Global Leadership Series

Estonian President Ilves: The Future of NATO

Fri, 19 Mar 2010 17:54:00 -0500

Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves addressed the Atlantic Council on March 19 as part of the Global Leadership Series. Atlantic Council Board Director and CEO of LexisNexis, Andrew Prozes, provided introductory remarks while Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic, moderated the Q&A session.

In a lively speech, President Ilves examined threats and opportunities facing the Alliance, while touching on perceptions of the post-Lisbon EU in Estonia. The President also evaluated areas of concern to states of Central and Eastern Europe with particular emphasis on the strategic role of energy supplies. During the question and answer session, President Ilves touched on strategic engagements with Russia, Estonian accession to the Eurozone, and the nature of cyber warfare.

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President Ilves: there should be much more co-operation between NATO and the European Union - Estonian Presidency Website
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Zapatero the Optimist

Nicholas Siegel — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 09:00:00 -0600

Despite coming off what the Spanish press has dubbed “Zapatero’s Horrible Week,” the President of Spain gave an inspired and constructive speech before the Atlantic Council in Washington last night.

The past week has truly been a difficult one for President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. At Davos, Spain was singled out along with Greece and Latvia for its seemingly interminable economic woes. In a bid to cut the ballooning Spanish deficit, Zapatero upon his return from the summit moved to raise the retirement age in Spain. Yet this has led to a chaotic national debate and pitted many of his closest supporters against him.

Then came the announcement that President Obama will not be attending the May 2010 U.S.-EU summit in Madrid, citing pressing domestic concerns. As if this were not enough, during this Washington trip, Zapatero’s only opportunity to speak with President Obama was briefly during yesterday’s National Prayer Breakfast. The Spanish press pulled no punches, and made much of the agnostic head of an agnostic political party taking part in such a grand religious tradition. To top everything off, the Spanish stock market suffered a minor collapse on Thursday, dropping 5.9 percent amid further economic concerns in the worst single-day loss since November 6, 2008.

Yet if these concerns were on President Zapatero’s mind last night he hardly showed it. Instead, he spoke in ambitious terms as both the President of Spain and as the recently-anointed holder of the rotating six-month presidency of the European Union. In his remarks, he moved between these roles with protean skill.

He was most European in calling for the EU to take on more of a leadership role in global affairs. Spain is the first holder of the EU presidency since the Treaty of Lisbon took effect last December, and one of its major priorities will be seeing to the treaty’s implementation. “The EU is streamlining itself and aiming to become more solid” with a more unified foreign policy, he said. While “the U.S. is still the first world power,” he argued that the United States needs Europe and together the two must adapt their relationship to face the realities of the 21st century. He also called for more inclusive international structures, such as the G20, that recognize the “new reality” and more successfully incorporate “emerging powers and sub-represented powers.

On security, Zapatero reaffirmed Spanish and European commitment to NATO and Afghanistan, and called for an immediate resuscitation of Middle East peace negotiations. While noting that radical ideologies must be combated with force of arms, as in Afghanistan and elsewhere, he emphasized that curbing the expansion of radicalism will require more long-term strategies. This, he said, was the idea behind the UN Alliance of Civilizations initiative, which was established by Spain and Turkey in 2005. On NATO, he argued that the alliance is and must remain a defensive coalition of democracies with no enemies and no sphere of influence. NATO should also continue to redefine its objectives in the face of 21st century challenges and must conclude a new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon summit later this year.

Yet Zapatero the Spaniard was there as well. Indeed, President Zapatero was most visionary in his call for a new transatlantic agenda that would include Latin America and parts of Western and Northern Africa. While rising powers such as Russia and China must be included in any new strategic vision, he said that the U.S. and Europe could particularly benefit from a new “Atlantic Vision.” This would expand the influence of democratic values and integrate the states along the Atlantic rim into a more secure and prosperous relationship.

Spain, he noted, is in a unique position to serve as an interlocutor for all four corners of the Atlantic either by proximity or linguistic connections. He said that a more closely integrated Atlantic Community could be accomplished in part through NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as through direct U.S.-EU efforts and other EU projects. The result, he said, would not only help curb the spread of extremism in North and West Africa, it would also help foster vital economic links between the North and South Atlantic.

When asked about President Obama’s decision not to attend the planned U.S.-EU summit in Madrid, Zapatero was unequivocal. “We know Obama is busy,” he said. “He has paid a great deal of attention to Europe and met nearly all European leaders in the past year. We know the EU is a priority for Obama. We will hold the summit when the EU and U.S. are ready, and when it takes place, it will be substantive.” Missing the opportunity to host a U.S.-EU summit is truly a blow to Zapatero on the domestic stage, yet on this issue he assumed the greater EU perspective and remained constructive. “All doors are open to Obama. We trust him as before and will work arm in arm.”

This was an important statement. In it Zapatero recognized not only Obama’s oppressive workload and the challenges to hosting EU summits amid massive restructuring of the Union, but also the need to better coordinate transatlantic cooperation to avoid similar imbroglios in the future. If Zapatero possesses one quality, it is the ability, even after a particularly difficult week, to remain optimistic.

Nicholas Siegel is assistant director of the Transatlantic Relations Program at the Atlantic Council.

Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero: U.S.-EU Strategic Partnership

Thu, 04 Feb 2010 17:00:00 -0600

Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero delivered a major policy address before the Atlantic Council. His visit to Washington came at the start of Spain’s EU presidency, just as the new Treaty of Lisbon comes into force.

With transatlantic relations a priority of the Spanish presidency, Prime Minister Zapatero presented his thoughts on how the U.S. and EU can work together to address major challenges such as Iranian WMD proliferation, Afghanistan and the global financial crisis, while also developing a post-Copenhagen approach to climate change and relaunching the Middle East peace process.

National Security Advisor General James L. Jones introduced Prime Minister Zapatero, following welcoming remarks from Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel. Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council, moderated the Q&A session. The discussion was part of the Global Leadership Series.

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Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez: 2/4/2010 — Transcript

Thu, 04 Feb 2010 17:00:00 -0600

Back to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Event Page

NOTE: Prime Minister Zapatero spoke in Spanish. The text of his remarks below is transcribed from a translator's audio.

Speakers:

Frederick Kempe, President and CEO, Atlantic Council
General James Jones, National Security Advisor
Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Atlantic Council
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Prime Minister of Spain

February 4, 2010

FREDERICK KEMPE: Greetings to you all. Mr. President, I think you can see by the turnout, by the crowd, the enormous interest in your remarks. I’m Fred Kempe; I’m president and CEO of the Atlantic Council, and I’m delighted to welcome you to this Atlantic Council Global Leadership Series event.

We’re honored here to have the president of the Spanish government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. I also want to give thanks to BBVA and its president and CEO Francisco González. Francisco, are you here? Francisco, it’s great to see you here. He’s one of the founding members of the international advisory board of the Atlantic Council, and as editor of the Wall Street Journal Europe, I used to steal your ideas all the time. (Laughter.) So it’s wonderful to see you.

Among the many distinguished guests this evening, we are honored to welcome Spain’s ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Jorge Dezcallar. We’re also happy to have His Excellency Javier Sancho, Spain’s permanent observer to the OAS. And I’m just delighted to see so many distinguished members of the European diplomatic corps.

It’s now my pleasure to turn over to welcome you all this evening, to start the evening, to our chairman of the Atlantic Council, Sen. Chuck Hagel, one of America’s leading foreign policy thinkers and actors. And he’s not just the chairman of the Atlantic Council; he’s also the embodiment of the Atlantic Council’s bipartisan nature and commitment to renewing the Atlantic community for global challenges. Mr. President, you may know bipartisanship doesn’t come easily to your country or to our country, but we really go at it every day at the Atlantic Council.

Chuck Hagel succeeded Gen. James Jones, who left to become national security advisor to Barack Obama, and he was our chairman before. Sen. Hagel represented Nebraska in the United States Senate for two terms and, while there, he was on most of the more important committees: foreign relations, intelligence, banking, housing, urban affairs, and the Committee on Rules and Administration.

In politics, he was known as a great leader who was not afraid to break with the party line in order to follow his conscience. In the age of ultra-partisanship, Sen. Hagel is still known for the infamous line, “I took an oath of office to my party” – excuse me – “I took an oath of office to the Constitution; I didn’t take an oath of office to my party or my president.” It’s an honor to turn the stage to our chairman, Sen. Chuck Hagel.

CHUCK HAGEL: Fred, thank you, and good afternoon, and welcome. I am particularly pleased that you are all here. I am honored to be associated with the Atlantic Council for its decades of good work – important work, relevant work – and the contributions that it has made and continues to make to the trans-Atlantic alliance.

As has been already noted by Fred Kempe, we have a wonderful tradition on the Atlantic Council, to say nice things about each other, and so I am particularly pleased to bask in the glory of that very generous, a bit exaggerated, introduction. But nonetheless I shall accept it, Fred, in the spirit that you delivered it. Thank you.

Now, let me say very quickly as I prepare my only assignment here – and that is to introduce Jim Jones to this group – Fred Kempe and his colleagues deserve great credit for the work that they have done and continue to do on behalf of world affairs and engaging America even deeper and wider in the areas that are most profound and challenging to all of us, as global citizens. So, Fred, thank you and to your very able colleagues.

Let me turn to my assignment, and that is to present Gen. Jim Jones. There is no one in this room, I suspect, who does not know Jim Jones. And this is one of those unique individuals who is both a Marine general and speaks French. (Laughter.)

We’re not here to introduce our French colleagues, but nonetheless, that is some indication of Gen. Jones’ range, his ability to perform all kinds of assignments – as has been his career – in difficult times and in difficult areas. And he has once again taken on not an unimportant assignment for our country – not just the president of the United States, but for our country – and our relationships. And he will, I suspect, speak a bit to that as he introduces our very special guest today.

It is really an immense pleasure and an honor to present to you my predecessor in this job. And as I said, when I accepted this job after Jim was asked by the president to assume the national security advisor job, that it was a very poor trade. The Atlantic Council – they exchanged a general for a sergeant. But nonetheless I am plugging along and calling him often, and I am very proud of Jim Jones and our friendship, the job he’s doing and what he has done for our country and the world and yet what he will do for our country and our relationships. Gen. Jim Jones. (Applause.)

GEN. JAMES JONES: Sen. Hagel, thank you very much for the kind introduction, and Fred, to you and the staff of the Atlantic Council, thank you for all of the many good things that you do to add to our intellectual debate here in Washington on matters of both national and international interest. It’s a pleasure to be with you today to welcome back to Washington President Zapatero.

