



THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES

1101 15TH STREET, N.W. • 11TH FLOOR • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
TELEPHONE: (202) 778-4949 • FACSIMILE: (202) 463-7241 • EMAIL: ptucker@acus.org

**ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING WITH GENERAL JAMES JONES, OUTGOING SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR)**

SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON NATO

**PRESIDER: FRED KEMPE, PRESIDENT, CEO, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

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MR. KEMPE: Before we get started, I just wanted to announce that if
any cell phones ring, I'll take that as an announcement of someone wanting to
give a major contribution to the Atlantic Council. (Laughter.) And so please --
those who would rather do it more privately later, turn off your cell phones.

It's my great pleasure to welcome you all to the headquarters of the
Atlantic Council of the United States for this pre-holiday event with General
James L. Jones. This launches -- ah, well, that's very useful -- this launches
what will become here at the Atlantic Council a new commander series, and as you
can see, we're starting right at the top, where we'll have military leaders not
just from the United States, but also from other countries come to the Atlantic
Council and talk to us about their challenges in person and also in some cases
in a new video conference facility that we've installed at the Atlantic
Council.

I'm Fred Kempe. I'm the incoming president of the Atlantic Council.
Many of you may know me from my years at the Wall Street Journal, most of them
spent in Europe. And I think General Jones it's safe to say by the turnout and
the stature of the turnout, that you're quite a draw.

GEN. JONES: Thank you, sir.

MR. KEMPE: Thank you for coming.

General Jones is going to speak to us about the future of NATO having
recently turned over his command to General Craddock after roughly four years as
the alliance's supreme allied commander. You're the first Marine to have had
that job, and you were previously Marine commandant. If I'm not mistaken,
you're going to retire from the Marine Corps February 1st of next year after 40
years of distinguished service.

GEN. JONES: Thank you. Thank you, Fred.

MR. KEMPE: I'm not going to take up much time here with all the details of your very impressive biography, except to say that in Europe I've experienced on several occasions where Europeans are taken aback by an incredibly fluent French learned during your formative years in Paris, where your father was working for International Harvester. And the most interesting point on your bio or one of the more interesting points on your bio for me was, of course, your career at Georgetown University as a basketball player. (Laughter.)

GEN. JONES: Short career. (Laughs, laughter.)

MR. KEMPE: But with that, let me give you the first pass.

GEN. JONES: Thank you.

MR. KEMPE: And I wonder if you could get us started with a brief reflection on how the alliance is different now than it was when you joined as supreme allied commander four years ago, and if you could do that in two respects, both the health of the alliance, but also things that concern you at the moment.

GEN. JONES: Okay. Well, Fred, thanks very much, and thanks to the Atlantic Council for the -- this incredibly kind invitation to spend some time with you. It's a great honor. And I did speak to the secretary-general this morning, and he asked to pass on his best wishes for the Atlantic Council and its format. And he looks forward to visiting the Atlantic Council in the not too distant future.

Four years in NATO was an incredible experience, certainly one of the highlights of my life. I think I was very fortunate in arriving when I did in January of 2003 in the aftermath of the -- what I think was one of the most visionary summits that has been held in modern times. The Prague summit of 2002 gave someone like me, a strategic commander, what we in the military really want from our civilian leadership and that's strategic guidance. And it's spelled out in very precise terms what it was that the military leadership of then 19 sovereign nations wanted the alliance to do over the next several years, and at every turn, I referred back to that guidance when people would sometimes say, what are you doing and why are you doing this? I really actually had a document that I could relate to and say I'm doing this and we're doing this because we were told to.

And the military transformation, which, I think -- of the alliance, which actually started with that visionary summit, was really the -- gave me the -- gave us the legitimacy that we needed to take on some fairly major transformational goals that I think for the most part we achieved over the last four years.

Simply put, I think the conclusions over the last four years -- at least mine are that the alliance is an incredibly healthy organization, at least from a political standpoint. We -- perhaps the highlight of the four years was witnessing the accession of seven new sovereign nations into the alliance in 2004. That was a very, very emotional moment for seven former Warsaw Pact countries to come in and be full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And you don't have to go back too far in time to understand what that meant to the people of those countries, and it's really a palpable enthusiasm for freedom, for democracy, rule of law, and just the vast potential for those people that has been unleashed and that you feel every day, this

enthusiasm from these new members of the alliance. So to me, I think the alliance is healthy in many respects. That's certainly one. And the other evidence is that I know of no countries that are trying to leave the alliance, and I know quite a few that are trying to queue up -- to measure up to achieve full membership by as early as 2008.

So I think, over my tour, one of the things that I remember the most is that day in 2004 when the alliance went from 19 to 26.

The other things that I would tick off is that the transformation of the military footprint is really a fact. We have dramatically reduced the number of headquarters we've had during the Cold War. We have -- we disestablished the SACLANT billet. Supreme Allied Command Atlantic was replaced by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, which was further evidence of a commitment to really transform the military capabilities. All of the operations in the alliance came under one strategic commander, at SHAPE, and I was the beneficiary of that.

And the alliance also signalled that it was willing to render obsolete the term of "out of area," as if "out of area" was an exception during the Cold War. It is now not even a term that we use anymore. It's a given that NATO is operating today on three different continents, with over 50,000 troops committed to NATO missions, and also conducting NATO's only Article V missions in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavor.

MR. KEMPE: So Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Africa --

GEN. JONES: Africa, the Balkans --

MR. KEMPE: -- Balkans --

GEN. JONES: -- and --

MR. KEMPE: -- all of which is new since -- from in the past four years

--

GEN. JONES: All of this is new. That's correct.

