REMARKS BY NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, TO THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
MODERATOR: MARC GROSSMAN, BOARD MEMBER, THE ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
LOCATION: THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
DATE: THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2007TIME: 5:30 P.M. EDT
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THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
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HENRY CATTO (chairman emeritus, The Atlantic Council): (Taps microphone.) I don't know why one always taps on the microphone, because nothing ever happens, but nonetheless, it's tradition.
Good evening to all of you. I'm Henry Catto, chairman emeritus of The Atlantic Council, and I welcome you to another of our Global Leadership Series events. The series has been, I'm happy to say, a huge success in fulfilling its purpose, which is to bring top policymakers together to the council to discuss the serious challenges of -- that the United States faces and how the Transatlantic community is facing these challenges.
Before we get to the topic of the evening, I want to particularly thank the people who are here from Raytheon who have made this event possible.e.
Tonight we're honored to have Nick Burns, undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, to speak to us. He is one of our most political -- brilliant political minds -- blush, man, blush -- (laughs, laughter) -- and he will talk about a serious relationship for the Transatlantic community, that is to say, the relationship with Turkey.
The moderator for our discussion will be by fellow board member and Undersecretary Burns's predecessor, Marc Grossman. He is here to -- and here to introduce these two distinguished gentlemen is our president and CEO, Fred Kempe. (Applause.)
FRED KEMPE (president and CEO, The Atlantic Council): In the great Washington think tank tradition of introducers introducing introducers to introduce introducers, I will be very brief. But let me just say that at an Atlantic Council event this summer, shortly after the Turkish parliamentary elections, veteran U.S. diplomat Dick Holbrooke, a friend of many of us, said Turkey is to our national security now what Germany was in the Cold War; it is our new frontline state.
A former Afghan finance minister at the same meeting, Ashraf Ghani, defined those fault lines as the following: "If it's a frontline state," he said, "it was a fault line between order and disorder, moderate and extremist Islam, between the Western and the Islamic world," in the words of Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan. If that's true, then new public opinion surveys are troubling, that Turks have an ever-declining view of the U.S., the latest Pew poll showing 9 percent of Turks have a favorable opinion.
So it's easy to understand why we at The Atlantic Council feel fortunate to have two of the most U.S. -- distinguished U.S. diplomats with us, both of whom are particularly qualified to discuss U.S.-Turkey relations.s.
I'm going to leave it to Marc to glow even further about Nick as he introduces him, and then be incredibly tough in the moderation and not hold back whatsoever. He's a perfect mediator, having been the Turkish ambassador -- ambassador to Turkey -- and -- (laughter) -- there are some critics of the State Department who might -- but having been ambassador to Turkey and having held Nick's job right behind him, he knows what he's up against; he's also an Atlantic Council board member.
Let me turn over to you, Marc, and get out of the way for this very interesting evening. (Applause.)
MR. GROSSMAN: I actually think that the think tank tradition is not, "Introduce, introduce, introduce"; it's, "Get out of the way, get out of the way, get out of the way." (Laughter.) I'm going to follow that tradition.
Henry and Fred, thank you very much, and thank you for this opportunity. May I also just take a minute to thank all of you. One of the things that I heard in getting ready for this is that it's one of the largest events that The Atlantic Council has had in a very long time, and the fact that it's about Turkey, I think, is very telling. And the fact that all of you have come out on this evening to do what I think is so important as an American, which is to pay attention to Turkey, I thank you all very much for that.
May I also join Fred and Henry Catto in thanking Raytheon for sponsoring this evening, and may I also recognize all of the people in the audience, particularly the number of people who were our ambassadors of the United States of America to Turkey and all of the military officers who also served in that relationship. We thank all of you for your service. And I'm so pleased to see so many of the people who served with me in this audience.
One of the things that I would also say is that there's only one Turkish ambassador at the moment, and that's Nabi Sensoy, who I think is here somewhere, so let's be absolutely clear about who is the Turkish ambassador here. (Laughter, applause.) The rest of us, as he spends his life promoting Turkish interests -- the rest of us spent our lives and Nick spends his life promoting U.S. interests in this area.
As I say, my job is to get out of the way, because this is a major speech. This is a major presentation about the administration's views on Turkey. It comes in advance of a trip that Nick is going to take to Turkey, and we congratulate him for that.t.