President Obama had the opportunity earlier today to personally welcome the president at this morning’s National Prayer Breakfast, where they were able to meet and also have a little chat. And the president delivered some inspiring remarks that many of you may have heard, and then attended a meeting over at the Chamber of Commerce this afternoon, so he is busy today and we’re going to impose on him shortly to address us and to answer some very important questions that I’m sure you will have for him.

It goes without saying that Spain is a very valued friend and a long-time ally of the United States. And we are united in a broad partnership based not only on our many common challenges and our mutual interests but on the core values we share and the historic bonds between our people.

I’ve always admired Spain’s rich and noble history, and as a Marine, I always make it a point to salute the Spanish marine corps, which is the oldest marine corps in the world by quite a bit – quite a number of years. And if you look – were to look at the uniform of the U.S. Marines and the Spanish marines, you would see great similarities between the two.

I’ve also had the great honor of meeting His Majesty King Juan Carlos, whose royal lineage goes back centuries, and we look forward to welcoming the king to Washington for a meeting with our president later on this month.

Spain’s greatness is not just about its past, however. It’s also about its future. And under the leadership of President Zapatero, the United States and Spain have built a partnership that will meet the challenges and the opportunities of the 21st century.

President Obama and President Zapatero are working together to promote peace and prosperity around the world. In response to President Obama’s decision to increase our forces in Afghanistan, as an example, President Zapatero immediately worked to commit over 500 additional combat troops and trainers. And most importantly for a former NATO commander, he also lifted caveats – all caveats – on Spanish forces, giving commanders on the ground critical flexibility to operate as they need to.

In Iraq, President Zapatero is also deploying Spain’s prestigious Guardia Civil, which are critical to Iraq’s ability to stand up its own professional forces in the defense of the country. Within the European Union, Spain has been a leader on counterterrorism cooperation, which is vital to secure the security of our citizens. And the president has also set an example within the EU by strongly supporting our president’s goal to close our detainment facility at Guantanamo Bay.

In Haiti, President Zapatero also demonstrated leadership and compassion by quickly moving people and supplies to the same, and providing ongoing care for this hemispheric priority. On these and many, many more issues, President Zapatero has shown himself to be a true ally, partner and friend of the United States. We are committed to strengthening and deepening that partnership both bilaterally and within our multilateral relationships.

This is a historic time for Europe, with a NATO focused on developing a new strategic concept, the ratification of the Lisbon treaty – providing new authority and structures for a stronger European Union – and the naming of the first permanent president of the European Council.

Today, I am more confident than ever that the trans-Atlantic alliance which has anchored our peace and prosperity for over 60 years will provide a strong foundation for our shared and common future. I know we all look forward to hearing the president’s ideas for moving trans-Atlantic cooperation forward, and I am therefore immensely proud to introduce President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the president of Spain. Thank you. (Applause.)

[Note: President Zapatero’s remarks are delivered via translator.]

PRIME MINISTER JOSE LUIS RODRIGUEZ ZAPATERO: Good evening. I’d like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to address all of you at this very important forum of analysis and thought: the Atlantic Council. I would like to express my appreciation to its chairman for their invitation, and for the very affectionate and friendly words of Gen. Jones – very generous as well. You know that Gen. Jones is a good friend of Spain’s, and Spain is a good friend of Gen. Jones.

Therefore, ahead of us is a fertile relationship between our two governments and, today, in which I’ve had a very extensive and intensive activity, beginning with that very unique ceremony of the National Prayer Breakfast – today, in this forum, I would like to convey some of our thoughts on the challenges and how I see the main issues of collective security from the Atlantic perspective. I would like to make two – four statements as a starting point in order to focus our subjects.

First of all, the United States continues to be the first world power and will continue to be so. But the United States needs Europe. We both need the other. We need to adapt the relationship between the United States and Europe to the new realities and challenges of the 21st century realities, some of which we know already as challenges, but others are yet to be defined after the substantial changes in world geopolitics after the coming down of the Berlin Wall.

Secondly, in our quest for security and counterterrorism around the world, which is the most, the clearest, current danger to us, we have both shown firmness, respect and collaboration, and Spain will continue to prove firmness, loyalty, and cooperation in this struggle against terrorism, whichever it may be.

Thirdly, there is a decisive matter in the agenda of international security: the possible renewal of the peace negotiations in the Middle East. We are speaking of a conflict that destabilizes a region, but not only does it do that, but it nurtures radicalization in the Arab and Muslim world, where most of the potential hotspots of risk and conflict are to be found.

This danger has become global because there are more and more actors trying to influence the region that needs this peace process so desperately. We have the opportunity of once again beginning a new peace process, a new dialogue in the Middle East, and it is up to Europe and the United States to make it a success, to a great extent. We have to work together quickly and with full and close cooperation.

Fourthly, our concept of the trans-Atlantic relations for this new world of the 21st century needs a certain degree of adaptation, some changes which I would like to propose to you. We should enlarge our vision of trans-Atlantic relations and of trans-Atlantic security.

And we should do so to include Latin America and some parts of Africa – the Atlantic countries of Africa – to build a new trans-Atlantic community and to manage those dormant problems that affect us all, most especially on the African side of the Atlantic where we could be beginning to see some worrying risks to our security.

Consequently, Europe and the United States need each other. The United States will continue to preserve its leadership to so preserve collective security. Spain will continue to be firm in its fight against international terrorism based on solidarity, and we must enlarge our vision of the trans-Atlantic agenda and trans-Atlantic security to include Latin America and West Africa.

We all know that we are going through very many changes, transformations. It’s an era in the making in terms of what is going to be marking the coming decades in international relations and the balance of power. It’s a time of change; this has been shown very clearly in what can be called economic security, a new vision of security with the G-20 as its reference. A refoundation of the G-20 that is still fledgling seems to be gelling as the forum of reference for economic security matters, to anticipate the crises, to facilitate growth and to give answers to the problems to facilitate balanced growth.

And today at the G-20, what we’re talking about essentially is financial security. That’s what our citizens want. That’s what our business community needs, and so do our countries in order to develop the international financial system, which has been undergoing tremendous growth in recent years but has been growing without any prior and robust system to guarantee the proper functioning of our economies. The definition of what the G-20 is to be – and we are still in the refounding process – is going to be conditioning the new international governance system.

It is going to be the forum, the channel through which it will be clearly and obviously expressed that there is a new reality that has been taking shape in these last decades. And I’m speaking about the emerging powers – what we could call sub-represented countries in the international arena who are demanding legitimately greater responsibility and participation in the solving of global problems in order to give them an effective solution.

We, therefore, are seeing changes in the international structures, the most important of which, the most significant of which, the G-20, yet in the making, yet to be defined. And it is of great importance for the definition to be appropriate, to be adequate and for the G-20 not to merely want to stay as it is, but it should be come more operational and more effective together with this architecture – this political architecture – in the international relations.

It is evident in the disencounters (sic/confrontations) that risks always bring about in difficult times do not have the ideological component they use to have during most of the 20th century. The risks that come from these disencounters come primarily from the disencounter of cultures inspired by certain religious movements and essentially from a religion or the use of a religion that has extremist components that defend aggressiveness to what we know as the West.

It’s known that the struggle against jihadism, the most violent expression of this movement that uses violence, this fight against them should of course use force, but it should also use a more strategic vision in the long term in order to tackle and to contain the problem of substance which is preventing radicalism spreading in the Arab world and in the Muslim community. And this risk is growing.

In order to make this possible, the United States and especially Europe must make a major investment to foster moderation – diplomatic, political, social – with dialogue of alliance of cultures and civilizations. Hence, I am convinced that the alliance of civilizations that is under the aegis of the United Nations and that unites 102 states and organizations – and I hope and trust that soon the United States will join as well – can play a critical role in curbing the expansion of radicalism and in opening up channels of dialogue and in investing politically, diplomatically in confidence and trust in most Islamic and moderate countries.

Ladies and gentlemen, Europe is a unique project in the history of the politics we know ever since states were consolidated in their modern form. It is a political project that brings together 27 countries at present – 27 countries that preserve their legal entity as states and their sovereignty but that pitch in together all their efforts and harmonize very many of their policies in order to achieve general aims to the benefit of each and every member state of the European Union. It is a European Union that is streamlining itself and aims to become more solid, not only in the economy but also in foreign relations and security.

The new Treaty of Lisbon will enable the relationship of the European Union with its main partners and allies around the world, such as the United States, to be a more fluent, closer and based on solidarity. And it will enable the responsibilities of security and defense that Europe must endow itself with can be done more effectively and with a common policy.

Europe deploys political and economic power which is unique in its kind, not only because of its economic potential, not only because it’s in the lead in development aid, but because Europe’s interlocutory capacity is privileged in some regional areas that are decisive to peace and stability in Europe, and very specifically and especially with the Arab world, with the Mediterranean region and with Africa.

And that’s why the European Union must take on more responsibilities. It must take the lead more often, have more initiative. Europe must exert its leadership for collective security in our trans-Atlantic relationship. And it must do so in line and in harmony with the United States. There have been very many years of political consensus and work in international fora. We’ve worked on Pakistan and Afghanistan where we concur on human rights, the Balkans and the major issues that affect our security.

And I would like to make a very specific reference to Afghanistan. Gen. Jones, I know what’s at stake in Afghanistan for all of us. Spain knows it well. We have just lost one of our men, John Felipe Romero Meneses, in an ambush with a landmine. We’re speaking now of 90 Spanish soldiers who have died in Afghanistan – the fourth country in terms of casualties – and I would like to pay them homage, as I would like to do to all of the American soldiers and any soldier who has lost his or her life.

It is a very difficult mission, but it is our resolve to remain there and to help the country recover and to achieve security and to build a democracy. As Gen. Jones has mentioned, my government has heeded the call of President Obama for the new strategy in Afghanistan. We will be requesting from our parliament a surge by 500 new soldiers. And in doing so, Europe will be contributing over 30,000 troops in that difficult mission to return Afghanistan to the Afghans, but with acceptable conditions of security and freedom.

When we speak of Atlantic security, we need to talk about NATO. NATO is redefining its objectives. This is a process that will have a highlight at the next summit to be held in Lisbon. As you know, at the summit in Strasbourg in 2009, the heads of state and government of NATO entrusted Sec.-Gen. Rasmussen a new strategic concept for NATO. This new concept must be concluded at the Lisbon summit.

