance, nothing is less certain than the ability to set Iran's nuclear timetable back by more than a year or two.

Some -- e.g., Henry Kissinger -- argue that we should be engaging Iran in a multilateral international solution, along with Russia, China, India and Pakistan, for ending the Afghan war.

The estimated $1 trillion-$3 trillion in precious minerals, including uranium, that lie deep underground in Afghanistan could form the centerpiece lure to accelerate an end to hostilities with a coalition government in Kabul.

In light of the rapidly unfolding crises of 2011, the reluctance of U.S. intelligence agencies to forecast beyond next five years is understandable. As Robert Gates, serving as U.S. secretary of defense, noted two months into NATO's intervention in Libya, "If you'd asked me four months ago if we'd be in Libya today, I would have asked, 'What were you smoking?'"

Al-Qaida has vanished from news media and most have assumed that the killing of its leader Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs May 2 put an end to the threat of a terrorist weapon of mass destruction in a major U.S. city.

The killing of major underground leaders is frequently a spur to followers to avenge their death. Terrorism has been the weapon of the weak against the strong from time immemorial. Today, the arc of instability, from West to east Africa to Pakistan to Bangladesh has any number of al-Qaida copycat sympathizers.

Al-Qaida ceased to be centrally directed long before bin Laden's death. Tomorrow, an unmanned drone, launched from a cargo ship a few miles off New York could be the carrier of deadly pestilence.

The Preventive Action's annual report for 2012 is designed to overcome the lack of forecasting ability in the intelligence community by developing a list of plausible human-generated contingencies of relative importance to U.S. national interests, grouped according to levels or categories of risk associated with various types of instability or conflict into three tiers:

The 30 contingencies were sent to a wide selection of more than 300 government officials, policy analysts, academics and journalists for their confidential feedback.

These are the Top 10 that directly threaten the U.S. homeland and are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement:

-- A mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally.

-- A severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weaponry).

-- A major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces.

-- An Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response).

-- A highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, pipeline output, transportation and emergency services.

-- A significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States.

-- Severe internal instability in Pakistan triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks.

-- Political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies.

-- A U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counter-terror.

-- Intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-edged transatlantic crisis.

Happy New Year!

Arnaud de Borchgrave, a member of the Atlantic Council, is editor-at-large at UPI and the Washington Times. This column was syndicated by UPI.