Nick Burns, as of you know, is one of the most senior of our career diplomats, ambassador to Greece, ambassador to NATO, and now the undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; before that, a distinguished career that included being the department's spokesperson. And so he comes to you with real experience in this regard, and I have been very, very pleased that he has over these years taken so much interest in Turkey.
I provide for him the easy answer to most questions. When people say, "What fool did this?" -- (laughter) -- in Nick's -- that would be me, in most cases. (Laughter.)
And so with that, Nick, I'm going to get out of your way, with that introduction. We thank you very much for coming here. We thank you very much for your service to the United States of America, and we look forward to what you have to say about the United States and Turkey. (Applause.)
MR. BURNS: Marc, thank you very, very much. It is a pleasure to be with everyone tonight. I apologize to those of you in the obstructed-view seats behind the pillars here. It's like Fenway Park. We have that. But I hope it's worth the price of admission.
Thanks very much to the Atlantic Council for inviting me back. I was here a couple of months ago to talk about our relationship with Europe.e.
And it's a pleasure to be here with so many people who know a lot about Turkey. I'm a little bit -- it's a little bit daunting to look out and see Ambassador Mort Abramowitz and Ambassador Marc Grossman and Ambassador Bob Pearson and Ambassador Mark Parris, all of whom were ambassadors to Turkey, and Jim Holmes, who now spends his life promoting the relationship between the United States and Turkey, and General Brent Scowcroft, who I think is the senior person in this city who for a long, long time has understood Turkey's critical importance to the United States. So I'm really delighted that all of them took the time from their busy schedules to be here.
To the Turkish ambassador, to Ambassador Sensoy, thank you so much for your friendship. Thank you for what you're doing here to promote this vital relationship between us, and we're really honored by your presence.
The ambassador of Armenia, Ambassador Markarian, is here tonight, and that's important, because we do look forward -- we, the United States of America -- to an improved relationship between Turkey and Armenia in the future.
So thanks to all of you for coming.
I thought I would come by, and I asked Fred Kempe if he would provide this platform -- and Fred's a great friend. He's doing a wonderful job at the Atlantic Council. I thought I'd come by to say a few words about our relationship with Turkey. I'm going off to Turkey very soon. More importantly, the secretary of State is going to have a series of meetings with the Turkish leadership, as will President Bush, in the months ahead. and it's an important time for our relationship with Turkey. Turkey has just elected a new government, and our countries are now entering, I think, a new era in our relationship, and we need to be committed to a revival in the close strategic partnership that we've enjoyed with Turkey going all the way back to the close of the Second World War and Turkey's entry into NATO in 1952.
I'm going to visit Istanbul, where I'll see the ecumenical patriarch and the Turkish leadership there and the business community and the NGO community, but of course also visit Ankara to see the Turkish leadership. And the message from the United States will be that we want to restore the primacy of this relationship for both of us, but from an American perspective, restore the primacy of Turkey as one of our most important strategic partners in terms of our bilateral state-to-state relations and also in terms of what we can do bring our business communities together, to bring our civil societies together and our people together.
There's really nothing more important at this point in time, in the autumn of 2007, as we Americans and our government look out at the world and see that Turkey is this critically important country to our interests in the greater Middle East Region.
The Turkish people just concluded historic elections, and these elections demonstrated the strong health of Turkey's democracy. It's the most impressive democracy in the Moslem world. And the results were decisive. Turkey can now expect a period of renewal and growth at home, and a period of challenge and greater responsibility in its foreign policy.
And the United States looks forward very much to continue our excellent relationship with President Abdullah Gul and with Prime Minister Erdogan. President Bush and Secretary Rice know both of these gentlemen very well. We have worked together with them. They are trustworthy partners, they have kept their word to us, and they've been good allies to the United States.
We have worked very hard over the past few years to develop this relationship with both of them and with their colleagues in the Turkish government, and we'd like to agree with this newly elected Turkish leadership on a period of high-level visits just over the next few months -- the ambassador and I were just talking about that before we came in here -- but more importantly, a period of strategic discussions between the two of us on what both of us need to do to protect our mutual interests in the Middle East and hopefully the common interests that all of us have for peace and stability in that region.n.