Some principles must be very clear in this new strategic concept of NATO. NATO is defensive in nature. The resources and assets of the alliance are not against any country and it’s an organization that does not consider any country to be its enemy. The alliance does not affirm or recognize a sphere of influence. On the contrary, NATO defends the right of nations to exercise their legitimate sovereignty, and independently so, within its in borders.

Thirdly, NATO governments are open to a relationship of cooperation with its neighbors, and also with Russia. Fourthly, NATO – it’s necessary to recall this – is an alliance of democracies. Therefore, we would like this new concept, this new strategy of NATO that will be replacing the current one, which dates back to 1999, for it to include and to take into account NATO’s new reality because NATO now has 28 member states as compared to the 18 it had in 1999.

It is absolutely clear that this new strategy must pay attention to elements such as the nuclear proliferation. And we are happy with the initiatives of President Obama regarding nuclear disarmament. And we consider it especially important for dialogue with Russia to make progress. And then there’s piracy, which is dangerously spilling over to new areas. And then we have energy matters and security.

All these different fronts require a clear strategic vision, a European commitment and the commitment of all the members of the alliance so as to provide a strategic horizon of greater security. In that strategic horizon of greater security, we must necessarily count on the new actors. Security in the international community is primarily the responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations, of the United States, of the European community, of Atlantic understanding. And with that vision future perspective which is broader taking Latin America and Africa into account, yes. But we also in order to have more effective security, we need to have a much broader dialogue with the new and powerful players in the international arena.

It is evident that confronting the situation in Afghanistan – a difficult area, I’ve been there, it’s difficult – we must be inclusive of China and Russia in that commitment in the dialogue for our collective security. The mission will be a long one. It is not something that can be done overnight. But the Atlantic vision, the vision of the allied democracies, that very close link we have, deserves tabling it as a new factor in our security strategy.

And I would like to conclude, to finish by saying that Atlantic security has given very positive fruit for extending democracy. And that’s our first consideration. And there, the United States plays an essential role. And the EU has seen how, in a very short period of time, very many new democracies have joined.

Secondly, in that new role for NATO and for security from the Atlantic relationships perspective, we must expand our area of action. We must include the African and the Latin American perspectives. And in order to make this possible, Europe is essential and – if you may allow me – Spain, most particularly. The challenge of international terrorism requires dual positioning: one, the position of combating terrorism as we are doing in Afghanistan, but also the combat with ideas, the understanding among cultures.

And finally, let us renew the Atlantic alliance in its new strategic concept. We need to assume that NATO today plays an entirely different role from the role it played during the Cold War. And let us endeavor to build a new relationship, a new bridge for the international actors that may prove to be determining, such as Russia and China, in areas as important as the Middle East, that is close to us.

Spain assumes its responsibilities as the eighth economic power in the world in the arena of collective security. And it does so as one of the countries that contributes to the stabilization forces, peace forces or security forces – be it under the leadership of the U.N. in Lebanon where now the 12,000 soldiers are under a Spanish commander or be it in Afghanistan with ISAF or other parts of the world.

We are up to the challenge of what we are as a country. As a country, we are an interlocutor with very unique potential in very many areas of the world. And in that dialogue we will always be serving solidarity and trust with the United States from a European Union that must gain in commitment, capacity and in responsibility taking in security and collective defense matters. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. KEMPE: I will say that that was not only a very enlightening speech but, in several respects, inspiring. And inspiring because of this vision of a new trans-Atlantic community. This call for enlarging our vision, particularly Latin America and West Africa and, of course, many more elements that I’m sure the audience will raise questions about. And I’ll start with a couple of questions of my own.

The Atlantic Council’s mission is renewing the Atlantic community for global challenges. What you’ve done is you’ve further defined what we’re trying to do, so you’re going to also inspire our work. And we launched a center this year, the Michael Ansari Center for Africa. I suppose we must now launch a center for Latin America as well. But thank you for those inspiring words.

But let me ask you a question off of that. Can you be more specific? What do you want to do with the United States and the European Union in Africa and Latin America that’s not being done now? And particularly, is there anything you can do during your presidency that would lock in this new agenda and give it some sort of concrete momentum?

PRIME MIN. ZAPATERO: Well, the idea stems from a fact I’ve seen – an Atlantic vision, an enlarged vision, means that we understand the world’s new reality after overcoming a historical dialectic that was characterized by the Cold War, when we represented the bastion of democracy. And now it isn’t only the bastion vis-à-vis a geographical area; it should be the bastion of extending democracy and security as a concept that in certain regions requires this and needs to grow and extend.

And why Latin America? Well, because there are other actors in the world who want to strengthen their relationship, but probably not through a concept of shared collective security. Why Africa, and especially Northern Africa? Because it’s a fact that it is a growing risk area where terrorism – Islamic terrorism – is extending.

There are countries that need to feel closer to the Atlantic security. This can be through NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue, but that still needs to be worked on. It can be through a greater integration with the instruments that Europe has in the pipeline for partnership in association in the Mediterranean. During this specific period of time, to answer your question, we will be holding the first summit of the Union for the Mediterranean – EU and the Union for the Mediterranean.

Energy is at the very heart of the subjects to be dealt with at that summit. If we are capable of extending our ties and our cooperation to the Mediterranean area, the Atlantic vision will have had more elements of security in place. This is our vision from Spain and it’s an asset that Spain can contribute and it’s an incipient debate in Europe and it’s a debate that we would like to make inclusive in our relationship with the United States.

MR. KEMPE: Mr. President, before I ask you a second question, some in the audience will notice I’m calling you Mr. President. Some call you Mr. Prime Minister. At the Wall Street Journal, we actually had to do a linguistic and political investigation for our style book and we decided that you were both because you’re the prime minister – translated into English – but you’re also the president of the Spanish government. And we thought that a more direct translation from Spanish will allow me tonight to call you Mr. President. So thank you.

You talked about the European Union as a unique construct that has weathered a lot of storms. It is currently facing an economic storm and Spain is in the middle of it, where Spain, perhaps not correctly, is being weighted down a little bit by the situation in Greece. Your economy is expected to shrink 0.6 percent this year. The euro and so on as a whole will grow only 1 percent. Spanish unemployment is growing. Could you talk about how deep this challenge is for Europe in general, how deep it is for you and how does this impact your plans for an EU-wide economic strategy?

PRIME MIN. ZAPATERO: The financial crisis has had effects in every developed nation and in the European Union, too. But it must be said that Spain, like the immense majority of the European countries in the euro zone, is a strong and solid country. It is a country that in these last 25 years has shown its ability to grow and its ability to handle its public resources well in government.

Every uncertainty dropped regarding the euro – first, talking about Greece, a country that I support as a European, because Greece is in Europe. And all 27 Europeans will be supporting Greece because that’s what Europe is all about, and that is now being extended to other countries all come from areas outside the euro zone – that do not belong to the euro zone – areas that use other currencies. The euro is a success story. It’s a strong currency. It’s endowed us with a stability and it will continue doing so for the European Union and Spain.

I’ll make two remarks about Spain. First, Spain’s financial system is robust, strong. It’s the only developed country that has not seen any bank in crisis. No bank has collapsed. And we have the leading bank – the first bank in the euro zone. This is the most serious financial crisis in over 80 years. Wouldn’t that be a strong country – a country that has proven to be this resilient under this serious storm? It is a country where we – government has not had to inject money into the financial system, which is in itself a guarantee. It is a guarantee of our commitment to reducing our public deficit.

Spain is 20 points below the European average in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, our strength is beyond doubt and time will prove that these attempts, where there’s always a great degree of speculation and short-term benefits, are totally groundless. The European Union is going to be approving a strategic – an economic strategy for 2020 with two aims – economic recovery and recovery of jobs as soon as possible, and gaining in innovation, which is so necessary for Europe.

In relative terms, when compared to the United States and other countries around the world, we have not had the same ability to improve Europe’s productivity and that is the great challenge. In order to make it possible, our strategy has to be demanding in research, development, innovation, education and training, and technological policies and energy policy and in tackling the challenges of climate change. That will be the economic strategy that we will be approving this first half of the year for 2020 and what is the path to be followed to bring our economic policies closer.

You know that the monetary policy of the European Union is not up to the governments. It’s in the hands of the European Central Bank. But the single currency brings with it more common policies – or should – from the macroeconomic standpoint, from the standpoint of the market where this currency is in use and from the standpoint of the fundamental parameters of very specific business sectors.

So this is our challenge but I need to recall here that the EU amounts to 22 percent of world GDP. It’s the first truly commercial power in the world. And in very many sectors, we have the leading companies. We will be meeting our responsibilities and most definitely Spain – Spain will certainly do so.

MR. KEMPE: Okay, I see the first question already. The gentleman in the red coat. If you could – okay, then after that – keep your – because of translation, please keep your questions short; keep them concise and just for after we end this gathering, if you’d put your translation devices on your chair and just leave them afterwards, that would be the simplest thing to do, please.

Q: My name is Gustau Alegret. I’m a journalist from RAOC-1, from Catalan Radio Station. Let me start by saying thank you to the Atlantic Council for this opportunity to ask my question to the prime minister of Spain. And if you don’t mind, I’m going to switch to Spain (sic) because I’d like to ask him directly.

[Note: The following remarks are delivered via translator.]

Mr. President, you talked about leadership. You said that Europe and the United States should strengthen their ties recently. Spain isn’t at its best right now. Recently, you went to Davos and the Davos Forum questioned the situation in Spain.

Through the Wall Street Journal this week – and this was later confirmed by the White House – we found out that Obama will not be present at the European summit that you are so carefully preparing. Unemployment figures in Spain are up to 20 percent; unions are against the proposals you’re tabling.

Well, I’ve gone through all this to say that your leadership seems to be challenged and you’re talking about leadership in the United States and in Europe. I would like to know whether you feel challenged. And to finish, I would like to say that there was a poll published today in Spain. Your rating has dropped. I want to know what you think about your leadership, whether you think it’s being challenged and what’s your future strategy regarding the Spanish economy? Thank you very much.

PRIME MIN. ZAPATERO: Your question is very closely related to trans-Atlantic security, yes it is, but the vote at political responsibility is given by our citizens and the Socialist Party has won two elections. And that is what can be defined as leadership: the trust of our citizens.