So -- and then the other thing that I take away is also the willingness of the alliance to embrace change. And nowhere was that more evident than by the creation of the NATO Response Force, which is now fully operationally capable. And that was achieved at the Riga summit.

The NATO Response Force is probably NATO's most visible commitment to genuine transformation, to being willing to not only take on missions at strategic distance but to do so in an expeditionary manner. The portfolio of the NATO Response Force is really NATO's first combined arms capability -- army, navy, air force, marines and the special forces, all operating under one commander, with a very, very specific timeline through which -- that they must meet in order to get out the door and start executing their mission.

The first major mission that was executed by the NRF was in support of the humanitarian disaster relief mission in Pakistan. We also did some small assistance in reaction to Katrina here in the United States. But the first NRF mission, interesting enough, was a humanitarian disaster relief. It was not a combat mission at all. And one of the things that NATO is doing, I think, as a result of this, is reinventing itself and re-explaining itself. Because in the

world, NATO is thought of, correctly so, as a -- principally a warfighting organization, and this transformation of NATO going from a reactive, 20th-century force -- which it needed to be -- to a 21st-century, more expeditionary and agile force, brings with it a whole lot of things that perhaps even the visionary Prague summit didn't realize.

I jokingly say that if nations realized what they were signing up to in 2002, they probably wouldn't have done it, because it does cost money and it does cost -- it has caused a lot of pain. But it gets you into things like multinational logistics and organic intelligence, which NATO has never had. NATO has always existed off the largess of contributing countries who say, well, we will tell you certain things. But you can't get into expeditionary operations if you don't have intelligence. So we're doing that as well.

MR. KEMPE: Well, let me pick up from that. And we'll -- in the first part of this, we'll have a conversation between the two of us, and then for the second half, we'll go to you for your questions.

That's an impressive list -- seven new countries, a military transformation of a certain sort, fewer headquarters, a NATO Response Force -- a lot of things that one can tick off as real accomplishments, and I think you've taken some political instruction of the Prague Summit. One can safely say you're a strategic commander who ran with it.

Now we're in a situation that, despite all of these accomplishments, people are looking at the Riga summit, which was billed to be one of the most important in the alliance's 57-year history, building off all the things you're talking about, and there's a real division of opinion. As some are saying it was hugely disappointing, showing a real lack of political will, others are saying, well, that's a misread, there was actually a lot accomplished. How would you grade the summit?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think it was a solid summit. I mean, I'd say, you know, a solid B. And that's not bad when you consider all of the things that are going on in the world. But I think that there were elements, if you read the communique carefully, you can see elements for the future. And that is to say, what are some of the things that NATO ought to consider doing in the future that it has not firmly taken on at this point?

And we've had a number of seminars. The secretary-general has been very visionary in his belief, for example, that NATO should be thinking about such things as the defense of critical infrastructures in our membership countries. New partnerships, new relations with countries at great strategic differences that want to have a relationship with NATO. And by example I would use South Korea, Japan and Australia, to name three that have come to the alliance and said: We have issues of collective security here that we believe dovetail; we're not really interested in becoming members, but we do want to work on this collective security business.

MR. KEMPE: But the world's global partnership didn't appear in the communique, but do you see in the communique, strategic commander, enough there to globalize NATO and take on these --

GEN. JONES: No, but in the communique you will see references to energy security, for example, as a topic. This is not just a NATO topic, this is an international topic that can and should be addressed. The defense of critical infrastructures. I believe that you will hear more in NATO over time

as NATO considers the issue of proliferation and narcoterrorism and the like. These are some of the asymmetric issues that I think are coming NATO's way. NATO will have to embrace those and decide how it wishes to proceed.

But that's why I think the summit was a solid summit. It reaffirmed a lot of the things that we're doing. It fixed some of the things that needed to be fixed. We brought in, for example, NATO into special operations, which we didn't have, at Riga, before that. And so I think that it was solid. I think my successor, General Craddock, and General Smith at the Allied Command Transformation and Military Committee, can, in fact, extrapolate a number of tasks to work forward on. I think the next couple of summits will be interesting to watch because I think this movement towards a more proactive alliance is really absolutely essential for the future.

MR. KEMPE: And also the three Balkan countries coming into partnership and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, an open door for more members.

So we know the half-full. Go to the half-empty. What would have had to happen for you to give it an "A"? What disappointed you about the summit?

GEN. JONES: Well, I wouldn't say that I was disappointed, but I do think that that piece of the asymmetric threats that face us collectively, whether you're in NATO or out of NATO, the asymmetric challenges of the world are clear and they're not going to be solved in the next five or six years. They have to be reckoned with. And an organization like NATO has to transform itself, I think, to take those on. So that piece of it, I think, is still work to be done.

And the good news is that some of those discussions have been ongoing in Brussels during the course of the year. They just didn't metastasize quickly enough in order for them to be, you know, solid deliverables.

But I think that on the matter of transformation, that as well as we've done on the military side, I think the other piece of transformation that has not been done to the secretary-general's satisfaction or to anyone else's is that the accompanying transformation of the political process, of the institution of NATO to support this expeditionary capability is still very much in the 20th century as a military capability is becoming a 21st century force. And those two things are kind of at odds.

So my recommendation and my parting message to NATO, for whatever it's worth, is that we really take a look at the second piece of transformation now and start fixing the system so that as NATO becomes even bigger, that the political processes by which decisions are taken, by which we decide how we spend our money or how we acquire things, can, in fact, be somewhere in parallel with this new state-of-the-art capability that we're trying to get to in the military side.