Turkey, as I said, for -- if you look back for 50 years of American foreign policy, Turkey has been one of the stalwart friends and allies of the United States. And it's been particularly an ally of ours as we seek to stabilize NATO and as we've developed NATO, the growth of NATO, over the last 10 to 15 years. And as we look out at the Middle East, we understand that the Turks have a longer history than we do. The Turks have a 160-year history of reform and of thinking through reform in their own country. And in our view, Turkey is the most successful example in the modern world today of a secular democracy within a Moslem society. And that has implications, positive implications, Ambassador, for reformers throughout the greater Middle East.
We think that Turkey's importance to us is even greater today than it was perhaps 10 or 15 years ago. I remember when I worked for General Scowcroft at the National Security Council staff at the end of the Cold War. It was a conventional wisdom that with the disintegration of the Soviet Union -- not in our government, but perhaps in the press -- with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey's importance to the United States would diminish. And those people who predicted that 15 years ago were exactly wrong, because we are now at a time when the Middle East is for the 21st century what Europe was in the 20th century for the United States. The Middle East is the most vital region of the world for our corps national security interests.
Between 1917, when Woodrow Wilson put us into the First World War, and 1999, when Bill Clinton put 50,000 American troops into Kosovo, Europe was the epicenter of everything the United States was trying to do in the world. And now it's very clear -- it's very clear after 9/11, it's very clear after our incursion into Iraq, it's very clear as we look at the challenges posed by Iran, by our faith in the government of Lebanon, as we look at the Israeli-Palestinian issue, that the Middle East is that vital epicenter for Americans as we look out into the world.
And that has a lesson for our relationship with Turkey because Turkey is the only country in the region that can work effectively with all of the other countries in the region. Turkey's influence is substantial and unique, and in this very important sense, we look at Turkey as our indispensable partner in the greater Middle East. Indeed, our history of close relations and shared interests and common values makes Turkey one of the most important American allies anywhere in the world. That's not to say that our relationship has been perfect; it's not to say that we haven't endured, especially in the last several years, our share of difficulties and sometimes misunderstandings and miscommunications. From our perspective, 2002 to 2005 were particularly difficult years, but we do believe -- and I think this is a common view in Ankara as well as in Washington -- that we've turned the corner and that we've recovered our balance in this relationship from those difficult years.
And we now have with this recent Turkish election a moment of opportunity to build stronger ties at all levels between our two governments. For the past two years, especially, what Secretary Rice has been trying to do with Abdullah Gul when he was Foreign minister of Turkey has been to work with considerable energy on both sides to revive the relationship, to address more effectively not just the bilateral issues in our agenda, but our common regional responsibilities.
Now I don't have to tell an audience at the Atlantic Council why Turkey is important to Americans, but think of it this way: Turkey is influential in the Balkans. Turkey is influential in the Black Sea region. Turkey is influential in the Caucasus, and Turkey is influential in the greater Middle East. In this vitally important set of regions and through the arc of countries that encompass those regions, where so much of our foreign policy attention now lies, Turkey is the vital link for Europe, for Western Europe, as well as for the United States of America.a.
On perhaps the most dynamic international issue of 2007, we also share a common interest with Turkey, and that's on energy. We share a common interest in preventing the domination by one country of the oil and gas sources and pipelines for Western Europe and for all of our allies who live in that region. Turkey is the gateway for exports of oil and natural gas from the Caspian region and Iraq to Europe, and building on the successful cooperation that Marc Grossman and Bob Pearson and Mark Parris led for the United States, we developed with the Turks the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline of the 1990s.
We developed the South Caucasus gas pipeline, and we now seek to expand this critical energy infrastructure into a southern corridor to help our European allies -- Italy and Greece and our allies in Western Europe -- to create a free market for energy supplies in Europe, and this effort will also have positive implications for our friends in the Caucasus, for Azerbaijan, and for our friends in Central Asia, like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, because it'll bolster their own independence by providing them access to European energy and markets. So we hope it'll be possible for Turkey and Azerbaijan to work out a swift arrangement on transit turns.s.
