Atlantic Council

Back to Senator Richard Lugar: Congressional Perspective on the Future of NATO

SENATOR LUGAR'S PREPARED REMARKS

I would like to thank Fred Kempe and the Atlantic Council for an invitation to address this gathering.  By hosting today’s dialogue, the Council again has proven why it is held in such high esteem within the Atlantic community.  It is a special honor to be introduced by my good friend, Chuck Hagel, who has contributed enormously to the United States Senate and to U.S. national security. I deeply miss his presence on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but continue to benefit from his wise counsel.  

The new NATO Secretary General has made the formulation of a new Strategic Concept one of his first priorities in office. He has asked a distinguished Group of Experts to lead the effort. I am grateful for the opportunity to offer my thoughts on the state of the Alliance.    

Since 1991, it has been axiomatic to begin discussions on the future of NATO by affirming that the Alliance is at a crossroads or facing a crisis. Even before 1991, this was a common refrain. At a CSIS conference in Brussels in 1979 commemorating NATO’s first 30 years, French strategist Pierre Hassner presented a paper with two slogans: “The situation has never been so serious” and NATO “rocks but does not sink.” 

Hassner’s point, which I believe rings true today, was that even as statements of alarm have been characteristic of Alliance discussions since its inception, NATO has achieved impressive longevity.   The NATO alliance has been a fundamental component of the basic peace and stability enjoyed by Europe for many decades.

When evaluating NATO, I start from the presumption that after 60 years, it is still a work in progress. Alliances must continually reassess their purposes and adapt to new circumstances.  If one takes this long term view, current alliance deficiencies – though serious -- do not seem insurmountable.   NATO possesses enormous geopolitical assets and a history of achievement that, with the proper leadership, can undergird success in the future. 

Before we can chart a course forward, the Alliance must ask itself: What is it that the new Secretary General has inherited? What is it that we are supposed to fix? We must articulate a vision for NATO that both prepares for any potential threat from traditional rivals and develops new capabilities in meeting unconventional threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, cyber warfare, and energy manipulation.  This challenge is magnified by the fact that most of our domestic constituencies no longer perceive our security and way of life to be under imminent threat. 

The forthcoming strategic review must grapple with at least four central issues now facing the Alliance.  

Strengthening the Credibility of Article Five 

First, how do we strengthen the credibility of Article Five? Recent developments have eroded some of NATO’s deterrence value, both in the eyes of those who are supposed to be deterred by it and those who are supposed to benefit from such a deterrent. This erosion has occurred as Members of the Alliance have expressed less enthusiasm for NATO expansion and found an increasing number of reasons to avoid committing forces to Afghanistan. The decline in the deterrent value of Article Five became more apparent with the onset of the energy crises in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments of “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies with respect to oil and natural gas arrangements with the Russian Federation. The perceived success of Moscow’s foreign and energy policies has enlivened nostalgia in Russia for a privileged sphere of influence, causing allies on NATO’s periphery to be increasingly nervous about the credibility of Article Five.  

In this context, the recent decision by the Obama Administration to alter Alliance missile defense plans has the potential to further damage confidence in Article Five.  At the time of the Russia-Georgia conflict, U.S. negotiators were engaging Poland and the Czech Republic on the terms of deployment of a theater missile defense shield to protect against an Iranian missile threat. In response to rising domestic opposition, these governments expended considerable capital to keep talks moving forward. Following Russia’s escalation in Georgia, the Poles expedited agreement on the terms of deployment for reasons having little to do with Iran or missile hardware. For the Poles, the presence of American soldiers and trainers on Polish soil, who were ostensibly charged with maintenance and control of those systems, was a way to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Polish security. 

It was in this psychological and political environment that the Obama Administration announced its about-face on missile defense last week. The timing of the announcement was a surprise for several reasons. The Quadrennial Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews have not yet been completed. Over the past months, the Administration has withheld final decisions on several other national security items on the basis that the QDR and NPR were not completed. In this case, it would appear that at least a portion of the NPR was accelerated or set aside as part of an effort to justify the President’s missile defense announcement.

Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the new missile defense architecture proposed by the President. It may well turn out to be a technical improvement in meeting the projected threat over the original design proposed by the previous Administration. But Iranian missiles never constituted the primary rationale for Polish and Czech decisions to buy into the Bush Administration’s plan. Rather, it was the waning confidence in NATO, and Article Five in particular, that lent missile defense a political credibility that exceeded the military merits of the plan.  

The United States must be sensitive to events that have transpired in the broader European security environment since the Bush plan was proposed and negotiated.  

Therefore, the Obama Administration must re-engage the Poles, the Czechs, and the entire Alliance on ways to strengthen security in Central and Eastern Europe.   