MR. KEMPE: Well, let's get concrete there. What you're basically saying is that the political consensus is behind the military capability. So 21st century military capability and aspirations and 20th century, if lucky -- that's my words -- political consensus. What concrete needs to be done on the political consensus side? Is it doing away with consensus voting on decisions? Is it scrapping a bunch of things? What would you lay down as two or three concrete things that need to be fixed for NATO to prosper?

GEN. JONES: I think one of the things that we need -- a couple of things. One is I think the Military Committee of NATO, which is supposed to give the military advice, is in danger of becoming overrun by the early input of political -- political influence before the military advice is developed. And I think we ought to organize ourselves in such a way that the military advice that is rendered stays as pure as possible until there is an appropriate time for the political process to take place. But --

MR. KEMPE: Can you give an example so one understands what that means?

GEN. JONES: Well, the advice comes from the strategic commanders as an operational commander, for example, into the Military Committee. And the Military Committee's system of discussion is very similar to the North Atlantic Council's. In other words, countries can break silence, countries can block military advice from going forward. It's the infusion of national politics on military advice at a very low level that causes military advice to be distorted, to be tweaked and to lose its essence. And I think it has to be pure.

And I think there are ways in which you can do that. Some structural reorganization could be done that preserves the integrity of that military advice for a little bit further into the process. I believe that we have a system of acquisition in NATO that does not at all support the need of the soldiers in the field. Two years to three years to acquire a 5 million euro piece of equipment that's urgently needed, such as a Blue Force Tracker, for example, which started in Kosovo in 2004 and is still not in the hands of --

MR. KEMPE: Which helps one avoid friendly fire in a situation like Afghanistan.

GEN. JONES: Exactly. It's very inexpensive. It's off-the-shelf technology. But in NATO it devolves to a 26-nation industrial base competition between North America and Europe.

MR. KEMPE: How long have you been asking for the system?

GEN. JONES: Well, two years.

MR. KEMPE: Still don't have it?

GEN. JONES: No.

MR. KEMPE: Right. Yeah.

GEN. JONES: So those things are important. How we spend our money, what we spend our money on is definitely still in the 20th century. And sooner or later, NATO will have to address, you know, whether you want 350 committees all acting on the rule of consensus. Is that really what -- is that really how you get your best advice? And at some point, if the NAC get bigger and bigger, they'll have to address that. So that's work in the future. But --

MR. KEMPE: And one gets rid of consensus, and that means that the French -- and I'm winking here -- and others don't have the ability -- a single country -- to block NATO going forward.

GEN. JONES: Well, you do have to ask yourself that. Is -- I mean, is it -- if you've got 24, 25 countries lined up and want to do something of a certain stature -- and you know, what's the logic of one country being -- one or

two countries being able to block that? I mean, why not have a system where they can just opt out?

Which is actually what many countries did in supporting the NATO training mission in Iraq. There are quite a few countries that said: Okay, we'll support the mission, but we're not sending any troops there. None of our troops are going to go.

And we said: Fine, we'll do it. We'll -- but that's some of the flexibilities that could come -- those are some of the flexibilities that could come NATO's way and ought to be discussed, so that the institutional part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can in fact support what we're trying to do to make NATO more agile, more responsive and more capable.

MR. KEMPE: Well, let's talk about the hot-button issue where this is all being tested: Afghanistan. There were 26 presidents and prime ministers in Riga at the summit, but they knew the future of the -- or they were saying the future of the alliance is playing itself out in Afghanistan. Lots of focus in this town on the Iraq Study Group, which starts with the words "The Situation is grave and deteriorating." In The Washington Times, Harlan Ullman wrote that conditions have been exactly the same, "grave and deteriorating," in Afghanistan.

Some of us have called for an Afghan study group, not so much for the group but for more official attention, with the fear that the harm to U.S. credibility of Iraq is being repeated or could be repeated to the greater alliance in Afghanistan.

So do you agree with those words, "The situation is grave and deteriorating"? How would you assess at the moment the situation in Afghanistan?

GEN. JONES: Well, Fred, what I would say to start out with is just to remind everyone that in Afghanistan you have everything that you need to have a cohesive mission. You have five U.N. resolutions. You have the clear statement of this Chapter VII, which is peace enforcing.

There are some countries who are trying to say: Well, we didn't sign up for this. We thought it was peacekeeping.

That's nonsense. It's Chapter VII. That's the mission.

We have 37 sovereign nations on the ground, 32,000 troops --

MR. KEMPE: Under NATO command.

GEN. JONES: -- thirty-two thousand troops under NATO command.

We have another 11,000 under Operation Enduring Freedom, under U.S. command.

We have a total of 60 nations that are in Afghanistan doing something. They may not contribute troops, but they're -- they've got projects, they're helping the Karzai government.

So this is a phenomenal undertaking, and it has all the international legal ramification that you need.

And what Afghanistan needs -- quite apart from the fact that in the media you keep hearing about the resurgence of the Taliban, what Afghanistan needs to turn the corner and to keep on -- to keep in a positive direction is to -- is more focus. And it's not military focus. It is focus of reconstruction, development. It's bringing cohesion to the huge amounts of money that are being spent to do the five or six major things that absolutely have to be done. And that includes the Karzai government itself has got to do better at certain areas to bring more focus. And if we do that, I think Afghanistan is definitely a possible success story.

But those things -- those four or five things have got to be done. MR. KEMPE: And what are the four or five?

