Atlantic Council

By Gökhan Çetinsaya

A new Middle East is emerging after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The developments in Iraq will have far reaching consequences for the region’s future. Iraq is like a miniature of the Middle East with its population structure, social characteristics, problems and challenges. A process of mutual influence is expected between Iraq and its neighbors. Each domestic actor in Iraq has relations with ethnic and religious groups in the neighboring countries. The Kurds in northern Iraq have links with the Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran; the Shiite Arabs have relations with Arab and non-Arab Shiites in Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; the Sunni Arabs have relations with the Sunni Arabs in Syria and Jordan and Islamic movements in the Arab world; and the Turcomans have relations with Turkey. All of the neighboring and regional countries have also interest in and relations with these groups and actors in Iraq. Therefore the developments in Iraq will affect neighboring countries while policies pursued by its neighbors will inevitably have an impact on Iraq.

The New Middle East

The new Middle East seems to take its shape in the light of the following (interrelated) trends:

• There is a rise of non-state actors in the Middle East. They appear (as witnessed in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine) to will play crucial roles in the region. They have their own armed militias; they fight with the armies and challenge the states.
• They are at the same time ethnic and sectarian groups. Both at the state and non-state levels, ethnic and sectarian groups are rising as new influential actors; ethnic and sectarian discourse and politics will be dominant in the region.
• They are also ‘Islamist’ groups. ‘Islamism’ or ‘Political Islam’ will be influential as a political power. The ‘Islamist’ trend includes both armed and non-armed groups, as well as both Shiite and Sunni groups.
• There emerges a new strategic balance of power in the Middle East. The results of the loss of Iraq’s strong army and its ‘Arab identity’ in the region will be enormous. Iraq, as a powerful Arab country, withdrew from the regional equation and the strategic vacuum would be filled by Iran, Israel and Turkey. The new Iraq, as a militarily weak and a politically instable country, changes the balance of power in the region, especially at the expense of the Arab World.
• In this new strategic environment, there has been much discussion on the emergence of a “Shiite crescent” in the region. In fact, there appear to emerge not one but three “crescents” in the new Middle East:

• The Shiite crescent: The new Iraq turns out to be a country in which the Shiite Arabs would dominate both the central government and the foreign policy in the federal and democratic processes as prescribed by the constitution. It is inevitable that in such a situation Iran will gain an enormous advantage. The economic, social, cultural, and religious interactions between the two countries that had been prevented by the Baath regime will definitely increase in this new era. These interactions also cause anxiety for other regional actors who think that a ‘Shiite crescent’ is being created in the region stretching from Pakistan to Lebanon. As to the population rates, Shiites comprise 60% of population in Bahrain, 40% in Kuwait, 14% in Saudi Arabia, and 35% in Lebanon. In some arguments, the Zaydis that compose the 73% of the population in Yemen and the Nusayris in Syria who remain outside the Twelver Shiite Islam are also added to this list. This political crescent is at the same time an ‘oil crescent’ under the Shiite control stretching in the axis of Iran, Bahrain, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and southern Iraq. In addition to the aforementioned geo-political and geo-economic factors, one should also expect the effects of social, cultural and religious changes of the process of globalization in the ‘Shiite world’.

• The Muslim Brotherhood crescent: The new Middle East witnesses the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood parties in different parts of the region. The parties which adopted the political, social and religious philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood movement are getting strength in Sunni Arab politics day by day. In countries like Palestine where democratic elections were allowed these parties won the elections; in other countries like Egypt and Jordan, where democratic elections were not allowed, they became main opposition parties.

• The Kurdish crescent: The developments in northern Iraq would inevitably have political, social, economic and cultural impacts on the Kurds living in all the three neighboring countries- Turkey, Iran and Syria. Both in the short and the long run, these countries will feel the political, social, economic and cultural impacts of the ‘Kurdish Federal Region’ which was established in northern Iraq. The rise of the idea of independence and pan-Kurdish movement should be expected to gather momentum especially among the post-1991 generations in northern Iraq. In addition to mutual political effects, social, cultural and economic interplay should also be expected due to strong tribal and religious relations across the borders. Cultural interaction will have wider dimensions given the opportunities of globalization, i.e., media, universities, newspapers and magazines, literary products and internet facilities. A significant economic interaction should also be expected in this crescent, especially between Turkey and northern Iraq.