The success of NATO in Afghanistan remains inextricably linked to America’s own legacy there. Absent NATO structures, many of our allies would have even less incentive to field forces capable of fighting alongside the United States. We would also lose the added influence among local populations that derives from any activity conducted with a coalition, especially civilian-intensive operations as in Afghanistan.   

The United States has struggled to garner greater European participation in Afghanistan, despite strong strategic incentives for Europe. European cities are a lucrative destination for Afghan drugs, and territories in the region have been used as training grounds for terrorism perpetrated in Europe. Continued unrest in Afghanistan also has the potential to expand throughout the region and disrupt energy conduits on which Europe depends.     

While the 2009 Summit re-affirmed that “the principle of indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental,” this has not translated into sufficient contributions by Alliance partners in Afghanistan. The situation is not monolithic, and many allies have suffered extreme loss fighting alongside American forces in the most perilous zones of southern Afghanistan.  

I understand historical sensitivities and the diverse military dispositions of our European friends. The economic dislocations of the last year have created additional constraints for defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic. But some allies are failing to structure military forces in ways that would make them fully deployable. The European NATO nations spend about one third as much per service member as the United States does. We must reverse the growing perception of a two-tiered Alliance, where operational restraints and chronic troop shortfalls inoculate certain allies from the risks being undertaken by others. The Alliance needs bold leadership if we are to arrest these trends and build strong defense institutions on both sides of the Atlantic.  

Energy Security and Unconventional Threats 

The third question the strategic review must ask is: How should NATO respond in an era where computer attacks, energy cut-offs, terrorism, and hazardous material can imperil a nation’s security and prosperity in ways that only military forces once could? One particular gap in the last Strategic Concept, exposed by a series of energy crises and myopic responses, was its failure to incorporate energy security into NATO’s mission. 

Three years ago at the NATO summit in Riga, I encouraged the Alliance to make energy security an Article Five commitment in which any member experiencing a deliberate energy disruption would receive assistance from other Alliance members. I argued that there was little distinction between an energy cutoff and an armed invasion. A shutdown of natural gas supplies to a nation in the middle of winter could cause death and economic calamity on the same scale as a military attack. Merging energy support into NATO’s core mission would also strengthen Alliance cohesion and reinforce public support for the alliance. The challenge of securing stable, affordable energy supplies is one that looms at the top of every ally’s agenda, cutting across the fields of transportation, industrial, environmental, and national security policy. 

I did not expect my proposal to be immediately embraced by many Alliance leaders, but I hoped it would stimulate more thought about how NATO and other European institutions could achieve collective solutions to energy insecurity.  I have been encouraged that NATO has made progress in making energy security part of its operational duties, including strategic planning, infrastructure protection, and intelligence analysis. But even as NATO works to confront energy threats, we have not answered the question of how NATO will respond when energy is used as a weapon. In past years, Gazprom has shut off the spigot to six NATO allies or their neighbors on the heels of political developments that the Kremlin found objectionable. The Atlantic community must work together to establish a credible energy strategy that removes energy decisions from the realm of statecraft and eschews the go-it-alone polices that leave others exposed to exploitation.    

This July, we saw promising signs that a common strategy is achievable. I was invited to join the U.S. Envoy for Energy Security, Ambassador Richard Morningstar, for the signing of a landmark agreement in Ankara to move forward on the Nabucco pipeline. This agreement among twelve countries and the European Union was a breakthrough that had only dim prospects one year ago. Apart from the natural gas it will carry, Nabucco illustrates that parochial interests can be surmounted for the common cause of energy cooperation. 

The fourth question is whether closer cooperation between Russia and NATO is possible. Despite setbacks in the last year, NATO must continue to advance common interests with Russia through the Russia-NATO Council on such issues as weapons proliferation, terrorism, and missile defense. Russia, too, faces critical foreign policy challenges for which it requires allies. Russian participation in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor in the eastern Mediterranean and the joint rescue of a Russian crew in the Atlantic are emblematic of the types of operations that can translate into cooperation with Moscow in other areas. While vital Alliance decisions must be made by members only, we must not let divergent views within NATO thwart the emergence of a more productive agenda with Russia.       

After the Alliance lost its galvanizing threat, I was one of those who urged that NATO should not become a relic but rather re-cast its strategic rationale to meet emerging threats. NATO, I argued, had to go “out of area or out of business.”  Though some allies have called for geopolitical retrenchment in response to perceptions that Article Five guarantees have declined in value, I believe the proper response is to strengthen those guarantees and find creative ways to address the more nuanced threats that we face today. A new Strategic Concept simultaneously must reaffirm the fundamental value of NATO and reinforce those principles that led to its creation. 

The provision of security assurance within Europe has been a central challenge to American foreign policy since 1917. Our continued commitment to NATO does not come without costs, but remains the most promising vehicle for projecting stability throughout Europe and its political fault lines with Asia and the Middle East.   I am hopeful that the new Strategic Concept can undergird NATO’s continued success for decades to come. 

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