And governments, sometimes, are easier than others. Obviously, I cannot hide that this is not an easy time. There are essentially economic challenges of great magnitude for Spain and for so many other countries. But I trust Spanish society implicitly and I also have confidence in the political project I represent and I know we will be recovering the vigor, the strength of Spain, for which it is respected and considered around the world – here and in many others.

And I’m not going to be opening up a debate on certain opinions on the Spanish economy that, to be honest, I do not share and that come from outside Spain, and in my opinion are made with lack of knowledge and groundlessly. And you will have the opportunity to see that for yourself.

We are living through times – when these things influence the markets, they influence expectations; they influence confidence. But the foundations of Spain’s strength are solid. We know where we want to go, we know the reforms we need to make and I am certain that our society, Spanish society, will be with us. And leadership, yes, of course, sometimes means taking the most difficult road.

MR. KEMPE: And one could have almost imagined that question being asked of President Obama in almost the exact same words in a presidential press conference here.

Q: Hi, I’m Reggie Dale of the CSIS here in Washington. I won’t ask a question that would have gone to President Obama. Two clarifications, if I could. In this new NATO relationship with Latin America and North Africa/West Africa, are you thinking that these countries would be members of NATO or would they be in the Partnership for Peace? What would be the institutional link?

Second question: You mentioned the Treaty of Lisbon and I’m wondering if you consider that the Treaty of Lisbon empowers the country holding the rotating presidency to convene summit meetings with foreign leaders.

PRIME MIN. ZAPATERO: Regarding your first question, I have not spoken about NATO in our relationship with Latin America or Africa. I’ve talked about a more general Atlantic relationship in Europe, Spain and the United States and working on that perspective but not taking this to NATO directly.

The Lisbon Treaty strengthens the European Union, to answer your second question. For those of you who are not European, it’s difficult to explain and we have a shared presidency system. We have a rotating presidency and a permanent presidency. The permanent president represents the council and therefore the European Union abroad. The rotating presidency, in this case and now, Spain, produces the work program for its six months.

Now, in coordination with the two future presidencies – Belgium and Hungary – a work program for 18 months, therefore, that include the different items in the economy, energy, justice and home affairs and security that we want to make possible, that we debate at the European Council, needs to be taken to the European Parliament.

EU summits, held every six months, are planned well in advance, as is only obvious. Before we had the permanent council, the rotating presidency planned on its own in coordination with the commission of the different summits, and that is what Spain did. And it had the competence to do so because to plan and program summits – and I suppose you’re referring to the possible summit with the United States – there’s an accepted system already, a tradition of a yearly EU-U.S. summit. And the Spanish presidency had done its homework and had seen what dates could be the most appropriate for that summit.

We know that President Obama and his administration have a very, very busy agenda, and if there’s anything that President Obama has paid attention to, it’s Europe – European Union. He’s paid seven visits; he’s met each and every European leader in a very interesting session. And we know that Europe is a priority for President Obama. We will be holding the EU-U.S. summit when the agendas so allow.

And when I say “agenda,” I don’t mean dates; I mean the contents of the agenda that we both – the EU and the United States – want to be rich and dense, and no European thinks neither governments nor citizens – and I think it’s quite well-known that President Obama is very liked in Europe and we do not think that he has lost interest in the European Union. On the contrary, I am absolutely certain that when the summit does take place, its contents will be substantial.

And it’s good for Americans to know that you have a president that, in Europe, has all doors open to him. We have trust in him, and continue to have the same trust we had when he was first elected. And we work arm-in-arm, hand-in-hand, with President Obama’s administration.

Q: Mr. President, thank you very much. I’m Harlan Ullman for the Atlantic Council. You spoke forcefully on a number of issues. My question concerns both Afghanistan and the strategic concept. NATO has bet, as you know, much of its future on what happens in Afghanistan. So how much do you think the strategic concept ought to incorporate Afghanistan, or is the issue so hot that maybe it’s best left alone?

MR. KEMPE: Let me actually add a question to that. You spoke quite movingly about the – Spain’s loss of your 90th soldier in Afghanistan. And during your last meeting with President Obama, you said our engagement in Afghanistan is firm, solid. How do leaders in your position across Europe, where the support for this war is not great, bolster that? What is the message you send? How much of a problem is public opinion in this respect? So it’s really two questions – quite different ones – dealing with Afghanistan.

PRIME MIN. ZAPATERO: Well, I do understand that Afghanistan should be in the strategic concept. And Europe – I looked at the figures earlier – has over 30,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. To President Obama’s new calling with the new strategy, very many countries have responded. Germany is going to be offering 800 new soldiers, Spain will be contributing 500 and many other countries will be contributing more soldiers. And it’s true that among our public opinion and our societies in Europe it’s not something that’s easy to explain.

But my knowledge of what the European Union governments think enables me to say that European governments are firmly committed to Afghanistan with the United States. And we know that results will only be obtained in the long term and that we need to persevere in our strategy. But we know that under no circumstance can we leave Afghanistan in the hands of al-Qaida and radical Taliban.

MR. KEMPE: A question here.

Q: Thank you very much. I’m Garth Trinkl, Department of Commerce. You mentioned the Atlantic Council would like to expand its Atlantic vision to include both North and West Africa as well as Latin America. Could you begin to tie in your expanded vision of the Atlantic Council with the newly formed G-20 process, which has a series of meetings going on in February and June, and then next fall in Korea?

Is there a role in this Atlantic vision for Japan, for India, for Korea and Australia, which are large parts of the international donor committee? Looking at this in economic, international economic terms, as opposed to geopolitical terms, how do you see this enlarged Atlantic vision merging with this G-20 process?

PRIME MIN. ZAPATERO: Well, everything responds to one same concept. The concept is: If we want the century we have ahead of us to enjoy more stability, more security from the standpoint of peace, the extension of democracy, the reduction of conflict and also from the economic standpoint, we need to include more players, some of which have never played a role in collective security issues internationally. Others have played a minor role. In recent times, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this affects the Atlantic relationship – the alliance in terms of collective security and economic security.

Today, the interest of the Atlantic vision calls for including new actors, makes it advisable. And I have referred to two specific areas, but I have done so because in speaking of two areas where Spain can take the initiative – Latin America and Africa. I’m not excluding others, but this shared strategy – this shared responsibility – is something to which Spain can contribute in these two areas from the economic standpoint.

Let’s see what the G-20 has to offer us; what it can do. Is it a forum with a model with sufficient representation capacity? Yes, in my opinion, it does – 80, 85 percent of world economies, with Spain, of course, in it. And the idea that was considered at the beginning to have a sort of economic security council in the sphere of the G-20 can contribute to expanding economic security. This requires reforms, of course, in the IMF. Representivity (sic) of countries – many emerging countries – needs to be changed; there needs to be reforms in the World Bank to consolidate the decisions of the G-20.

As far as I know, my impression is that both the United States and most of the G-20 countries – the founders of the G-20 – have the intention and the objective to consolidate the forum. And insofar as the participation of emerging countries, of new actors, becomes more intense in every sense, we will be working towards collective security.

MR. KEMPE: I’m afraid we’ve run out of time, and I apologize. There are a lot more people who have got hands up and I’m sorry to disappoint you. I just want to say in closing before we thank you – and I thank you on behalf of the audience – that this new vision for the Atlantic community is a compelling one. It makes a lot of sense in a lot of different ways.

I think the question in the end was a right one, as how does the quote, unquote, something we used to call the “free world” work better with each other? Morocco has also been promoting the notion of a tri-Atlantic initiative. And if you look at the map, the Atlantic Ocean does wash up on all of those shores, so it does make some sense.

So thank you for that vision, but also thank you for touching on a great many other things – G-20, the economic issues, the questions of Afghanistan – and really illustrating for us not only the centrality of Spain in its EU presidency, but the centrality of Spain. Thank you so much, and on behalf of the audience. (Applause.)

Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C.

Back to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Event Page

Transcript: Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski Talks to Council

Peter Cassata — Wed, 19 Nov 2008 16:12:29 -0600

Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Welcome to the Atlantic Council. I’m Fred Kempe, president and CEO.

Minister Sikorski, Ambassador Kupiecki, representatives of the Warsaw and Washington diplomatic communities, Atlantic Council board members, and friends, it’s an honor for us to be hosting today this installment of the global leadership speaker series. Let, me first off, give my thanks to a board member, Torkel Patterson, and his company, Raytheon, for supporting this event.

Minister Sikorski, many prominent individuals have proceeded you on this podium, heads of state and government, European ministers, leading policy-maker, and it gives me my pleasure to greet you as a continuation of this important string that has included Chris Hill, Bob Kimmitt, Nick Burns, President Saakashvili, President Yushchenko, but not only to introduce you and greet you here but to congratulate you on the 90th anniversary of Polish independence.

Let me just make a personal statement here first before introducing you. I was in Poland, as you know. We met in those days, 1980, 1981, and it changed my life in two respects. It changed my life, first of all, because I saw a courageous people who took on the burden of changing their history against almost what looked then to be impossible odds. In fact, I must say many of the journalists covering the country at the time sometimes thought the Poles were just being a little crazy. How could they ever really accomplish what they were trying to accomplish. But they of course got us all caught up where many of us covering the country at that time lost our objectivity absolutely.

The second thing I learned was the role of the U.S. and its European allies can be decisive when we’re principled, when we’re focused, when we’re consistent, and when we’re determined. And, conversely, when we lose that focus, when we lose that determination, a lot of history does not go in the right way, and in Poland, there were times when it went both ways. There were times of determination and focus and there were times of lack of focus. And I think in the end Poland and its Western friends took crucial decisions at critical moments and the history is we’re sitting here now with a minister of a democratically elected country which is part of the European Union and the alliance, NATO alliance.

The title of your speech, Mr. Minister, could not be more relevant: “The Barack Obama Promise: A European View.” The expectations of this U.S. administration are enormous in the world and in Europe of course and the challenges are daunting.

I’ll give you only a brief introduction because I think you are a person who’s well-known to this crowd. Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, foreign minister of Poland, chaired the student strike committee in Bydgoszcz in March 1981, worked at a time when I was doing this as well as a war correspondent in Afghanistan, won the World Press photo prize in 1988 and had a number of government positions leading up to the position he has now as foreign minister having served also as defense minister and in other responsibilities.

Most of all I think we can say here that you are one of the strongest, most principled Atlanticists anywhere in Europe. It’s an honor to have you here and we look forward to your comments.

(Applause.)