GEN. JONES: I think the Achilles' heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder. And that's why I say the Taliban is not 10 feet tall, and it's not the only problem. It funds the corruption in the police, corruption in the local governments, corruption at high levels of government. And it actually is so pervasive that it's preventing the legitimate economy of Afghanistan from developing apace.

So if I had a dollar to put down on what I would like to have done, what I think should be done immediately in Afghanistan, it's some progress to show that the international community is very -- is serious about fixing this problem. That's number one.

MR. KEMPE: Well, let's stick with that one for just -- but let's stick with that one for one second, because that's probably first and foremost over the other four or five. What do you do? The British have country control of that problem at the moment.

GEN. JONES: The G-8 is the -- the U.K. is the lead nation under the G-8. But that doesn't mean that it's a U.K. problem. And I -- and what has not happened, I think, is a family of nations that are under the U.K. leadership, that are uniting themselves and their resources to commit to a broad-scale solution set. And it has to be broad. It's not any one thing. It's not a -- there's no recipe for this, not just eradication, or it's not crop substitution. It's a lot of things that can be combined to begin to wean the economy, this terrible economy, and turn it into the right way, and to wean it off of this -- the resources that it generates.

MR. KEMPE: And briefly, if you could tick off the other --

GEN. JONES: But the others are tied to it.

MR. KEMPE: Yeah.

GEN. JONES: And they have to almost happen simultaneously. In order to prosecute the war, you've got to be able to have a judicial system that's functional. And the judicial system in Afghanistan, which is Italian lead -- Italian-led, under the G-8 agreement, is woefully underfunded, undertrained.

And the thousand prosecutors -- by the way, they have a great attorney general there, who is probably one of the most uncorruptible -- incorruptible persons that I've met. But he's got a thousand prosecutors, and they're paid

\$65 a month, on average. And it takes -- it only takes \$350 to \$400 to get them out of the zone of temptation for being -- for corruption. And he has the right idea. But again, we've been talking about this for six months. Those prosecutors, to my knowledge, are still getting the \$65 a month. So they have to supplement their income.

So judicial reform is lagging.

And third is police reform. We absolutely need German leadership here to coalesce the countries -- and here an organization like the European Union could be very helpful as well, because they have a lot of expertise in this -- to provide the local security and stability that allows reconstruction development to proceed in the hinterlands. Because without it, we're actually competing with the Taliban and al Qaeda and other organizations in terms of what they can pay versus what the government can pay their troops and their forces.

So those three or four things, plus, I think, also the involvement of the Afghan government to lead this nation and be visibly present out in the hinterlands to show the people of Afghanistan that better things are coming; and that military operations, although necessary, are followed very quickly, such as Operation Medusa was, by tangible evidence of reconstruction development that makes a difference in the lives of the people.

If you connect up those things, I think, and develop -- and the last piece is a serious relationship with Pakistan, at the head-of- state level and also at the army levels, to try to bring order along the border. Those five or six things done in tandem will rapidly shift a lot of the problems that we're having away from this seeming momentum that the so-called Taliban has.

And I'd just like to say one other word, is that to understand Afghanistan, you have to take it in its totality. And in its totality, Afghanistan -- there are many parts of Afghanistan that are doing quite well and where we've had some success; in Jalalabad, for example, in the northeast corner, we've had two years of poppy crop reduction. Why? Because we've had a good governor, good police chief, a very good provincial reconstruction team, and an Afghan National Army presence. And you're seeing in that northeast corner of the country an agrarian economy that's being developed. And what are the farmers doing? They're making an honest living, and they're decreasing their dependence on producing poppies. That model needs to be exported elsewhere in the country.

MR. KEMPE: So if I list them quickly: narco-state, take it on with more focus; judicial reform; police reform; expand the reach of the Afghan government to Pakistan.

I'm going to throw to the audience, but one quick question that's in the news that plays a little bit off the Pakistan question. A British interpreter, it's announced today, for NATO's commander in Afghanistan has appeared in court accused of passing secrets to Iran. Now, I don't expect you necessarily to comment on this, but maybe you could just say -- we haven't talked much about Iran in conjunction with Afghanistan -- to what extent do you face influence of Iran with the Taliban. Or is it just a Pakistan external issue that one's dealing with?

GEN. JONES: No, I think the -- I know the Karzai government is, in fact, in touch with all of its regional neighbors. I don't think there's a lot of evidence that Iran is trying to destabilize Afghanistan. There are some

regional issues on the western border because of trade that goes back and forth -- quite a bit of it, as a matter of fact, goes into the city of Herat.

But no, I read the same news. It's disturbing.

MR. KEMPE: Do you have any insight into it at all?

GEN. JONES: I don't have any insight into that.

MR. KEMPE: So let me throw to the audience. As you ask your questions, if you could identify yourself. And the shorter and the sharper the questions, the more we can get in.

Bob. And your affiliation, as well.

Q Robert Hunter, RAND Corporation. I used to be an ambassador to NATO. First, General, congratulations, and thanks for what you did for NATO and for this country. If I had my druthers, we'd make you SACEUR for life, but I don't think I have. (Laughter.)

Afghanistan.

You mentioned Riga. Did Riga give you what, as strategic commander, you really would need for NATO to be successful in Afghanistan, given that the secretary-general and everybody else understands NATO has bet its future on Afghanistan?

Related to that, we in this country are always worried about do the Europeans pull their weight. What are the prospects, and what do you think ought to be done to try to get the European Union to step up on the civilian side, maybe to appoint a supremo (ph), somebody who can really get some resources and some coordination so that you, as strategic commander -- until recently -- can really do your NATO job?

Thank you.

GEN. JONES: Thank you, Robert.