Turkey should also strive, we hope, to find a pricing formula for future exports to Turkey from the Caspian Sea natural gas field Shah Deniz. This is a necessary step to complete the intergovernmental agreement for the Turkey-Greece-Italy gas pipeline. And over the longer term, Turkey should continue to cooperate with the United States and Iraq and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to expand gas production and, therefore, to expand gas exports onward to Western Europe. Strategically, this is an important an issue as any that we face in Europe today. The Europeans understand that, and the vital link in this question is Turkey.
In South Asia, Turkey is helping NATO to bolster regional security in Afghanistan. The Turks have twice commanded the International Security Assistance Force. No other country has done that. Turkey is leading a provincial reconstruction team in Wardak province. Turkey has been an important arbiter and friend and connection between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Turkey has provided a welcoming and neutral venue for President Karzai and President Musharraf to discuss their mutual interests in cooperating against the Taliban and al Qaeda.
And it is in this area that we feel Turkey could make an even greater impact. Turkey could offer assistance to repatriate Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Turkey can help Pakistan and Afghanistan to improve border management and customs collections. Turkey has the credibility to do this, as a Moslem country and as a friend to both countries. United States tries to play the same role, as General Wald knows very well -- and we're so pleased to see General Wald here today -- as a country that can help form tripartite cooperation with the Pakistanis and the Afghans. And Turkey is fulfilling the same role.
The United States is trying to provide a venue for economic cooperation with the populations living on either side of the Pakistan/Afghan border through reconstruction opportunity zones, for the duty-free entry of products manufactured in that area into our country. That's another opportunity, that type of venture, for the Turkish people and the Turkish government.t.
Turkey has also played a key role in Kosovo, and there are many veterans of the Clinton administration here who were our leaders in the State and Defense departments during the Kosovo crisis. We remember how important Turkey's support was back in 1998 and 1999, and Turkey still has 600 military personnel in KFOR at a time when we're looking towards the independence of Kosovo by the end of 2007.
The Turkish government is playing THE leading strategic role in the Black Sea region. They have Turkey's Operation Black Sea Harmony, which coincides with the NATO maritime operation there. And that is important for NATO's south and eastern flanks. I think we'll see in the coming years greater cooperation between Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania in the Black Sea region as those three leading members of the NATO alliance hold down NATO interests in that region. ;
But it's in the Middle East where in 2007 and looking towards the next year, 2008, the connection between the United States and Turkey is going to be most important. Turkey borders, of course, Iraq and Iran and Syria. Turkey can help deepen our understanding of events in the Middle East. We do a lot of listening when we meet with Turkish officials, and we try to gauge the strategic challenges that we face in that part of the world.
And it's not only geography and common interests that make Turkey a key partner of the United States. It's also, as is true in the case of every ally in NATO, shared values, shared faith in tolerance and in diversity. That's what cements the Turkish-American partnership. We do share as well, as societies, a deep appreciation for the importance of separating civic and religious life. In Turkey, reform movements during the late Ottoman period aimed to balance the claims that religion makes on personal lives with the exigencies of a modern state. One of the most famous waves of reforms, the so-called Tanzimat movement of the mid-19th century, was an attempt to give all residents of the empire the same rights, whether they were Moslem or Christian or Jewish.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk rejuvenated Turkey's modernizing reforms. He granted political rights to women, and of course he laid the foundation for Turkey's industrial rise and established the Turkish republic as a secular democracy. And it's that commitment to a secular democracy which makes it -- which makes Turkey a natural ally of our country.
Turkey, if I can say this from an American perspective, as a friend, and objectively, now may be at a new historic turning point, with a real opportunity to invigorate its political and economic reforms that will anchor it in the European Union and bolster its ability to inspire reformers beyond Turkey, in those countries that are now autocratic and we hope in the future might become more democratic. In this sense, the parliamentary elections on the 22nd of July and the presidential election of Abdullah Gul on August 28th demonstrated once again the mature democracy that Turkey certainly is, and the respect for constitutional processes that is so important in modern Turkey itself. In this sense we very much welcome Abdullah Gul's election as president of Turkey and as a friend of our country. The Justice and Development Party now controls the government, the presidency and the parliament. And at the same time, Turkey's voters, like in so many other democratic countries, sent a message of moderation and of diversity during the recent elections. The AK Party won a resounding victory, but opposition parties received over 50 percent of the vote, with more parties crossing the 10 percent threshold. And so that new parliament is now very much representative of Turkey's diverse electorate and voter sentiment. And Turkey's voters thus appear to have signaled their desire for Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul to deepen Turkey's secular democracy by rejuvenating its political and economic reforms, but in the context of Turkey's Muslim society.y.