H.E. MINISTER RADOSLAW SIKORSKI: Thank you very much for having me. President Kempe, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to this forum. I’m proud to be speaking as the first European politician in the global leadership series on the future of the EU-U.S. relations since the U.S. elections. I’m glad to note that the Atlantic Council will host the new Bronisław Geremek Distinguished Lecture Series to start next year. Bronisław Geremek was the person who first brought me into the foreign ministry. He was my boss for three years and his departure is a very sad loss to Poland and to the trans-Atlantic community. And I’m glad that he will be commemorated in this way.

Much of your campaign was dedicated to financial gyrations that were felt and are being felt not only in the United States but also in Europe and Asia. The international crisis shows once again the interdependence between our countries. But empathy in this regard has its limits as Ronald Reagan once put it. Recession is when your neighbor loses his job; depression is when you lose yours.

Let me congratulate you on electing your new president. The campaign beats every record in generating interest in political debate and in voters’ mobilization. I was privileged to speak with both candidates during the campaign and I agree with The Economist magazine, which welcomed the choice of the candidates on both sides with the words, “America at its best.” Yes, both of them represented the best qualities of dignity, talent, and ideas that America has to offer.

The outcome of the elections was generally met with a cheerful reaction across the globe, including in Poland. America’s image, America’s authority, and America’s capacity to lead have been restored. Ladies and gentlemen, much has recently been said about the trans-Atlantic partnerships. To me it seems that the cornerstone of this relationship is our joint faith in freedom and human rights. Because of our history and our experiences, Poland and the United States are countries that feel this in their bones. I come to you from the land of solidarity and would like to thank you again that you stood by us in our hour of darkness.

America and Europe should remain advocates of freedom and hope at home and beyond our borders. Of course, in the increasingly interdependent world, we have to be prepared to deal with issues with prudence. At times, it requires pragmatism and flexibility. But because we are strong in our principles, we can sometimes seek compromises without undermining our values. America can count on Poland in promoting liberty in the contemporary world.

Despite our misgivings, we supported the United States in Iraq, which was unpopular both in Europe as a whole and domestically in Poland. All together, we sent 15,000 of our troops during the five-and-a-half-year period, which was longer than the U.S. participation in the Second World War. We took command over one of the stabilization zones, and we let the international division Central South with troops from 24 countries. We are proud to have completed our mission and to have handed over a secure area to Iraqi authorities.

Today we face global economic distress, new challenges to security and adverse impact on climate change, to name just a few. They called for quick and decisive steps to prevent fundamental disorder. The world urgently needs stabilizing forces. Together, the United States and Europe acting on the basis of a renewed partnership are such forces.

We can pursue our policy successfully even when we collaborate across the Atlantic and keep our alliance solid. We Europeans share a strong belief that the trans-Atlantic partnership, firmly rooted in our history reflects our common future. It remains the key factor in safeguarding not only our security and well-being but also the security and well-being of other nations around the globe.

Therefore, vision and resolve are badly needed on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans and Europeans should think in terms of common goals, both hard- and soft-power assets are at our disposal to deal with global challenges. Coordination of policies will enable us to meet them effectively. There will be differences of views and there will, on occasion, be competition, as is natural among free nations. Nevertheless, we must not let these differences be played off against us by others.

On numerous occasions, your president-elect emphasized deep understanding of the need for a close cooperation with allies. He reiterated that America cannot meet new challenges alone. And he underscored that the world cannot meet them without America. In Europe we agree. Some people in this town used to talk about a unilateral moment or even, in a more hubristic tone, of a unilateral era. That was hubris, but Europe does not need America as a leader who sets high standards for policy and conduct.

Barack Obama, speaking as the Democratic candidate, said that, “To lead the world we must lead by example. I will make clear that the days of compromising our values are over.” The unilateral moment may have passed but the dawn of an Obama presidency could be a transformational moment, when things that are impossible in ordinary times become possible. It should be seized.

Ladies and gentlemen, over two weeks ago, the chief diplomats of EU countries and high-ranking EU officials met in Marseille and agreed on a package of proposals for cooperation with the next administration. Poland participated in crafting these proposals. Europe has agreed to assume its share of leadership and responsibility for the most complex and challenging issues. Poland combines its traditional affinity to the United States with a strong European identity. Anti-Americanism is alien in my country. We have stuck with the U.S. even in difficult times. This makes us natural advocates for a strong link spanning the Atlantic.

Middle East remains the main source of security concerns. Iran’s ongoing uranium enrichment program constitutes a threat to stability in the region and undermines the international system of non-proliferation. As long as Iran refuses to act responsibility, we have to exercise pressure.

We have no time to waste in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The stakes are very high. As Americans and Europeans, we share the same goals and join forces in helping to build a viable Palestinian state as well as to enhance the security of Israel? The upcoming presidential elections in the Palestinian autonomy pose an opportunity for the EU to step in with new practical measures to strengthen the moderate forces within the Palestinian political leadership. At the same time, we Europeans strongly believe that there is need for an early and full engagement by the new American president.

Afghanistan, we know that the situation in that war-torn country is severe. There is an urgent plea on coordinating allied efforts in order to use our resources more efficiently. Europe needs to be ready to respond to American expectations. It can also support the American military efforts with its experience in reconstruction and our resources of soft power. Even though, unlike some allies, we have no national interests in the region, Poland has contributed – (inaudible) – today NATO-led ISAF operation. This year we have increased the size of our contingent from 1200 to 1600 troops and sent additional helicopters. Our engagement derives from the understanding that NATO’s credibility is at stake. When NATO goes to war, NATO has to win.

We all know that military means are not sufficient to achieve a satisfactory settlement. The key to success lies in our ability to persuade the Afghan people that our aim is to bring them security and improve their living conditions. The international assistance in building roads, schools, water treatment plants, should accompany the military and political efforts on a larger scale, but it should be targeted politically with the aim of co-opting regional elites to the project of democratic Afghanistan. There is a need to seal the borders and dedicate more forces of military police to train the Afghans. I have suggested to my colleagues among other things that the way to engage, by Europe and Afghanistan, is to create more provincial reconstruction on the EU supervision.

Let me now turn to what we in Poland think is one of the greatest challenges for the trans-Atlantic community, which is our neighbor to the east, Russia. Over the last years, Russian leaders have tried to reconstitute Russia as a major world power. And that in itself doesn’t have to be a problem from Russia’s neighbors. But it all depends on what means are used, whether 21st-century means or 19th-century means.

As you now, Poland had difficult, sometimes very painful relations with Russia in the past, but we don’t want a confrontation with our neighbors. The government of Donald Tusk has restarted a pragmatic dialogue with Russian authorities. We lifted objections on Russia negotiating its entry into OECD. We think it would be good for Russia and for all of us for the accountancy rules to apply; therefore, Russian companies, Russian governments, statistics to be more transparent.

Poland was also helpful in restarting the partnership and cooperation agreement talks against some significant internal opposition in our country. I have already visited Moscow twice. Warsaw is the first NATO capital visited by the Russian foreign minister after the war in Georgia. We had good, frank discussions. We have a number of bilateral issues to deal with and we search for opportunities to cooperate on the international level. We also clearly communicate to the Russian partners our interests, and we don’t shy away from defending them.

We will shortly put forward written proposals for confidence-building measures related to missile defense on the basis of transparency and reciprocity. We would like Russia to have the confidence that whatever we declare might happen in those facilities is indeed the case. And I think the best earlier example of us doing that was the decision by the governments of the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic to publish the agreements that we have signed on the Internet.

Our bilateral trade with Russia amounts actually to $14 billion, which is quite a lot for us. In fact, Poland is the last country on earth that wants a return of the age of East-West confrontation. That was not a happy time for us. And we know that a return to such a confrontation would mean that Poland would pay a price. On the contrary, we would like to see Russia as a partner, a member of the broadly defined West, in dealing with issues to do with the North-South divide. We would like Russia to become a stakeholder of the European stability and prosperity on the basis of a genuine partnership. It could be, Russia, a crucial partner in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, tackling international terrorism, as well as other global challenges.

Nevertheless, we cannot pretend that nothing has recently happened. When the Russian president, just a day after the American elections, threatens to deploy Russian missiles as a countermeasure to the plans to field elements of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland, we cannot turn a blind eye on Russia’s actions in Georgia. The recent developments in South Caucasus demonstrated breech of international law and commitments that Russia undertook within, for example, the OSCE process.

More worrying even than the Russian activities is their justification. The Russian president stated his doctrine as follows, if I’m summarizing it correctly. Russia will protect its compatriots – and the compatriots is defined rather broadly – and infrastructure projects outside of its territory if necessary by force.

That justification was given in the case of Georgia. Unfortunately it is not new. Searching for a rationale to invade Poland in 1939, Moscow also claimed that it had to protect non-Polish residents of Eastern Poland. Even further back into history in the 18th century, Russia invaded Poland under the pretext of rescuing religious minorities.

The “Medvedev Doctrine” has implications for many of the former Soviet Republics and can have far-reaching consequences. We should take the Russian leaders seriously because it seems that they mean what they say. In April, the previous Russian president, Vladimir Putin, speaking at the NATO-Russian council in Bucharest alluded to Ukraine as an artificial creation with a large Russian-speaking minority on its territory. Should the Georgian scenario be emulated in Ukraine, we would have a large-scale European crisis. The security of Europe would be shattered.

Georgia is a pivotal energy corridor but Ukraine is much more than that. Ukraine is a genuine, if messy democracy, but is also a swing country for the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass. As Professor Norman Davis, the British historian put it, Russia plus Ukraine equals the Russian Empire. Poland would not be able to ignore such a development.

So here’s a doctrine for a doctrine: Any further attempt to redraw borders in Europe by force or by subversion should be regarded by Europe as a threat to its security and should entail a proportional response by the whole Atlantic community. We cannot afford to sit back in complacency when the post-Cold War European order is being question. Russia started with contesting the OSCE then withdrew from legally binding operations under the CFE treaty. Then she suspended its commitments under The Hague Code of Conduct and recently invaded Georgia.

Step by step, there is a constant attempt to undermine the cornerstones of European security. Now the Russian president offers a new security architecture that should replace the existing one. If it means a good strategic discussion with Russia, then we should grab it, but I hope it doesn’t mean replacing the Atlantic alliance.

We heard President Medvedev say that NATO had no longer the capacity to provide security of the European continent. Russian leadership does not hide from the fact of its preference to push America out of Europe. We in Poland would not be in favor. Russia power has been like a glacier cast over Eastern Europe for the last several centuries, sometimes advancing, sometimes withdrawing, always leaving behind a debris of ill-feeling, tragedy, and missed opportunities. The glacier may not advance again; after all, we are supposed to be facing a global warming, and glaciers are supposed to disappear.

