Atlantic Council

On March 18, the Atlantic Council hosted a conference with senior administration officials, experts, and authoritative Europeans to assess the alternative futures for U.S. force posture in Europe. The event, generously sponsored by Booz Allen Hamilton with support from L-3 Services Group, featured Dr. Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, U.S. and European points of view in two separate panels, and Representative Jim Marshall (D-GA), Member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Transcripts and Audio:

Introductions and Panel 1 - Administration Perspective on Force Posture (Transcript, MP3):

Panel 2 - U.S. Perspectives on Force Posture in Europe (Transcript, MP3):

Panel 3 - European Perspectives on U.S. Force Posture in Europe (Transcript, MP3):

Conclusion and Panel 4 - A Congressional on Force Posture in Europe (Transcript, MP3):

 

U.S. Force Posture in Europe Conference Agenda (PDF)

Download Congressman Michael Turner's Remarks (PDF)

Media Coverage:

• For a Smarter U.S. Footprint in Europe, Think Small - Leo Michel, Defense News

Related Documents:

• Primer document on U.S. Force Posture in Europe (PDF)
• Strengthening the Transatlantic Alliance Through a Policy of Strategic Assurance to Central and Eastern Europe (PDF) - Alan Hester and Paul Bauman, Atlantic Council Senior Fellows
• Document from Atlantic Council Army Senior Fellow Colonel Alan Hester - Building Allied Capability (PDF) - Alan Hester, Atlantic Council Senior Army Fellow

On December 17, 2009, the Atlantic Council’s International Security Program hosted a workshop to consider options for the U.S. Force Posture in Europe in advance of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Atlantic Council Vice Chair and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Kramer opened the workshop, which was moderated by Ian Brzezinski, a member of the Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO and European Policy, and Booz Allen Hamilton Principal. Participants included current and former U.S. Government officials and military commanders, congressional staff, policy analysts, and foreign embassy representatives.

The event held in December marked the beginning of a continuing discussion on this topic through a policy paper and public discussion of these issues in the broader context of its work on the future of the Alliance. Below is the scene-setter which framed the first workshop. For more information, please contact Atlantic Council Senior Fellows Paul Bauman at pbauman@acus.org or Alan Hester at ahester@acus.org. 

European Theater Force Posture Scene-Setter

17 December Working Group

In its ongoing global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, the Department of Defense (DOD) continues planning to reduce the number of troops permanently stationed overseas, consolidate overseas bases, and establish a network of smaller forward locations with limited personnel. Realigning the U.S. overseas posture involves closing obsolete and redundant bases, constructing new facilities, and ensuring that other needed infrastructure is in place to support realigned forces and missions.

Global force posture planning was reinforced and guided by Bush Administration announcements on August 16, 2004 to significantly alter the U.S. overseas military posture. The plan recommended establishing new overseas operating sites and smaller minimally-manned sites, and transferring 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from Europe and Asia back to the United States. The Administration argued that current U.S. global basing arrangements are a product of World War II and the Korean War, and that with the end of the Cold War, these basing arrangements needed to be updated to ensure U.S. forces are optimally positioned to respond to potential 21st-Century military threats.

Within the European Theater specifically, the Bush Administration plan sought to transfer 40,000 more European-based U.S. troops, mostly from the Army, to CONUS.  United States Army Europe force levels, which stood at 217,000 in 1989 and 65,000 in 1996, would decline to 24,000 in the end state.  The end state envisioned the removal of all heavy armored units from Europe, with a Stryker Brigade remaining in Grafenwohr, Germany and the 173rd Airborne Brigade remaining in Vicenza, Italy.  Air Force presence in Europe has likewise been reduced from 1989 levels.  From a total European commitment of 9.25 fighter wings in 1989, the Air Force reduced its presence to 2.33 fighter wings, located in the UK, Germany, and Italy.

A component of the new strategy was the planned implementation of a concept to periodically deploy units permanently based in the United States to Forward Operating Sites in Eastern Europe for training.  Additional objectives of this concept were maintaining presence and influence in the newly democratized areas of Eastern Europe, and demonstrating the ability of the United States to deploy and reinforce the European region or to deploy from the European Region to reinforce other regional commands with deployable forces.

These plans received a mixed response, especially as regards timing and synchronization with other initiatives, and concerns over signals it could send to both Allies and potential adversaries.   On May 9, 2005, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (“Overseas Basing Commission”) issued a report in response to its congressional mandate.  The commission’s conclusions included the following concerns/recommendations:

• “U.S. presence in Europe remains crucial to future global stability. The legitimacy of that presence lies directly with our ties to NATO. Full participation in NATO allows us to maintain a leadership position in European affairs, as well as in contiguous regions. We cannot hope for much influence without presence — the degree of influence often correlates to the level of permanent presence that we maintain forward.”
• “The argument that rotational units will suffice for such influence may have merit, but it runs against the perception our allies will hold that the presence is not permanent and that it may not be continued over time if political will is lost, budgets become overstretched, or rotational units are diverted elsewhere.”
• “The complete removal of all of the armored force from the EUCOM region is not necessary or warranted at this time. The Commission has found no strategic imperative or threat reductions that dictate their removal. It provides an unbalanced force to the Region.”
• “Given the continued uncertainties on the peripheries of the region, the heavy modularized brigade is a cost effective risk mitigation force.”

By 2007, the US Army had removed a corps headquarters, two divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and their assigned supporting units from Europe and force levels stood at 43,000 enroute to announced end state of 24,000.  Senior US military leaders in the region, however, issued a report recommending against further planned cuts, below the 43,000 level, in order to allow for the execution of Theater Security plans to train and exercise with NATO allies and Partnership for Peace nations.  A stronger presence in Europe was also seen as a hedge against potential security risks, including the Balkans, and as a deterrent to potential adversaries.

On November 21, 2007, in response to this request, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced a temporary freeze in executing plans for further reducing army forces in Europe.  While plans for the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team to remain based in Italy and for a Stryker brigade to remain in Germany remained unchanged, the decision meant that the two heavy brigade combat teams, the 170th at Baumholder and the 172nd at Schwinfurt, would remain in Germany until 2011.  The temporary nature of this freeze, effective until 2011, essentially meant it was up to the next president, President Obama, to decide the eventual number and location of American forces in Europe.

The outgoing Commander of US European Command, General John Craddock, testified before Congress in March 2009 that this freeze should become permanent.  United States Army Europe Commanding General, General Carter Ham, concurs, warning that if forces are cut further, as called for in the original plan, there would be insufficient resources to engage with allies, in particular to conduct training exercises with NATO military partners, and to prepare for contingency operations.  European basing considerations are now a part of the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), although it is unclear if USEUCOM’s request for a halt to further planned cuts in the European Theater will be addressed directly in the report.

Related Publication:

• Global Futures and Implications for U.S. Basing