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The Two Timetables

Nikolas Gvosdev | September 17, 2009
Moscow Time

U.S. and Russian strategies in the space “east of Europe” and across the Eurasian plain are operating on two different timetables.

Washington’s approach—as summed up by Vice President Joe Biden—is to start with the long-term un-sustainability of Russia’s approach to the world. Any resurgence of Russian power as a result of the “Vladimir Putin model” rests upon unstable factors (energy and commodity prices,over-reliance on the bureaucracy and the coercive instruments of the state, etc.) while future trends for Russia look grim (especially when it comes to demography). So, sooner or later, the Russian wave will crest and then Russia’s ability—indeed, its very desire—to challenge U.S. interests will recede. To secure its long term economic and political future, Russia will have to change course and seek accommodation with, instead of confrontation against, the United States in the Eurasian space.

This is a useful model, because, on the one hand, it allows the United States not to have to abandon its ultimate goals of NATO expansion to the east (especially to Georgia and Ukraine), by putting an ultimate air of inevitability on the outcome. On the other hand, given severe resource constraints caused not only by the burden of two wars but also increased domestic pressure, it reduces the urgency of Washington having to do something “right now”.

Moscow doesn’t think in long term increments, at least not worrying about Russia’s standing as a major power come 2030. Its short term strategy is to maximize whatever benefits it now possesses into reshaping its neighborhood into something more favorable for its economic and security interests. If the U.S. offers a vision of a future down the road that is attractive to Russia’s neighbors, Russia is trying to focus their attention on the here and now—what concrete steps Moscow is prepared to take in the present. In other words, what can be banked on right now. The U.S. promises that at some point in the future, you’ll be in NATO? How about a deal on natural gas this year? (Look, by the way, at how Russia has successfully wooed Turkey in this regard).
 
The Russian strategy employs both carrots and sticks. Over the last year, we've seen Russia use pressure to try and demonstrate the hollowness of promises from the West. It is not accidental, in my view, that Yuliya Tymoneshenko has dropped some of her rhetoric about Ukraine joining the West and the need to "contain Russia" in favor of pragmatic talk about doing business with Russia and seeking mutually-acceptable outcomes with the Kremlin ever since the Russo-Georgian war of last year.

The elections in Ukraine will be an interesting bellwether. In 2004,the “Orange” coalition came to victory on the promise that Ukraine’s destiny would ultimately lie with the West. The elections now are about which politician can plan to deliver benefits to the country—and whether future promises are more valuable than present offers.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College.  The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. Photo by Flickr user punxutawneyphil under Creative Commons license.

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Comments

"while future trends for Russia look grim (especially when it comes to demography"

Obviously, VPOTUS Biden dosen't know that in 200 Russia had the second highest birth rate of any major European countriy, exceeded only by France. Or that even with the globaal financial collapse, Russia's birth rate for the first 6 months of 2009 are up over the same period of 200.

So I wouldn't count Russia out yet.

What is so stable about the U.S., though, when the crises emerge there? Does Biden know for sure about 2030?

>>Moscow doesn’t think in long term increments

Hmmmph, I wonder if this is indeed what they ( in this case US 'realists' camp )want to build their long-term Eurasia strategy on, or is this just a clever excuse on the level with 'the grapes are too green'. Because honestly, who plays chess as national sport and who plays poker ? And who would out-sit who in the long range? Ain't we forgetting China, EU and other players? Demography is all fine and dandy but there are such small things as national debt, budget deficit, mammoth military budget that ain't going any smaller any time soon, 2 wars in the Middle East, erosion of international influence, oil that still hovers around 72$ - even in the middle of the worst crisis in decades, 2.5 trillion newly printed IOU's and I can go on and on... It just might turn out that by 2030 inviting Ukraine and Georgia into NATO might not even be on the list anymore - keeping Turkey and Germany in the NATO might be more urgent problem. And , honestly, what Biden said was probably the best way to keep Russia straddle the fence and let NATO bleed itself to death in Afganistan/Iran
- all the time letting them mumble about demography.

This is a useful model, because, on the one hand, it allows the United States not to have to abandon its ultimate goals of NATO expansion to the east (especially to Georgia and Ukraine), mcpmcsa by putting an ultimate air of inevitability on the outcome.

wedew....

I find it interesting that were even seeing elecltions, not so long ago this would be unthinkibale

Thank you very much for the information provided! I was looking for this data for a long time, bit I was not able to find the trusted source

Hmmmph, I wonder if this is indeed what they ( in this case US 'realists' camp )want to build their long-term Eurasia strategy on, or is this just a clever excuse on the level with 'the grapes are too green'. Because honestly, who plays chess as national sport and who plays poker ? And who would out-sit who in the long range? Ain't we forgetting China, EU and other players? Demography is all fine and dandy but there are such small things as national debt, budget deficit, mammoth military budget that ain't going any smaller any time soon, 2 wars in the Middle East, erosion of international influence, oil that still hovers around 72$ - even in the middle of the worst crisis in decades, 2.5 trillion newly printed IOU's and I can go on and on... It just might turn out that by 2030 inviting Ukraine and Georgia into NATO might not even be on the list anymore - keeping Turkey and Germany in the NATO might be more urgent problem. And , honestly, what Biden said was probably the best way to keep Russia straddle the fence and let NATO bleed itself to death in Afganistan/Iran

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