On the contrary, we wish the Russian people for their glacier to melt away for underneath it a Greenland can emerge, a Russia that is part of the broadly defined West, that inspires respect for its wealth, for its culture, for its scientific prize, and not fear for its tanks.

As the West, do we have any means to discourage Russia from reconstituting itself as a 19th-century empire? Well, at the EU level, we have some instruments to use if we only choose to do so. We are 400 million people and the largest economy on earth. We create 12 trillion euros of GDP, between 10 and 15 times more than Russia. And we compose together the biggest market for energy also for Russia. We should be able to regulate because the European Union excels at regulating access to its internal market. If we could regulate Microsoft, why shouldn’t we be able to regulate Gazprom.

We expect the European commission to negotiate the new partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia that ensures reciprocal rules for the transit of energy from and through Russia. The result of the negotiation should be equitable for Russia and for Europe, for industry and consumers. The PAC-2, as it’s known in the jargon, have to be approved unanimously by the EU Council, in which member states have their seats, and ratified by parliaments in all member states.

NATO has been the cornerstone of the trans-Atlantic partnership for nearly six years. Not only was the alliance successful in deterring the Soviet Union but also helped in reintegrating the former captive nations with the Western democratic community. For the last 15 years, NATO has transformed itself to meet new challenges for the security of the trans-Atlantic community. It has expanded its mission beyond the treaty territory taking new commitments in places like the Balkans, Iraq, and most notably, of course, Afghanistan.

Developing new expeditionary capabilities has been a part of NATO’s transformation. Poland supported these efforts, understanding that it is the right thing to do in the face of new threats. While ware ready to continue our engagement in Afghanistan, we feel that the time has come to renew the essential role of NATO. NATO should recover its traditional role, not just as an alliance, but as a military organization, and once again devote a portion of its energy to the treaty area.

What made NATO different from alliances of the past was that it had its own military committee, its own staff, and its own intelligence-assessing instruments. A part of NATO’s strength stemmed also from common exercises so that the military personnel knew one another. We need sound intelligence and gaming. We need contingency planning that is not immobilized or gutted by political correctness. We need to make the NATO guarantee credible again.

Since the ’90s, we had acted as if there was no possible threat that would require action on the basis of article five provisions. But with Russian tanks rolling into Georgia territory, we have seen this era come to an end. NATO should continue to fulfill its primary responsibility of providing security for its members; sober realization that the rules of the game have changed makes a compelling case for launching a serious debate about NATO collective defense capabilities, the debate that seems to be long overdue. It must lead to a new strategic concept for the alliance.

The 60th anniversary of NATO provides a good opportunity to come up with new ideas for the alliance so that it will be better equipped to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Regaining Central and Eastern Europe for democracy and market economy has been one of the greatest achievements of the trans-Atlantic cooperation, a success of historic proportions.

Next year we will be celebrating 20 years of the “autumn of the peoples.” Twenty years ago if you asked me whether it was possible that Eastern Europe would not just be free, democratic, but also be members of the EU, of NATO, it would seem too much to hope for, and yet here we are, we have achieved it. This was a successful policy and it’s a policy that should be continued in the future. And we certainly hope that the new administration will commit itself to bringing the rest of the region closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions. It is important for NATO to continue its open-door policy, which has already proved to be so successful in changing the geopolitical landscape so profoundly.

The EU also has peaceful instruments to shape relations with its neighboring countries, for example, through its European neighborhood policy. Poland together with Sweden conceived the idea of Eastern partnership, which aims a deepening and accelerating integration with the EU of the six Eastern partners: Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and hopefully Belarus. Russia would also be welcome, if she so wishes. Since the political system in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus has changed, there is an urgent need to put forward far-reaching projects of cooperation that will help the six, or more, to better prepare them for the EU are key. The EU can play a crucial role in helping to introduce stability and prosperity in these countries through promoting European values, standards and norms.

One of the key issues is to base the Eastern Partnership on two strong pillars: deepened bilateral cooperation between the EU and its Eastern partners and multilateral cooperation between the EU and the east European region, complementary to the existing regional cooperation schemes. As part of the partnership, we hope for a deep, free trade area, and also for visa-free regimes and a structure of supporting partners in adjusting to EU standards. We gratefully remember that the U.S. government has been a champion of stabilization and development of Eastern Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. I hope that the Barack Obama administration will continue this successful policy.

I’d like to conclude by saying that Poland negotiated a deal regarding the building of a base of missile defense interceptors on our territory in response to an American request. Actually, we would like to see this project to be continued, but we understand the internal American ramifications. We see our participation in the project as an opportunity to enhance Polish-American strategic and military cooperation. It can enhance American presence in Europe and produce strong ties between Central Europe and the U.S. Let me also note that NATO has agreed that such a system will be useful for the protection of Europe against a possible ballistic missile threat. In fact, we in Poland think we are doing a favor to the entire trans-Atlantic community by exposing our territory to greater risk for the sake of a greater security for all.

Ladies and gentlemen, President-elect Barack Obama put it in his victory speech, quote, “The true strength of our nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope.” End quote. We, in the trans-Atlantic community strongly agree. This constitutes the basis for a new era of collaboration between Europe and the United States. After all, as the European security strategy phrases it, “Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.” We look forward to working with the new administration to make this promise a reality. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MR. KEMPE: Thank you, Minister Sikorski. As one could have predicted ahead of time, that was an enormously articulate presentation, but also frank and, I think, hitting many of the points that are most swirling around right now – what Europe and the U.S. and the U.S. and Poland have to deal with. Let me start with a question and then we’ll get to the audience. And as you ask your own questions, please identify yourselves.

If I were still in my reporting shoes, I think I might have seized upon your doctrine for a doctrine – to write something – that Europe should answer the, now, stated Russian doctrine with a doctrine of its own that a proportional response should come, should there be a threat to security or a testing of borders or violation of borders – you probably restate that better than I’ve scribbled it down, here, but I did scribble it down – we can’t afford to sit back in complacency when the post-Cold War order is being questioned. It’s a very clear statement.

Question growing off of that: President Sarkozy has been quite open to Russian discussion of a security conference – meeting of some sort – next year; has also, perhaps, made some comments regarding missile defense that Prague and Warsaw might not consider particularly helpful at the moment. My question growing that is more, how together do you think Europe is right now on its policy toward Russia? In other words, how much of a chance would you have for the embracing of such a doctrine? And if it’s not together, why isn’t it, where isn’t it and how does one achieve that?

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, we have just taken a unanimous decision to restart negotiations with Russia. We are free nations; there’ll always be a dialogue and there will always be different points of view, but we have taken a formal decision to start negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement. These negotiations will not be easy, and they’ll take at least a couple of years. The European Commission has been charged with conducting them, and I think this is good, because we need to talk to the Russians, but we need to talk on the basis which maximizes our strengths.

You know, we are the largest economy on Earth, and when the Commission negotiates on our behalf, the Commission can be much more effective than individual European countries on their own. So Russia now has an option to be associated with this very – with its, actually, largest market. But it – we have to set down some rules. And I think it’s a – when oil is at 55 (dollars per barrel) is a better time to negotiate than when oil was at 150.

MR. KEMPE: (Chuckles) – and on President Sarkozy, specifically, did you have problems with his open door on this idea of a conference and his comments on missile defense?

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, we all love France, don’t we? (Laughter.) I believe President Sarkozy has backtracked on what he said to a common position, which was stated at NATO – by NATO at Bucharest, which is that NATO takes note, with acceptance, of the Polish and U.S.-Czech plans for MD. President Sarkozy is very keen to engage Russia in a strategic discussion, and there is nothing wrong with that. But we believe there is already an institution which spans North America, Europe and Russia and it’s OSCE. And this is the best formula, because there are already some institutions that work on behalf of security and procedures in institutions. For example, election monitoring – I mean, I was struck in the last few months that Belarus accepted OSCE election monitors and Russia did not. So we have such an institution already; we should take full advantage of it.

MR. KEMPE: Thank you, and one more question from me before I turn to the audience: missile defense. We have a situation where there are some noises from around the Obama administration questioning the technology – whether things are ready. One can start hearing the potential of a deal postponement against pushing things forward with the Russians, in some form or another.

Can you – Medvedev’s announcement about the idea of putting missiles in Kaliningrad: A, How does this affect you? And B, Can you imagine a deal that comes with Russia, now, which would be somehow bringing them into the system – bringing them in tighter – a deal that might even involve some cooperation on Iran against a postponement of deployment in Prague and – excuse me, in the Czech Republic and Poland?

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, I think to welcome the new U.S. president with a speech in which you threaten your neighbors and NATO allies of the U.S. with missiles was a mistake. To use the words of a famous Georgian, some people in the Russian leadership have become dizzy with success. The MD is an American project, and I’m not going to pretend to you that we have more control over it than we do.

We have agreed to site the missiles out of friendship, but in fact, negotiations are continuing because our Parliament requires for us to append, for ratification, of the surrounding documents, such as the Status of Forces Agreement and some other agreements. And those will still take some months to negotiate. But we are prepared to be transparent. We believe that Iran is preparing – building longer and longer-range missiles. But it’s really up to the U.S. to make up its own mind, and that’s why we will tread carefully, here, and not – and wait until the new administration makes its assessments.

MR. KEMPE: Thank you very much. Please? Oh, just, can you wait for the microphone, sir?

Q: Martin Walker (sp), UPI. Radek, welcome back to Washington. The context in which you put your new doctrine for a doctrine was immediately having spoken about Ukraine, citing Amy’s (ph) remark that Russia plus Ukraine equals the Russian Empire. Can you give us your current perspective on how you see Russian-Ukraine relationships? And, if you have time after that, also on Russian-Belarus relationships and what prospects there seriously are for Belarus, Ukraine to become much more closely tied to the Atlantic alliance?

MR. KEMPE: And then, perhaps, also touching on the MAP issue, which is – Membership Action Plan issue – which is either coming up or not coming up ahead of the NATO summit in April.

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, look, Ukraine is a genuine democracy – a country in which the outcomes of elections is uncertain ahead of them. It has a constitution, which splits executive branch between the president and the prime minister and some lively discussion there. I believe Ukraine’s orientation has some very solid foundations; Ukrainian businessmen will tell you that the Russian economy is competitive to their economy, whereas what they have to offer for the European market is actually competitive for them. So they have to earn their keep, if you like, by exporting to the West.

