Atlantic Council

President Mohammed Morsi’s July 8 decree (Arabic text) calling the dissolved parliament back into session has stunned all of Egypt and set off heated debates about whether the move is even legal, let alone advisable.  At the same time, it should not be entirely surprising: the Muslim Brotherhood president has indicated since he was sworn into office on June 30 that he did not accept the dissolution of the Islamist-majority parliament, which took place in the tense interval between the voting and announcement of the presidential election results.  It was only a question of what he would do to challenge the dissolution, and when.  But it seems no one was expecting him to make his move so quickly. Questions being debated right now in Egypt about Morsi’s decree include whether it has any legal basis, whether that matters, why he issued it now, and what will happen next. 

• Is the decree legal? The early analysis of whether the move is legal is running heavily against Morsi.  Morsi’s decree annulled a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) decree that dissolved the lower house (People’s Assembly, PA) of parliament that was elected in late 2011.  But the SCAF decree followed a ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court invalidating the system under which one-third of the PA were elected.  Morsi’s decree says nothing about the court decision, so as of now it is not at all clear whether Morsi is simply ignoring the court decision or whether he plans to accommodate it in some way—for example, by agreeing that the one-third of seats concerned need to be re-elected.  All the decree says is that the whole PA should reconvene and resume its legislative duties, and that new elections should be held 60 days after a new constitution is approved—which might well be months away.  So while Morsi might have the legal authority to annul a SCAF decree (there are mind-numbing legal debates about that as well), it is not at all clear that he has the authority to ignore a court ruling that requires at least a partial rerunning of the elections as soon as possible.

• Does legality matter? At an evening gathering of the members of the liberal elite hours after the decree, most were horrified by such brazen disregard for Egypt’s highest court.  One asked whether Egypt was returning to “the law of the jungle,” while others saw the decree as yet the latest example of perfidy and over-reaching by the Muslim Brotherhood.  But some younger attendees, including a liberal MP and a political advisor, acknowledged that the series of events just before Morsi’s inauguration—the court’s quick invalidation of the electoral law that had produced an Islamist majority, and the SCAF’s follow-up Supplemental Constitutional Declaration cutting back presidential powers significantly—had damaged the reputations of the judiciary and the military and perhaps encouraged Morsi to believe he could get away by playing by the same rough rules.

• Why did Morsi do it—and why now?  Morsi appears to have been under significant pressure from his Freedom and Justice Party, as well as Salafi parties, to use his presidential authority to restore their hard-won majority in the parliament.  But he might also have been acting to pre-empt another decision by the Supreme Constitutional Court expected on July 9, on a case challenging the legality of the SCAF’s action dissolving the parliament.  Another explanation of the timing was that Morsi might be implementing a decision made by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council during a July 7 meeting.  Some observers find this troubling, as Morsi made a show of resigning from the Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, promising to be president of all Egyptians.  There is a conspiracy theory that Morsi issued the decree as part of a deal made with the SCAF, but that seems unlikely; a TV talk show host who is in regular touch with the SCAF said military leaders told him they were taken completely by surprise.

• What happens next? If what Morsi has done is to counter a soft coup by the SCAF that took place just before his inauguration, the question now is whether the military will mount a counter counter coup of some kind against Morsi and if so, how.  Another important question is whether the parliament will succeed in reconvening a quorum and, if so, whether it has an agenda of legal steps it plans to take in an attempt to outflank the SCAF and constitutional court.  Also, will there be a resumption of violent demonstrations?  Tahrir Square filled with celebrating demonstrators throughout the evening of July 8, chanting pro-Morsi slogans, but cleared out by 1 am, showing that at least for now, they were not seeking a confrontation with the military. 

One more note: Morsi’s decree places the US administration in a ticklish position, coming as it did within hours of a friendly meeting with Deputy Secretary of State William Burns—who said quite properly that “it will be critical to see a democratically elected parliament in place,” although he undoubtedly had no inkling of Morsi’s next move—and a week before a planned visit by Secretary of State Clinton.  Difficult days ahead for Egyptians and difficult decisions for Washington, which had been eager, along with much of the world, to believe that Morsi’s election was finally putting the Egyptian transition on a firmer footing.  But it is now clear that Morsi has no intention of accepting the admittedly humiliating conditions the SCAF attached to his presidency.

Michele Dunne is director of the Atlantic Council's Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. Photo Credit: Reuters