I think Riga did accomplish some important things with regard to the mission in Afghanistan. Prior to the summit, we circulated to all nations a request to restate their national restrictions on their troops in Afghanistan. So we basically wiped the slate clean, we waited for the inputs to come back, and surprisingly in a pleasant way, we were happy to note that many of the operationally restrictive caveats were removed by quite a few nations.

So that translated into more maneuverability for the ISAF commander, something on the order of 1,500 to 2,000 troops that he now can use with greater expectation and greater -- to better effect.

We also from Riga received, I think, a general affirmation that in extremis, countries will come to the aid of each other, NATO countries will do that. And I think that was also very positive.

MR. KEMPE: Without defining "in extremis."

GEN. JONES: Without defining "in extremis." But I think that, frankly, nations understand that when the commander of ISAF says that he is --

some of his portions of his force is at risk and he needs help, that nations will do that. And I take it as a positive that they will, in fact, do that.

We still need to raise the force contributions a little bit in Afghanistan. It's not -- doesn't sound like that much, but we're at about 90 percent of everything that we would want, so -- MR. KEMPE: You've said you want 2,500 more troops?

GEN. JONES: We're talking about a couple of battalions. We're talking about some helicopters, some mobility. We're talking about some intelligence capabilities, communications assets and the like. But with the U.S. contribution rolling in a few months ago at about 12,000 troops, that made a huge difference. And so I think the commander of ISAF has a lot more ability to execute his mission than he did six months ago. And Riga kind of put a capstone on that and emphasized it, and I think we all felt good about that.

With regard to the second part of your question, I do think that organizations like the EU, but not just the EU -- the U.N. and other organizations that are on the ground -- need more focus and more cohesion. And I was very happy to hear President Karzai start the Policy Action Group, which has a -- it's a way of prioritizing where the aid is going to go so it can generate good effect in a timely way. And subsequent to that they also developed some what they call Afghan Development Zones where that aid is going to be targeted.

And, I think, the idea of linking up the military operations, which NATO definitely supports, to link up the military operations, not to just have gun battles but to have situations where we can bring order and discipline and safe and secure environment and immediately come in with fairly massive reconstruction and development projects that in short order show the people of the area, particularly in the south, that there is value in supporting not only NATO but also the Karzai government, which all of these things have to have an Afghan face on them.

The Afghan army is 30,000 strong today. The Afghan Ministry of Interior has about 50,000 different types of police forces -- border guards, civilian police, et cetera. And that's one of the positives that we can point to.

But I think that more cohesion along the international organizations and more authority vested in someone or some group to focus this is what's needed. We're doing an awful lot, but I have a feeling that it's done in a disparate way, and if it's not my job, it's somebody else's job, and as a result, some of the really important things we talked about, Fred, are the things that are languishing. And those things will make the likelihood that Afghanistan could become a military problem more likely.

MR. KEMPE: And there is no single person or place that's responsible for the whole ball of wax.

GEN. JONES: Technically, the U.N. -- the representative of the secretary-general of the U.N. is the recognized authority, but that has not been terribly effective at pointing these things -- these efforts into the right four or five niches that absolutely have to be met.

MR. KEMPE: Question? Please.

Q Al Millikan, Washington Independent Writers. Is there anything that working with Turkey in NATO has shown you that would or should be a factor in the EU's considering them to become a part of the European Union?

GEN. JONES: Turkey is obviously one of the key players in NATO. It's got the largest army in the European land mass, and at Riga came through at the last minute with some NRF contributions that actually helped us get over the top in declaring NRF-7 fully operationally capable. And so I hope that Turkey will continue to be a major player in terms of contributions to NATO missions. It has not always been -- has not always been so.

But Turkey is a strategically very important partner, and with its military capability, which is very impressive, can be as influential as it wants to be in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Where it goes with regard to the European Union is a separate issue that is really a political question that I'm not qualified to address.

Q Avis Vaughn (ph), Georgetown University, formerly Department of State. General, I wonder if you could expand a bit on what you said about the border with Pakistan, what needs to be done there, and how much is Pakistan not doing and how much are the Afghans?

GEN. JONES: Thank you, Avis (ph). As you know, the NATO mission, in terms of having the responsibility for all of Afghanistan for security and stability, is relatively new. One of the first things I did is I went to Islamabad to meet my counterparts, my military counterparts, and establish a relationship. I went there twice. In the last few weeks, I greeted the chief of their general staff, General Al-Haq (sp), at SHAPE, for the first-ever visit by a senior Pakistani military official. And he was also received by the secretary-general at NATO, made an address to the North Atlantic Council.

During my meetings with him, we discussed very frankly some of our observations on the Afghan side of the border since the agreements, the accords, were reached on the Pakistani side with the tribal areas. And I told him that the returns did not really look too encouraging given the porous nature of the borders and some very physical evidence that fighters were still coming across and returning rather freely across the many border crossings that are there.

He convinced me of his earnestness and sincerity to continue to work with NATO to bring about a better resolution, and we're going to do that, put many things in place over this winter.

One is already in place. That's the Tripartite Council, which is a military council of Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO that meets regularly to discuss mutual problems.

I think that on -- from the political side that NATO will be heard through the secretary-general on this issue if it continues to be a significant problem. The problem of the Taliban is not an Afghan problem alone. This could be a Pakistani problem if Afghanistan doesn't work out the way we want it to. And so the obvious relationship of the two countries is something that is, I think, self-evident, and we have to figure out a way to make sure that President Musharraf, I think, and President Karzai start focusing on this problem collectively in saying what can we do to reduce this obvious problem.