And I think if freedom means anything, it means the right to determine your alliances and your – the way in which you want to integrate yourself with your neighbors. Ukraine, of course, has some historic relationships with both Russia and Poland, but it really is up to the Ukrainians to decide these things. Poland is very happy with its membership in the EU; it’s been enormously advantageous to us, and we’re a little bit like Germany in the old days – we will be a normal European country when we have normal European neighbors on both sides of our borders. And by the way, that includes Russia; Russia is also a neighbor.

We believe that Russia has some internal problems – infrastructure, demography, the state of even the extractive industries – that require some investment, some attention that the kind of policy that was demonstrated in the Caucasus will be bad for Russia itself. But that’s for the Russian authorities to decide. But to try to change borders by force, in as important a country as Ukraine, would simply not go – I mean, the crisis would be of a different magnitude than what we’ve seen in Georgia.

MR. KEMPE: For those who didn’t hear, the question is a question of force, you said force or subversion – what do you mean by subversion?

MR. SIKORSKI: I think you’ve answered your own question.

Q: I’m Fred Hyatt from the Washington Post’s editorial page. Minister, you mentioned the drop in oil prices. I’ve heard theories that they could have political effects in Russia, which would cause Russia to become more aggressive, but also theories that it would reduce Russia’s capability to enforce what you call the “Medvedev Doctrine.” Would you talk a little bit about what effect these lower oil prices, you think, are likely to have, if any, on Russian foreign policy?

MR. SIKORSKI: As you say, it can go either way. Authoritarian regimes, on the whole, have a temptation to externalize internal strengths onto their neighbors, so that’s one – that would be the worst-case scenario. The best-case scenario would be for Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev to do what Prime Minister Putin put in his own document at the start of his premiership, which was that Russia needs to nurture its own society – to attend to its health system, to its demography, to its infrastructure.

Russia has, prudently, put away money for a rainy day. She has a fund for exactly such a contingency, so – and we don’t know how the oil price – how long they will last, but we have to hope that reason prevails and that the Georgian adventure will be seen as just that – something that, I believe – let me start with this: Soviet strategies had this wonderful concept, correlation of forces, by which they meant, all material and immaterial factors that determine a country’s ability to affect events. And on that basis, I think the – as an outcome of the Georgia crisis, the correlation of forces is worse for Russia than it was before.

In other words, that Russia may have gained some points – it was a short, victorious war and war is sometimes popular, domestically. But I think the overall effect has not been advantageous to Russia, and therefore, it should be a discouragement to try it again on a bigger scale; but, you just never know. You know, if only countries, like people, always acted in their best interests.

MR. KEMPE: Please, one in the back – I saw the first one.

Q: I’m Brian Beary from Europolitics. President-elect Obama has said he’s going to make good his promise to close Guantanamo. I’m just wondering if you have any advice or suggestions as to how he should go about doing that, and whether Europe could possibly help him out in doing that, and how it could help?

MR. SIKORSKI: This is an internal U.S. decision. Certainly, my personal view is that using due process from the start, or even the provisions that – under the Geneva Convention – that are there for military tribunals – much of what was achieved in Guantanamo could have been achieved without paying the price in image. So, yes, I think most people in Europe will be supportive and grateful for such a decision.

Q: Charles Gotti (ph), Johns Hopkins University. Nice to see you again. You said, and I think I have it exactly right, in your words, “We need to make the NATO guarantee credible again.” And yet, at the same time, Poland has been pressing the United States for a special relationship. Particularly, President Kaczynski has been very anxious to make Poland different from some of the other NATO members and go beyond Article 5 guarantees. How should we reconcile what you just said and what has been, I think, a Polish intent, now, for a couple of years?

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, I would have thought that’s quite easy. If you look at Europe, the United States has bilateral agreement that are additional sinews of the alliance with Turkey, with Italy, with Spain, with Germany, with Britain. The United States has major military installations in all of these countries. And in Poland we will be members of NATO for 10 years next year – all we have is one unfinished conference center.

So what we are saying is that the NATO infrastructure should be more evenly spread over its territory. And this is not to provoke anybody, but it’s just that that’s the way an alliance should grow; there should be no areas of higher and lower security. And we certainly feel that NATO has neglected us.

MR. KEMPE: But it isn’t because you trust a U.S. guarantee in a time of crisis, but you don’t trust a NATO guarantee or at least you don’t believe NATO will move quickly enough?

MR. SIKORSKI: Come on! You spend more on military than the rest of the world put together. Of course you have unique credibility as regards security measures. So of course everybody assumes that countries that have U.S. soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.

(Laughter.)

MR. KEMPE: Thank you for that frank answer.

Q: Ed Brown, a retired officer and former arms controller. What is the degree of severity of the financial crisis in Poland as compared to the United States? I understand you didn’t have the housing bubble, but you do have a credit crunch. Is your market down 40 percent like ours and you have similar problems or is it less severe?

MR. SIKORSKI: It’s much less severe. The stock market is down, but that’s mainly because of the withdrawal of foreign capital. But as regards the banking system, we haven’t had any problems at all. Our banking supervision has been very tough and we didn’t allow ourselves this – these exuberant and sophisticated financial instruments. The only problem may be that we have just above 20 percent of our mortgages are denominated in Swiss francs, but it is just over 20 percent. So if there was a large-scale devaluation, which I don’t expect, that could be a problem, but nothing like here.

Our economy has grown very steadily, depending on which – whether it’s purchasing-power parity or – but we are between 420 and $550 billion in economic – in GDP, which puts us just on the threshold of the G-20 group – (chuckles) – twenty-one or 22nd position in the world’s stakes. And we expect to grow next year, even if the euro zone falls into a recession. Our working assumption is that we are always 3 percent ahead of the euro zone. So if the euro zone goes into minus half (one-half), we still expect to grow by two-and-a-half.

We have several anchors of development, economic development. Number one, we get about 1 billion euros of transfers from the EU per month. And this is guaranteed until 2013. We get huge foreign direct investment amounting to about 10 billion per annum and we get remittances from Polish – from Poles working all over Europe: in Britain, in Ireland, in the countries that opened their labor markets. So this is all – oh, and also we privatized our pension system. We have a Chilean-style – every Pole has a private pension account and the pension funds are obliged to invest in the stock market.

So those are all sources of financial stability in Poland. Thank you.

MR. KEMPE: In – toward the back there, sorry. I’m trying to take people as much in the order as I saw them.

Q: Garth Trinkl, Department of Commerce. You spoke of the Eastern Partnership, which hopes to encourage the six non-EU countries and perhaps also Belarus. It’s an initiative of Poland and Sweden. Could you talk about the organizations, working groups on Crimea and Transdniester? Do they have a separate working group on Ukrainian national consciousness in eastern Ukraine?

Could you talk a little bit more about – well, let me go back. Zbigniew Brzezinski a year ago thought that Ukrainian national consciousness was enough to protect it from subversion and that the economic and political elites were strong enough to protect nationalism in Ukraine. What’s either your government’s position or the position of the working – of this Eastern Partnership organization?

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, they are not directly related because Eastern Partnership works with states and not with regions, for obvious reasons. But Eastern Partnership is literally in the works right now. The European Commission is just about the publish what we as the European Council asked them to do, namely, particularly projects that will be effected. And we expect infrastructure projects, we expect the time scale for the deep free-trade area and we expect the time scale for visa facilitation and eventually visa-free regimes for all of these countries. It’s very attractive.

Those countries are particularly interested and you might be interested that the country that was most active on this, the training of its bureaucrats in EU law. And EU law is, as you know, a seventh wonder of the universe; it’s 80 pages of legislation. Even Belarus now sends most of its exports to the EU. Belarus needs to earn the money to pay Russia for its energy imports in the EU. So they need to know about EU legislation. And Belarus was the most active in seeking this, which is, I think, a good sign.

And these are projects that we hope will cost some – several hundred million euros over the next few years, which is to say, a big program, but very light on structures. The most we expect in terms of managing it would be a coordinator at the commission. Think about it as a complementary project to what France and Spain created in the South. First it was Barcelona Process; now you have the Mediterranean Union, which addresses the Mediterranean periphery.

And I think this is exactly right, that Europe should be this concentric ring of states that have privileged relationships with it and so that stability and prosperity spreads around Europe as those rings grow. And I hope all of our neighbors, including Russia, take advantage of it because I imagine Russia would like the Russian citizens, at least in the Kaliningrad Oblast, to take advantage of visa-free travel to the EU. The border crossings there should be modernized, the environmental standards should be raised. Those are things that Belarus, Russia can join.

But that’s – but it’s a project for states, not for regions.

MR. KEMPE: I see two questions right next to each other so let’s take both of these.

Q: Thomas Berkovsky (sp), American University. Minister, coming back to NATO for a minute, enhancing security, what are your views on NATO enlargement? There’s discussion of a possible northern enlargement to include Sweden and Finland, possibly, and, of course, there is still older issues under discussion of the southeastern states like Ukraine, prospects for eventually joining NATO. Since you talked a lot about enhancing security, perhaps we’d like to hear your views on that.

MR. KEMPE: And let me take the second question right behind you.

Q: Thank you.

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, in Finland, as you know – sorry, go ahead. In Finland, as you know, it’s the subject of lively internal debate. Sweden also – we would love to have Sweden in NATO. But, you know, I was recently in Sweden and they said, well, you know, we’ve been neutral for 300 years; it’s actually served us quite well. And in that geographic position, you can understand it. But if they applied, Poland would vote in favor. (Laughter.) Please.

Q: I’m Susan Cornwell with Reuters and it’s a related question. What do you think the NATO foreign ministers should do in the near term on the membership-action-plan issue for Georgia and Ukraine, given what’s happened in Georgia? And, secondly, on your doctrine, can you elaborate any more on what you would mean by “proportional response?” It sounds to me almost like you’re already trying to extend a NATO Article V guarantee to some countries that haven’t joined, perhaps, if you’re talking about meeting, possibly, force with force in a country like Ukraine before it’s joined NATO.

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, we shouldn’t go back on what we promised at Bucharest. In Bucharest, we said two things: that both these countries will join NATO, but not yet. If you asked me today whether we have consensus on MAP, I don’t think so. And, therefore, we need some discussion about how to maintain the relationships, the cooperation with these countries so that, eventually, one day, the promise may be fulfilled. But we must find imaginative institutional ways to help them get there.