Turkey and the New Middle East

In this new Middle East, Turkey faces several challenges, risks and opportunities. Turkey is extremely anxious over the above-mentioned developments in the region, and tries to pursue a careful and comprehensive diplomacy in the region in order to forestall the dangers. Turkish political and military elites believe that disintegration of Iraq or/and new destabilizations in the Middle East could be disastrous for the region as well as Turkey.

What is Turkey’s policy toward the Middle East? Turkey’s current policy toward the Middle East could only be understood in the context of general foreign policy and strategic vision of the new Turkish foreign policy decision-makers or the Justice and Development Party (JDP) elites. In this vision, Turkey has become a pivotal country and a regional power in Eurasia and the Middle East since the end of the Cold War, and it has a great potential for constructive role in the Middle East, and also a potential to become a global actor, in terms of its strategic, geographical and historical depth. This vision denies a ‘bridge’ role for Turkey. This new vision identifies four main principles of Turkish foreign policy:

The first principle is to establish a link between freedom and security. After 9/11, instead of a freedom discourse, the world led by the United States adopted a security discourse. The only exception in this context has been Turkey: Only Turkey after 9/11 achieved freedom and democratization at the same time; only Turkey adopted a further democratization program without risking its security, both in internal and external politics.

The second principle is called “zero-problem with the neighbors”. According to this line of argument, instead of a psychology of neighboring enemies or a defensive attitude towards neighbors, Turkey should establish good relations with all of its neighbors. Implementing this principle, Turkey will gain extraordinary room for maneuver in the region. This is also the first condition for Turkey to become a pivotal state or a key player in the Middle East.

The third principle is multi-dimensional and multi-track foreign policy. It also refers to Turkey’s new pivotal role in the Greater Middle East region. In today’s international and regional dynamics, Turkey cannot maintain a static or one-dimensional foreign policy. Instead, Turkey should pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey should pursue this multi-dimensional foreign policy on different tracks. Accordingly, for example, it is not a contradiction to create joint ventures with both Russia and the US, or both the US and the EU. It is not also a contradiction to establish close relations with its neighbors and maintain strategic relations with the US. Turkey can discuss the problems and create solutions in the East, without denying its Western identity. At the same time, Turkey can adopt Western values and principles and can discuss the future of Europe from a European perspective, without denying its Eastern identity. In this way, Turkey can also contribute to the EU’s bid to become a global power, instead of a continental power. This vision sees all these joint or multi-dimensional relations as different parts of a big picture. It prefers to see the global system as a puzzle.

The final principle is to pursue a pro-active and visionary foreign policy. Instead of a defensive foreign policy, Turkey, as a regional power and a pivotal country, should formulate and pursue a pro-active, constructive and comprehensive foreign policy. In the new international and regional environment, Turkey should not become a source of problems, but a problem-solving country, and should take initiatives to solve the problems of its region, given its strategic, geographical and historical depth.

Turkish-American Interests in the Middle East

The “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership” document, dated July 5, 2006, indicates that Turkey and the United States “share the same set of values and ideals in our regional and global objectives: the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity.” Turkey and the United States pledge themselves to work together on all issues of common concern, including:

• promoting peace and stability in the broader Middle East through democracy;
• supporting international efforts towards a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including international efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two-state solution;
• fostering stability, democracy and prosperity in a unified Iraq;
• supporting diplomatic efforts on Iran’s nuclear program, including the recent P5+1 initiative;
• contributing to stability, democracy and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan;
• supporting the achievement of a just and lasting, comprehensive and mutually-acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question under the auspices of the UN and in this context ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots;
• enhancing energy security through diversification of routes and sources, including from the Caspian basin;
• strengthening transatlantic relations and the transformation of NATO;
• countering terrorism, including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates;
• preventing WMD proliferation;
• combating illegal trafficking of persons, drugs and weapons;
• increasing understanding, respect and tolerance between and among religions and cultures;
• and promoting together effective multilateral action to find solutions to international challenges and crises of common concern.

Looking at this long list, majority of the two countries’ interests seems to be converging. But even on the converging interests, the visions and the means are not compatible. There are differences on the perspectives and the methods of implementation of these interests. In other words, the aims are identical but the means are conflicting.