So it's one of the most important things we need to do. It's an embryonic relationship. It's off to a good start. More to follow.

MR. KEMPE: Thank you. Beth.

Q Beth Jones, APCO Worldwide, formerly of State Department.

GEN. JONES: Yes.

Q General, I always thought of Partnership for Peace as one of the great organizations -- it was established with a lot of help from people in this room -- as a visionary organization associated with NATO. Talk to us about how you see Partnership for Peace developing not really just to attract members -- or for countries to join NATO, but as a way to enlarge the space in which NATO bring its values to bear.

MR. KEMPE: And maybe while you while talk about that, you can talk about how the global partners might fit in differently. Is it a new Partnership for Peace? Is it --

GEN. JONES: Yeah, this was discussed, Beth, in the months leading up to Riga, and there was some -- I think a minority view, but one that prevailed because of the real consensus that NATO wasn't ready to address different classes of partners and that we had the programs that we needed, we have the structure. Partnership for Peace Programs has 20 countries in it. It's still very effective. It's still very important. It's the best way that a nation -- the best process a nation can go through to achieve membership. But as you know, there are quite a few nations in the Partnership for Peace Program that have no intention of becoming members. And I think at some point it's legitimate to say what -- how is NATO going to organize itself to have partners that don't seek membership -- for instance, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Russia, Sweden, Finland -- and partners that do seek membership. And so maybe the destiny ultimately will be to have a different track so th!

at you can separate the ones from the other. I think it's a fair question. I think it's an open question. It was briefly addressed. It didn't pass the consensus test, and so it was tabled, but it's not going to go away. It's -- particularly as NATO even considers new members in 2008, this is definitely going to be a hot topic over the next few years.

MR. KEMPE: I saw a question in the back on the right.

Q Arthur Rochbandt (sp), U.S. Naval Academy. I just wonder if you could comment about the state of relations between NATO and Ukraine and possibly Georgia and the prospect for these countries to join NATO in the near future.

MR. KEMPE: And the question that's been raised about whether now Georgia is delinked from Ukraine, as Ukraine is not showing a lot of active desire for membership at the moment, and Georgia is showing a very active desire.

GEN. JONES: Right, yeah. Well, I think that for any country, they need the popular support to join NATO. Clearly, in Georgia, it seems to be there. It's a very sensitive issue with Russia, as you know, and we'll just have to see how it takes its course.

My view is that NATO membership should be held to a high standard; in other words, it's not enough that people aren't killing other to become a member of NATO, like, for instance, in the Balkans.

The standard ought to be pretty high. And I think the standard ought to be that there is a rule of law, there is a functioning economy, there is some adherence to democratic values, there is a subordination of the military to civilian authority, and there is essentially a social structure that's working and effective. My belief is that members of NATO should bring value to the alliance, and only when they have proven themselves to bring value to the alliance should the alliance offer membership. Until then, we have other classifications that they can stay in and work through until they reach this broad-based standard that I hope is never lowered for political expediency.

Q Don Bandler, Kissinger McLarty Associates. General, I'd like to go back to Afghanistan, because I think it's an existential important theater, one that we cannot afford not to run well, to prevail -- although what "prevail" means might be various definitions.

So my question really is do you sense, as I have sometimes in conversations of people involved from our own forces, as well, in the Afghanistan struggle, that it's -- the concern about it being two-tier? Namely, there are some nations there that are doing political work and, you know, coming off, meeting a band of people and moving on, focused on hearts and minds; and another group that's hunkered down frequently and doing the hard fighting and where the blood is on the ground. Is that a major concern for you, and what can be done about it?

MR. KEMPE: It's an excellent question, and Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay actually said in Riga that if he doesn't see that being fixed, he's going to have trouble keeping the Canadian people behind their own engagement.

GEN. JONES: Yeah.

MR. KEMPE: General Jones?

GEN. JONES: I think that's a fair characterization of Afghanistan. What I would like to see happen in Afghanistan is -- the way I would put it is, I would say there are too many stovepipes in Afghanistan, and there's too little horizontal integration of those stovepipes. And we need more horizontal integration.

And interestingly enough, it's not the military integration that I'm most concerned about. It's the folks that are doing reconstruction and development. The two have to be linked up, but we can't simply have everybody kind of doing their own thing. In other words: This is my mission. I'm German, and I'm here to do this, and I don't care about anything else. And I'm Italian, I'm here to do this, and I don't care about anything else.

Probably one of the most important things -- important capabilities that exist in Afghanistan is the provincial reconstruction team. And these dot the landscape in Afghanistan. We need to double them, as far as I'm concerned, because symbolically they represent hope for the future of Afghanistan. They are the band-aids that are out there in the hinterlands that are awaiting the influence of the national government to be able to project out far enough to do the things that the PRTs are doing now.

So I think that what we're seeing in Afghanistan is a gradual recognition that we have to have more harmony and more strategic focus in the reconstruction and development.

We're also seeing, on the military side, what I call the Kosovo syndrome. In 2003, when I arrived, the forces in Kosovo, which were extensive - over 20,000 troops in a country that's 100 miles by 100 miles -- I mean, the density of the troop-to-population ratio was staggering.

But this is a force that was completely hamstrung by national restrictions. It was absolutely organized the wrong way. It was a Cold War force. We even made it look like Berlin -- "you are now leaving the American sector, you are now entering the French sector, you are now leaving the" -- you know. And it took almost a near-disaster, in 2004, of this popular uprising, to convince the countries that we have too many restrictions and we're poorly organized. And after that they let us reorganize it, and now the Kosovo force is -- there are still too many troops in Kosovo, but that's a separate issue. But it is properly organized, trained and equipped, and it can do its mission.