The two countries are different, of course. In Georgia, there is widespread public support, but the latest event haven’t improved Georgia’s chances. In Ukraine, look, we are in an alliance of free nations. We do not want to drag anybody into NATO; it has to be Ukraine’s own decision. So there has to be a clear commitment by the government and then some years of hard work to fulfill the standards before we can consider Ukraine for a candidate.

MR. KEMPE: Thank you, Radek.

MR. SIKORKSI: I have to be diplomatic. (Laughter.)

Q: Thank you. Andre Sita (sp) from TAS (sp). The talk of the town here, of course, is who will be driving the U.S. foreign policy under Obama. So maybe you could tip us off on who you –

MR. SIKORSKI: (Chuckles.)

Q: No, onto who you are meeting. So I am asking you about your trip, about your plans for this visit, who you’re going to talk to. And also you mentioned in your speech that you will be announcing shortly new transparency measures, confidence-building measures for the ballistic-missile plans. Maybe you could say a few words about that. Thanks.

MR. KEMPE: And whether or not those would also include Russian personnel in these installations.

Q: Sure.

MR. SIKORSKI: Well, look, I am actually meeting some prominent Democrats during this trip here, but given the fatwa that went out on meetings with foreign officials, I really don’t want to destroy their appointment chances by mentioning their names. (Laughter.)

As regards the confidence-building measures, I’ve said this before in my conversations with Sergei Lavrov, with Minister Kislyak, who visited us in Warsaw and there is no secret about it.

We are willing to go almost but not quite to the permanent stationing of Russian personnel in Poland, not quite because, you know there are historical issues between our countries and the permanent stationing of Russian troops in Poland is something that our public is sensitive about. But we would like to give you the kind of inspection rights and the kind of monitoring by technical means that to any reasonable person would give you a complete assurance that nothing that was not declared was going on in the facility, that there would, you know, some of your journals have spoken of exchanging the warheads from – I mean, as you know, the interceptors don’t have actually a warhead; they just have a lump of metal in them. Some of your journals have been incorrectly scaring people of these lumps of metal being replaced with warheads or any increase of the number of interceptors.

I think with industrial monitoring and frequent inspections, you could have complete confidence and therefore we don’t understand your objections because Russian experts and high-level officials have said that this kind of configuration of the base is not a threat to Russia. Well, if that kind of – if the proposed configuration is not a threat and you would get the assurance that it would not be changed then we don’t quite see what you’re getting so excited about.

But perhaps it’s a kind of psychological testing of the new administration. I hope the test is passed.

MR. KEMPE: Well, I think rather than, you know, trying to outdo that closing, I think I’m going to thank you for your time. We’ve reached the end of our time. I do want to just note to the audience that we’ve talked about some of the most important issues going forward, but we’ve also talked about them in a different way; we’ve talked about them in a new light. Minister Sikorksi talked about new opportunities going forward in the U.S.-European relationship, but it only happens when the people in the institutions are all working in the same direction. So we’re very glad that we’ve had you here. You’ve played an enormously important role in the history of your country, but, most of all, you’re playing an enormously important role for the future of your country, for the future of the alliance. And thank you very much.

MR. SIKORKSI: Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)

Melting the Russian Glacier

James Joyner — Wed, 19 Nov 2008 12:02:21 -0600

Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski, speaking at the Atlantic Council today, declared that Russia's justification for invading Georgia, that it was defending its friends abroad, is one that has been used by Russian autocrats for centuries to justify a doctrine of imperialism. Saying that we need "a doctrine for a doctrine," Sikorski declared that, "Any further attempt to redraw borders in Europe by force or by subversion will be regarded by Poland as an existential threat to our security and should entail a proportional response by the whole Atlantic community." Beyond that, "We need to make NATO's traditional security guarantees credible again."

Asked by UPI's Martin Walker to define "subversion," noting Russia's behind the scenes efforts to influence the elections in Ukraine, Sikorski glibly responded, "You've answered your own question."

Pressed by Susan Cornell of Reuters as to whether Poland supported extending NATO Article 5 guarantees to non-members like Ukraine and Georgia, the minister observed that we had declared at Bucharest that they would one day be members. Cornwell followed up, asking whether "proportional response" meant military force, Sikorski demurred, "I have to be diplomatic."

He declared that Russian territorial ambitions have been, over the last several centuries, rather like a glacier, sometimes expanding, sometimes receding, but always there. Now, he declared, in an age of global warming, it's time for the glacier to melt. Rather than being feared for its tanks, Russia should instead be admired for its great culture and scientific prowess.

Sikorski outlined several tools at Western disposal should we muster the political will to wield them. He observed that the EU has 400 million people and, with a 12 trillion Euro GDP, the world's largest economy. It would be a relatively simple matter to demand Russia comply with international norms in order to have access to that market. He noted that "The EU is a master of regulation" and declared, "If the EU can regulate Microsoft, why not Gazprom?"

On the security front, there is NATO. He believes that we have acted since the Cold War ended as if there were no Article 5 threats. "That era is at an end," he announced. While NATO has transformed itself over the last fifteen years into an expeditionary force -- with full cooperation from Poland -- it is at its cornerstone a military alliance.

Sikorski's speech, delivered with passion and mischievious charm, was stirring. His rhetoric, delivered with the skill of an Oxford debater in Oxford accented English, was persuasive. He was, after all, merely calling on the West to live up to its own declared ideals. Indeed, he quoted from Barack Obama's victory speech: "Tonight we proved once more that the true strength of our nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope."

In reality, though, while people have ideals, countries have interests.

The West demonstrated time and again during the Cold War that its ideals had limits when faced with threats to its interests. When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was weak, we pushed hard to expand Western institutions, including bringing former Warsaw Pact countries into the EU and NATO. But, as we've seen in recent months, there are still limits to our will to act. When Russia invaded Georgia mere weeks after NATO had declared that Georgia and Ukraine "will become members of NATO," the action was met mostly by words. There's simply no appetite in America, much less "Old Europe," to go to war over the Near Abroad. And even EU trade sanctions have been stymied by the complex interrelationship between Member nations, most notably Germany, with Russia and its natural gas resources.

It's not at all clear why any of these fundamental calculations will change when Barack Obama takes office two months from tomorrow. To be sure, he ran on a plaform of "Hope" and "Change," two things desperately needed for Sikorski's doctrine to come to fruition. He may need more than that, though.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council.

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski Talks to Council

Peter Cassata — Wed, 19 Nov 2008 07:00:00 -0600

His Excellency Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Foreign Minister, spoke today at the Atlantic Council as part of the Council's Global Leadership Series. He praised continuing U.S.-Polish cooperation and solidarity, noting Poland's "traditional affinity" for the U.S.

Discussing NATO, Sikorski stated that "vision and resolve are badly needed on both sides of the Atlantic." He stressed not only that NATO's credibility is at stake in Afghanistan, but also that member states should restore the organization's role as a military alliance. In the face of recent Russian resurgence, Sikorski called for NATO to refocus its efforts on allied territory and said that providing security for member states should be the alliance's primary responsibility. He also said that the EU should use its economic weight as Russia's largest market to enact better regulation of Russian companies.

Sikorski congratulated President-elect Obama, urging him and his administration to continue plans for installing components of the European missile defense system in Poland. Poland is prepared to offer industrial monitoring and frequent inspection of the site as part of a package of confidence-building measures to address Russia's skepticism about the project.

Watch Video:

C-SPAN (1 hour, 2 minutes)

Read Transcript

Participants:

H.E. Radoslaw Sikorski – Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland
Frederick Kempe – President & CEO, Atlantic Council

Related Commentary on New Atlanticist Blog:

Melting the Russian Glacier – James Joyner
Obama's Election: The View from Europe – Peter Cassata
Sarkozy's Gamble? – Nikolas Gvosdev

Media Coverage:

Poland Won't Lobby Obama on Missile Defense – Walter Pincus, Washington Post
Poland Seeks to Reassure Russia on Missile Defense – Susan Cornwell, Reuters
Polish FM Wants Missile Defense Signal from Obama – Desmond Butler, Associated Press
Sikorski Visits Washington to Sound Out Obama Administration on Russia and Missile Shield – Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland)
Mr. Sikorski Goes to Washington – TheNews.pl (Poland)
Foreign Minister Sikorski in U.S. – Poland.pl (Poland)

Embassy Reports:

Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski Visits Washington – Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski – Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Schwab: Davos Model Key to Solving Systems Crisis

James Joyner — Fri, 17 Oct 2008 09:25:16 -0500

Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, spoke to an audience of Atlantic Council members for the inaugural Global Leadership Series event in New York. The speech also served as the kickoff for the 79th meeting of the British-North American Committee (BNAC).

Professor Schwab described the current financial crisis as a "systems crisis" and emphasized the "continued need for the Davos model of bringing state and non-state actors together to look at issues in an interrelated and strategic way." He warned that we might be going into an era of too much regulation because of current anti-business sentiment and that we need to preserve the right equilibrium between business and government. Further trends to watch for include the tendency for "national egoism" despite the globalized world economy, contrasted with stronger regional bonds and economic collaboration.

Schwab predicted that the commitment to corporate social responsibility and citizenship will continue as the business sector's image has been tarnished throughout this crisis.

Notable Guests and Dignitaries:

Matthew Bishop – Chief Business Writer/U.S. Business Editor of The Economist
Alan Griffith – Former Vice Chairman, The Bank of New York
Sir Paul Judge – Chairman, Teachers TV
Dr. Thomas Fingar – Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Brian C. McK. Henderson – Former Chairman of Global Public Sector Client Group in Global Markets, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
Lady Barbara Judge – Chairman, UK Atomic Energy Authority
Dr. Leroy Hood – President, The Institute for Systems Biology
Professor Klaus Schwab – Founder and Executive Chairman, TheWorld Economic Forum
Sir Mark Moody Stuart – Former Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell
Professor Thomas H.B. Symons, C.C. – Trent University
Dr. Paul Twomey – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
H.E. Michael H. Wilson – Ambassador to the U.S., Embassy of Canada

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Global Leadership Series

Estonian President Ilves: The Future of NATO

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President Ilves at the Atlantic Council Freedom's Challenge dinner

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Zapatero the Optimist

Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero: U.S.-EU Strategic Partnership

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Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez: 2/4/2010 — Transcript

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Transcript: Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski Talks to Council

Melting the Russian Glacier

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski Talks to Council

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Schwab: Davos Model Key to Solving Systems Crisis

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