The case of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMEI) would be illuminating. In principle, the ruling JDP elites support the American BMEI project as an essential initiative for the good of the future of the Middle East. This vision accepts globalization as a natural stage of world history. In that sense, it is not surprising to see the effects of globalization in the Middle East. Globalization will manifest itself in the Middle East sooner or later, regardless of the American initiative. The transformation towards democratization in the Middle East should have begun ten years ago, at the end of the Cold War, as in Eastern European countries. But it did not happen then for several reasons, and now it should start once. The Middle East cannot survive for very long with its present political system, and should, therefore, adopt democratic values and structures, and integrate into the global system. But they criticize the method or the style of implementation of the initiative by the Bush administration. For Turkish elites, there are two main conditions for the implementation of the American project: a) It should not change the political landscape of the Middle East. It should not fragment or dissolve existing nation-states or alter their current borders. This would lead to chaos in the region; b) The initiative should come from within the system or the people, and should take social, cultural and economic parameters of the region into account. This new Turkish foreign policy vision argues that a self-confident Turkey should formulate and develop its own project in terms of the BMEI initiative, and implement it with its own paradigms or parameters. Then, according to this vision, Turkey could manage or lead great transformations in the region without any foreign intervention. In this regard, Turkey should have an active policy for the future of the region, prepare the mental framework for this initiative, share it with the people of the region, and transform the region in peace and stability.

The second example is Iran. Turkey is against the nuclearization of Iran. A nuclear Iran will change the strategic balance between two countries and in the region, at the expense of Turkey’s national security interests. But Turkish political and military elites are also against an American military intervention to Iran. Because, a) Turkey does not want a new war and destabilization along its borders and in the region (or a new “Pandora’s Box”) after the developments in Iraq since 2003; b) Beside the possibility of great economic costs for Turkey, Turkish elites has always seen destabilization of Iran through a foreign intervention as a security threat for Turkey. Turkish elites argue that a foreign military intervention in Iran would lead to destabilization and disintegration of Iran, and this would strengthen Kurdish nationalism or facilitate the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Furthermore, Ankara and Tehran have been collaborated on the Kurdish issue since the 1930s until the mid-1960s, and now they are in full collaboration on the issue of PKK terrorism. In other words Turkey sees the possibility of a nuclear Iran as a long-term threat; the short term threat for Turkish political and military elites is the PKK terrorism, and possibility of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In all these issues, Turkey needs the help or support of Iran.

Finally, it appears in recent months that there emerges a new division or a new cold war in the Middle East: on the one hand the so called radicals (or anti-American actors: Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hizbullah); on the other, the so called moderates (or pro-Americans: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait). They struggle for power over Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and both sides fight proxy wars. In this new picture, all groups look to Turkey, and all groups want Turkey in their camp. But Turkey is extremely anxious over these developments in the region. What Turkey wants? Turkey does not want confrontation or a new cold war in the Middle East between the Shiites and Sunnis or pro-Americans and anti-Americans; Turkey wants an engaging dialogue, security building measures, peace and stability, cooperation and integration. Turkey wants to play a constructive, facilitating and balancing role in the new Middle East. Turkey wants to establish balanced and equal relations with all actors on all levels. Turkey argues that discourses based on confrontation should be abandoned; an active, constructive and multidimensional discourse and policy which emphasizes peace, security, democracy and stability should be developed. To this effect, Turkey is ready to pursue a comprehensive public policy towards the people and actors of the region and international actors. On the level of discourse, participatory democracy based on territorial integrity, effective use and fair share of resources, ethnic-sectarian integration, pluralist unity, security for all, constitution of basic rights and freedoms, political consensus and stability should be emphasized as Turkey’s expectations. From Turkey’s point of view, the new Middle East needs four fundamental features for peace and stability: a) a regional security system for all; b) mutual political dialogue; c) economic integration and interdependence in the region; d) cultural pluralism in the region.

A Proposal for Regional Peace and Stability

The problems in the Middle East are highly complex, interrelated and intertwined. Negotiation with one actor or dialogue between two actors could not solve regional problems. Therefore, a comprehensive and all-inclusive initiative and mechanism is needed for peace and stability in the Middle East. In this regard, all regional and global actors (all regional countries plus UN, UNSC(5), G-8 countries, OIC, GCC, the Arab League) should involve in this initiative or mechanism; and all regional problems should be dealt with on the same table at the same time. For this purpose, a new “Helsinki Process” for the Middle East, adopted according to the realities and nature of the region, should be established. Through this mechanism, a process of confidence building measures; encouragement of political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and cultural pluralism in the region would be achieved.

Gökhan Çetinsaya is chairman of SETA.