What we're seeing in Afghanistan is a little bit of that. People come in. The countries come in. They carve out their zones. They focus on those zones. If they don't have combat, that's good. But other people are having combat; that's their problem. But just as in Kosovo, we're seeing gradually people understand that we're all in this together, and you've got to be more united, and you've got to be more cohesive. And that's in the military and also in the reconstruction and development.

MR. KEMPE: Walt?

Q Walt Slocombe, now a lawyer but formerly of the Defense Department and -- (off mike). (Laughter.)

Your tenure involved the whole time of Iraq, from the beginning to where we are now. The argument is certainly made that one of the crises of Iraq has been a fundamental deterioration in our -- the confidence that countries have in the United States, and that that affects NATO as well. You have the unique position of being both SACEUR and what I persist in thinking of as CINCEUR. And what is your view about the transatlantic relationship, in a more fundamental sense, not from committees or stuff like that, but the sense of a real cooperation?

GEN. JONES: Sure. Well, I think, Walt, there's no question that if you look at the polls in various countries and everything, that the esteem in which the United States has been held has deteriorated. And this is a reality that is here. I mean, we have to face that. And the question is, you know, what do we do about it? And I think NATO is a terrific organization through which we can do something about that, and do that fairly quickly.

About two years ago, I was in Istanbul, and I happened to be reading a Turkish newspaper, an English-written. And they had just published a poll about Turkish opinions towards the United States. And I don't remember the exact figure, but it was something like 65 to 70 percent of the Turkish people polled believed that the United States was the enemy of Turkey.

And that afternoon I was giving a speech to the Turkish War College in Istanbul. And I promptly scrapped the speech and stood up in front of the young Turkish officers of the future and showed them this article. And then I said if you believe this, then we have a major problem, because this cannot be. And for the next 30 minutes or so I told them why I thought that this cannot be.

And so I think that we do have to have some inward-looking discussions and saying: Okay, what is it that we need to do? And most of the people that talk to me say, you know -- want to be -- want to feel that they are consulted, that they are treated with respect and dignity, and that occasionally we say thank you for some of the things that they in fact do. And I'm sure that we do that.

In Canada, for example, the Canadians took a very, very heavy load of the fighting in the southern part of Afghanistan. Everyone predicted that that fighting was going to take place, because all the elements were there. It was a part of the country that hadn't had any large-scale presence of troops. We put 9,000 NATO troops down there. It was obviously a safe haven for the narcotics traffickers, for the Taliban, for the criminals.

They had corrupt people in government. I mean, everything that was wrong in Afghanistan was in the southern region.

And Canada and a few other countries really answered the test -- and I'm sure that this was an intentional test, by the way -- that NATO was not going to -- was going to be a force to be reckoned with. The opposition paid a heavy price for that. And we should be grateful to Canada for the courage of those soldiers and their leaders.

And I think you're seeing a little bit of that starting to go that way. I think at Riga we saw expressions of togetherness, and more of that will come, I think.

But we as a nation, I think, need to understand that we can't do it alone and that we need our partners and friends. We need to value our forward basing and express our appreciation for those bases with our allies. And I think we can turn this around pretty quickly.

Q Jan Lodal. I'm at the Atlantic Council. General, a couple of managerial questions on your way out. You put some emphasis some of these things yourself, such as common funding and NATO assets. How important -- could these really turn things around for future SACEURs, so that they would have more control and more ability to choose who ought to participate without asking them to have pay for their own participation?

GEN. JONES: Yeah. Jan, that's an excellent question. I think that's one of the things, Fred, that I would add to the list that particularly for rapid missions, expeditionary-type operations, NATO Response Force missions, I believe that common funding is the answer. I believe that we have to remove the disincentives for nations to contribute forces.

For example, the Czech Republic has one of the few existing assets in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological forces. We can't expect the Czech Republic, every time an NRF goes out, everybody wants that capability, to foot that bill the whole time.

So I think part of this transformation of the financial way we handle -- we do business in NATO -- I believe that you could probably find savings inside NATO right now without asking countries for more money, to actually commonly fund expeditionary operations, because they're -- by nature they're short-duration, they're likely to be task-organized and -focused, and inherently not tremendously expensive. We went a little bit towards that. The secretary-general led the charge to commonly fund transportation for the next few years,

so if we activate the NRF, that we do have commonly funded strategic lift, for example. That's a start. More needs to be done in that direction.

MR. KEMPE: And -- please. And of course the Spanish, who stepped to the plate in Pakistan with the earthquake, came home shocked at the price tag because they didn't quite --

GEN. JONES: Well, I mean, the NATO, as many of the NATO aficionados here understand, operates under the "costs fall where they lie" principle, which means if you contribute forces, you pay for it. And that was great in the 20th century, because forces weren't going anywhere. We were -- it was a reactive alliance. We were going to absorb the first hit. And every year maybe forces went from Germany to Holland or, you know, moved a few hundred miles, but they really didn't go very far. So having nations absorb that cost was not particularly difficult.

Now you've got, you know, 32,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. You have a mission in Africa. You've got Operation Active Endeavor. You've got troops in the Balkans. Nations are having to absorb that burden.

And by the way, one of the things in Riga -- oh, I'm sorry -- one of the things in the Prague summit that was generally agreed to was that nations would contribute 2 percent of their GDP towards national security. In the four years since Riga (sic), we've actually done worse than we had coming out of Riga, because now today only seven countries in the alliance spend 2 percent of their GDP on national security.