As Turkey's democratic institutions strengthen and as its reforms proceed, we think that Turkey will grow in its importance to the United States. And realizing the full potential of this modern partnership thus poses several immediate challenges to both of our countries. As I said before, in the Middle East we think that Turkey can play a regional leadership role that is consistent with what the rest of the world wants to see for the Middle East, but it's going to be important that both of our governments make sure that while we agree on strategy, we also have a common sense of shared tactics.
At the top of the list, of course, is Iraq. Our decision to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein's brutality triggered an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey itself. Our official relations have recovered from the low point of the Turkish Parliament's vote on March 1st, 2003, to reject our request to move U.S. force from Iraq -- from Turkey -- excuse me -- into Iraq. Since then, Ankara has been a strong supporter of our efforts to stabilize Iraq, and the Turkish government has asked us not to abandon our goals, particularly concerning the territorial integrity of Iraq itself.
Turkey today represents the critical logistical lifeline for American troops in Iraq, and thus Turkey is making very important contributions to the wider international efforts that are designed to stabilize the Iraqi government and help the Iraqi people overcome this very serious crisis that they're now experiencing.
Turkey is similarly helpful in diplomatic efforts to bolster support for Iraq in the neighborhood. We very much appreciate the invitation by the Turkish government to host the next neighbors conference in Turkey itself in October. And Secretary Rice said just the other day publicly that she would be in Istanbul for that meeting. And Turkey's willingness to help us to address the Iraq crisis is also important because Turkey faces a challenge from the PKK that emanates from Iraq itself.
The American position during the first Bush administration, President Bush -- H.W. Bush's administration, during President Clinton's administration and now in President George W. Bush's administration has been very consistent. We see the PKK -- we view it as a terrorist organization. The PKK conducts warrantless attacks on Turkish citizens and Turkish territory. And we mourn the loss of innocent Turkish lives in the Turkish military, in the police force and among the citizenry from these PKK attacks.
The United States is a partner to Turkey in trying to combat the PKK. We are committed to working with Iraq as well as Turkey to counter PKK terrorists who are headquartered in northern Iraq. We are making progress slowly but surely in putting into place the mechanisms required to produce concrete and decisive action against the PKK itself. And we'll follow up on this plan with Turkey and our European partners to make it illegitimate for European countries to have front offices for the PKK in their countries and to make it illegitimate for Turkey -- for the PKK to try to finance its operations in Europe itself. And that's been a very consistent message from the United States to our European allies.
Turkey and the United States also face another common challenge beyond Iraq, and that's in Iran itself. Now, we've worked together to support the clear international consensus that the rest of the world should not support in any way, shape or form Iran's attempt to become a nuclear weapons power. And that's why we've gone twice to the U.N. Security Council over the last 10 months to sanction Iran under Chapter VII. Those sanctions are mandatory for all U.N. member states, and Turkey has implemented those sanctions and we thank Turkey for that contribution.
But I think it's true and it's fair to say that the United States and Turkey still need to work out some tactical differences in handling Iran. We understand fully that Turkey's a neighbor of Iran, that Turkey is a trading partner of Iran, as Iran is with so many of our European and Asian allies. But Turkey's recent conclusion of a memorandum on energy cooperation with Iran is troubling to us. Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran. And we urge all of our friends, and that includes the many NATO allies in Western Europe -- it includes Japan; it includes South Korea; it includes India and Pakistan -- not to reward Iran by investing in its oil and gas sector -- not while Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability and currently defying two U.N. Security Council resolutions by proceeding with this nuclear research at its plant at Natanz.
The United States and Turkey share a common interest, we believe, in Iraq and in Iran. But we also share a common interest in the search, 59 years in the making, for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, particularly a peace between Israel and the Palestinians. President Bush has articulated a vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. And the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad in our view is the most capable Palestinian government since Oslo, and we believe that government deserves a chance to make peace and to become a state. And as we work to develop the economy and the governance of the Palestinians, Turkey is going to be an important partner and an important source of support for the Palestinians themselves.
