NATOSource is proudly sponsored by EADS North America

New Atlanticist
National Interests
- Afghanistan
- Albania
- Armenia
- Australia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Brazil
- Britain
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Chad
- China
- Congo (DRC)
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Egypt
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Georgia
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Iceland
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Ireland
- Israel
- Italy
- Japan
- Jordan
- Kazakhstan
- Kosovo
- Kyrgyzstan
- Latvia
- Lebanon
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Libya
- Macedonia
- Malta
- Montenegro
- Morocco
- Netherlands
- North Korea
- Norway
- Pakistan
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Qatar
- Romania
- Russia
- Saudi Arabia
- Serbia
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Korea
- Spain
- Sudan
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Syria
- Taiwan (ROC)
- Tajikistan
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- U.A.E.
- U.S.
- Ukraine
- Uzbekistan
- Yemen
NATO allies may lack sufficient precision bombs for Syria contingencies
Jorge Benitez | December 17, 2012From Zachary Fryer-Biggs, Defense News: As NATO allies move troops and Patriot missile batteries into Turkey, heating up an already dicey situation on the Syrian border, experts are pointing to an alarming possibility: Most NATO countries might be ill-equipped to intervene in the ongoing conflict in Syria.
The problem stems from allies’ relatively small stockpiles of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), the smart bombs critical to effective operations in densely populated areas. So even if NATO members voice full support for an operation, they might not have the weapons to back it up.
“The heart is willing, but the flesh is weak,” said a former U.S. State Department official. . . .
Because of Syria’s superior air defense network and greater population density, the demand would outstrip supply, said Guy Ben-Ari, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“They just don’t have enough precision munitions, full stop,” he said. “Whether it’s to take out the air defense system, or whether it’s to take out the high-value targets that are much closer in Syria than they were in Libya to civilian populations, you do need a much larger inventory of precision munitions.”
Concern over the stockpiles of precision weapons is not theoretical. Less than a month into the 2011 Libya campaign, NATO came close to running out of PGMs, which are both advanced and expensive bombs. The situation became sufficiently dire that the U.S. rushed munitions to allies to help feed the campaign, and even kept aircraft on call in case NATO allies needed assistance after the U.S. had ceded major operational control. At the time, six countries were providing aircraft for the campaign: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Norway and the U.K. . . .
“[Ben-Ari:] There really is a big question mark on whether the PGM inventory specifically has even been brought back to pre-Libya levels, let alone overstocked for a potential Syria campaign.”
Yet several defense officials from NATO countries voiced confidence in their stocks of PGMs.
A senior Italian defense source said the Italian Air Force is “satisfied with its stocks of precision munitions, although not in reference to any specific mission.” A French defense official said that if there were an intervention, it would be in a coalition, and there would be sufficient stockpiles in the coalition. The official would not give numbers but indicated that France has “enough” bombs or could acquire them through its allies.
However, on Dec. 14, the French news website lepoint.fr reported France’s stocks will not return to pre-Libya levels until the end of 2013, citing a report from the Defense Ministry’s inspector general. A Defense Ministry spokesman declined to comment on the levels of munitions and the time for rebuilding stocks but pointed out that it takes about six months for an order contract to be signed, including the tender process, and the manufacturing time for sophisticated munitions takes months, not weeks. (photo: NATO)
NATOSource

The daily news of the world's most powerful alliance.
The views expressed in NATOSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.
Follow on Twitter: @NATOSource
"I am an enormous fan of NATOSource. I use it virtually every day, because it provides a wide variety of views, a solid base of factual knowledge, and keeps me in touch with the world of NATO."
Admiral James Stavridis, (Ret,), former SACEUR

(Graphics: Deutsche Welle and Reuters)
Most Popular NATOSource Posts
Key Issues
- Alliance Unity
- Allied Command Operations
- Allied Command Transformation
- Article 5
- Burden Sharing
- Capabilities Gap
- Chicago Summit
- Congress
- CSTO
- Cyber Threats
- Defense Spending
- Energy Security
- EU
- High North
- Intelligence
- ISAF
- Missile Defense
- NATO Defense Ministerials
- NATO Exercises
- NATO Ministerials
- NATO Operations
- NATO Partnerships
- NATO Response Force
- Nuclear Weapons
- OSCE
- Piracy
- R2P
- SACEUR
- SACT
- Secretary General
- Smart Defense
- Special Forces
- Strategic Concept
- Terrorism
- Transatlantic Relations
- United Nations
- Weapon Systems
TransAtlantic Links
Media Links
- Associated Press
- Baltic Times
- Brussels blog
- Deutsche Welle
- Economist
- EU Observer
- European Voice
- Financial Times
- Guardian
- Hurriyet Daily News
- International Herald Tribune
- Kathimerini
- Kyiv Post
- Le Monde Diplomatique
- Moscow Times
- New York Times
- Newsweek
- Prague Daily Monitor
- Radio Free Europe
- Reuters
- Ria Novosti
- Russia Today
- Slovak Spectator
- Spiegel
- St. Petersburg Times
- Sur
- Telegraph
- Times (London)
- Today's Zaman
- Wall Street Journal
- Washington Post
- Xinhua
Research Centers
- American Enterprise Institute (AEI), United States
- Aspen Institute, United States
- Atlantic Council, United States
- Brookings Institution, United States
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United States
- Cato Institute, United States
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS), United States
- Center for International Relations (CIR), Poland
- Center for Security Studies (CSS), Switzerland
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), United States
- Center for Transatlantic Relations, United States
- Cicero Foundation, Netherlands
- Council on Foreign Relations, United States
- Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS), Denmark
- EU Institute for Security Studies, France
- European Council on Foreign Relations, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Spain, UK
- European Institute, United States
- Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France
- French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), France
- Fundacion para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociale (FAES), Spain
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Germany
- German Marshall Fund of the United States, United States
- Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos (GEES), Spain
- Heritage Foundation, United States
- Hoover Institution, United States
- Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), France
- Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), United States
- Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Germany
- Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), United Kingdom
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Germany
- Lemnitzer Center, United States
- Marshall Center, Germany
- Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), Netherlands
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway
- RAND, United States
- Real Instituto Elcano, Spain
- Ridgway Center, United States
- Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), United Kingdom
- Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), United Kingdom
- Schuman Center (RSCAS), Italy
- Security & Defence Agenda (SDA), Belgium
- Strategy International (SI), Greece
- U.S. Institute of Peace, United States
- Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, United States