So at a time that the organization's will -- political will -- to do more things is escalating, its political will to resource them is decreasing. And that's a train wreck waiting to happen that's got to be addressed.

Sorry, sir.

MR. KEMPE: Let's take a quick two last questions here.

Q General, you talked about the importance of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, and I'm sure that's true in Iraq as well. What would you think of the concept of a Marshall Plan for that area, internationally sponsored?

MR. KEMPE: Let's take one question here from -- as well.

Q Mike Kramer (sp), Atlantic Council and Department of Defense.

Jim, I'll go back to the Middle East and relations with those countries. At Riga there was the Middle East Training Initiative. At the same time when Lebanon occurred, NATO didn't go in (to save them?). President Chirac announced that we couldn't go in because of association with the U.S. and the like. So how do we set NATO up to be more effective in the broader Middle East?

GEN. JONES: With regard to a Marshall-like Plan, obviously that would be the Cadillac program. And in a way -- in a way, with 60 countries in Afghanistan doing different things, you do have a huge investment.

What I would -- what I would like -- what I would recommend would be that that huge economic investment that is proceeding along a very, very broad

span of events -- axis of events, if I could use that term -- have more focus through it so that somehow you could channel those energies and those resources into doing the half-a-dozen things that absolutely need to be done now.

But as I said, if you make no progress on the narcotics problem, if you don't reform the judiciary, if you don't get more police, and if you don't get the Karzai government to sign up to some metrics that each year says here's tangible proof that we're moving in the right direction, then I think that, you know, the possibility of as I call it death by a thousand IEDs -- because that's the strategy of the opposition, is to attrit the alliance and the political will by fours and fives to the point where some countries, you know, a few years from now will say, that's it, we're out of here. And then sooner or later, then, you -- they are counting on the fact that we will not hold this cohesion. The way to hold the cohesion, in my view, is to do the things that you absolutely have to do and do them very, very well.

With regard to the Middle East, one of the most exciting developments - - and I apologize I didn't mention it up front, but it is one of the most important things that happened on my watch -- and that's the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative. So we revitalized the Mediterranean Dialogue with seven countries in the Mediterranean, five on the southern rim, two on the northern rim of the Mediterranean. But the way we revitalized it was we gave it a mil-to-mil context, so we actually are talking to the militaries of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Imagine those seven countries sitting down at SHAPE, at NATO, talking about matters having to do with the Middle East. The Middle East Training Initiative is something that is advancing, and I think NATO is -- and that's another axis on which NATO is advancing.

The other two that are exciting also is the NATO-Russia Council, which is very effective, and the NATO-Ukraine Council, which are very important initiatives as well.

So add that to the mix of where NATO was in 2002 and where it is today and you see further evidence that the term "out of area" really is obsolete. And NATO is healthy and is moving into some very exciting areas. And if we can continue the transformational efforts that have been begun and we expand it through the totality of NATO, we convince nations that we will reform ourselves from within, that nations will support equally.

And there's a certain sense of equity here that needs to be fixed. There are countries in NATO that could and should be doing a lot more than they are, and we need to elevate the pressure to get everyone to contribute what they can. And then NATO will -- NATO will continue to be the great alliance.

And I'd just simply close by saying that I think --

MR. KEMPE: Well, let me -- let me --

GEN. JONES: -- I think this great alliance will do great things in the future, and its most important days are still ahead of it.

MR. KEMPE: But before you close, give us a feeling briefly of the cost. If NATO goes in your direction, what -- in everything you've outlined -- what does it look like 10 years from now, briefly? But if it doesn't, where are we 10 years from now? Because both are possible.

GEN. JONES: Yeah, well, it's hard to -- I mean, it's hard to -- it's hard to predict because, you know, I certainly don't have the total blueprint of what NATO ought to do. But if it does some of those things, then you're still -- you still could be successful. So it's a question of how successful do you want to be. But I'm convinced that if you -- if we don't do the transformation, if we don't get some better equity in terms of the contributing nations, the ones who really day in and day out contribute the money and the troops, and we don't get everyone pulling their -- pulling their weight -- and those metrics, by the way, are there. I mean, everybody knows who the -- who the bill payers are -- then I think you could -- yeah, you could slide -- you could slide back.

I prefer to take the optimistic view. But everything in NATO -- as I look back on it, when I had a bad day, I would take a step back and say, okay, where were we six months ago, and are we moving in the right direction? And so the measure of success in NATO is are you moving in the right direction. And every two years or so we'd have a summit, and those summits are very important because they're exclamation points for the work you've done, and hopefully they also give you guidance for the work that's still yet to be done.

And so I think NATO is moving in the right direction, and nothing of -- none of the perceived criticisms or, if you will, observations that I've made here this morning should lead anyone to consider that I don't think NATO's moving in the right direction. I think it is.

But more focus, more organization, more reform and NATO could really be an instrument of tremendous effect, much more so than I think any one of us could even think about, on the global playing field in the future.

MR. KEMPE: And, General Jones, what do you do for an encore?

GEN. JONES: I think I'm going to go home and unpack boxes. (Laughter, laughs.)

MR. KEMPE: Well, we'll leave it at that. I --

GEN. JONES: Look for the Jones Movie Company to come to a theater near you. (Laughter.) There's great potential there.

MR. KEMPE: I'm not sure your country will let you stay in that state for all that long. But -- (chuckles) -- but at any rate, thanks to you from the audience for this fascinating session. But at the same time I want to speak on behalf of the audience to thank you for your distinguished service to the country.

GEN. JONES: Thank you. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END.