Atlantic Council

On any given day, U.S. military forces are conducting joint naval patrols, training and equipping partners’ military forces, and providing humanitarian assistance. Non-warfighting programs like these increasingly constitute the main line of efforts for US military commands. In 2009, for example, about 150 countries received some form of U.S. military assistance. The programs are driven by an expansive view of U.S. security interests, demands made by many countries who seek to reduce their own security deficits, but also genuine U.S. interests.

Building partners’ capacity is not purely devoid of national interests. By design, there are U.S. military activities that are implicitly and explicitly focused on international cooperation. Among these are developing headquarters for coalitions, coordinating security assistance activities, and participating in a multinational force. Coalition warfare has emerged as the norm over the last several decades and partnerships before war smooth the logistics and interoperability challenges that naturally occur in an operational environment. Thus, building relationships with strategically important countries is an important explanation for the changing face of the military.

In general, the United States has an expansive view of the security environment, which is too large for it to affect alone. The United States cannot command the commons; piracy in the Gulf of Aden, drug trafficking in Latin America, and terrorism in Europe suggest otherwise. Consequently, the United States has embraced the notion of operating indirectly through partners. Inherent to these activities is identifying partners’ capabilities that complement or assist the United States further its national interests. The military is strengthening the capacity of key countries in the Caribbean and Central America to better control illicit trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons. In this case, the military views these partners as “friendly surrogates” that can conduct operations when using American forces is not feasible or objectionable. Thus, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, and Honduras provide the first defense of America’s third border in the Caribbean.

There are further instrumental reasons underlying engagement activities. Each geographic combatant commander has specific responsibilities that necessitate running programs that have little to do with warfighting. These include: stationing of U.S. forces, sustaining forward deployed forces, obtaining multinational support against nonmilitary threats, supporting regional interagency activities, and coordinating planning with other government departments. Egypt, for example, expedites Navy ship transits through the Suez Canal. Or, developed states offset defense costs by providing host-nation support. Singapore, for example, developed port infrastructure to accommodate U.S. naval vessels and purchases U.S. weapons systems reinforcing levels of cooperation. And Japan provides about $4 billion annually to support U.S. forces on its territory. And Kuwait provides fuel, electricity, water, meals, and other allowances totaling $1 billion per year.

Further, good will activities serve a greater purpose to sustain access. For example, when Navy ships make port visits, the crew regularly plans and conducts community relations programs like rehabilitating schools. This not only allows the Sailors to do good things (and stay of out trouble), but it also builds good will among a population that can either welcome the next ship that visits or protest and obstruct it. American disposition for charity certainly underlies cooperative security activities, but for basing rights or gaining access to resources from partner countries, quid pro quo is necessary. Training and equipping partners’ security forces, conducting humanitarian activities, and facilitating military construction projects are a key piece of U.S. military strategy.

Having U.S. forces forward deployed in regions facilitates the identification of emerging threats, which can be confronted before mass violence outbreaks. The uncertainty of where the military will operate in the future is hedged through security relationships with nearly every country in the world. When critics divorce cooperative security programs and sustaining support for U.S. military presence, they risk undermining the ability for the military to conduct high-end operations if necessary. Trust cannot be surged during a crisis and presence during peacetime matters as much as attention does during conflict.

Derek Reveron, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.  These views are his own. Photo credit: AFRICOM.