So I think you can see, ladies and gentlemen, that as you think about American interests and Turkish interests in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in the Middle East, it's Turkey's identity, its dual identity as both a Middle Eastern and a European country, which is so important in Turkey's influence and power in the Middle East but also in the relationship that it has with the United States. And we thus face important challenges to help Turkey develop its own identity as a European country.
I think it's fair to say that President Clinton and now President Bush have been among the world's strongest supporters of Turkey's EU aspirations. And so we continue today to call on Europe's leaders, particularly its newly elected leaders, to signal clearly and unambiguously that Turkey should have a voice and a place, a seat, in the European Union in the future. And we believe that Turkey is going to benefit from that, but the EU will benefit from Turkey's membership for decades to come. And we see an ever more prosperous Turkey as well as an ever more democratic Turkey, which will make it a stronger partner for the EU in the future. It is the right goal for the European Union and it's certainly the right goal, as the Turkish government has expressed, for the Turkish people in the future.
We also think as the Europeans grapple with a very difficult problem, the introduction over the last few decades of a sizable Muslim population from North Africa and the Middle East into all the major cities of Europe, that Europe can learn something from Turkey itself about tolerance, for diversity, about access by the poorest members of society to education and to opportunity in that society. And therefore the entrance of Turkey into the European Union will be one way for Europe to learn to cope with the societal and religious challenges that it currently faces both in West and Central Europe.
Now, to reach this transcendent strategic objective, we would hope that Turkey would consider repealing Article 301 of the penal code, which restricts freedom of expression and has led to legal cases against private citizens and global figures, even Nobel laureates like Orhan Pamuk. We also hope that Turkey will help to make its own case with the European Union by allowing the ecumenical patriarch's religious school at Halki, in Istanbul, to reopen decades after it closed.
And ladies and gentlemen, Turkey's position as a candidate member for the EU is also reflected in the fact that for more than 50 years, Turkey has been an anchor for NATO. We know -- I think General Wald knows -- that several generations of Turkish military officers have received their military educations in the United States and in Western Europe. And many of our military officers have studied in Turkey as well. As we have gone through the NATO crises, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan, over the last 12 years, it's been the addition of Turkey and the inclusion of Turkey in those missions in Muslim countries that has made the critical difference for NATO's own credibility.
So an important part of what we as Americans need to do is to continue this bridging role that we play between the European Union and Turkey, but also to be Turkey's closest partner in NATO. And I certainly felt that was as I sat two seats away in alphabetical order from my Turkish counterpart around that table at NATO.
Ladies and gentlemen, I think we also need to look at two more issues before we get to a question-and-answer period and a discussion. We have tried now for nearly 45 years -- all of us -- to arrive at a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. And just the other day, Mehmet Ali Talat and President Papadopoulos met together in Nicosia to see if the could contribute to the resolution of that problem. We encourage further meetings between the two of them. We also call upon Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to reinvigorate the U.N.'s efforts to address the problem of Cyprus.
It is simply not acceptable -- and I see a lot of people nodding their heads in the room -- that in this day and age we forget that Cyprus is divided. We forget that that country is so beleaguered by the problems that were created decades ago. And so it's in the interests of the United States as a friend of Turkey, as a friend of the government of Cyprus and as a friend of Greece to see that we use our influence to help push forward on a resolution of the Cyprus problem. As we ask the United Nations to lead that effort, we will surely support it, and I hope to go to Cyprus a little later on this autumn to try to assert that American view that we can be a good friend and push forward towards a just solution on a bizonal, bicommunal basis for the people of Cyprus.
And finally, the United States and Turkey in our relationship, of course, faces seriously challenge of how to talk about Armenia and Armenians. Each year on April 24th, Armenian Remembrance Day, President Bush has issued a public statement lamenting the mass killings and force deportations of up to 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman authorities at the close of the First World War. The United States' condemnation of this tragedy is not at issue. The question is how best to facilitate reconciliation of all concerned parties with each other and with their painful and shared past.
We believe in that sense that passage by the U.S. House of Representatives bill 106, which would make a political determination that the tragedy of 1915, 1917 constituted genocide, would undercut voices emerging in Turkey for dialogue and reconciliation concerning these horrific events. We, therefore, have recommended strongly to the leadership of the Congress that it not pass such a resolution. We strongly encourage Turkey to normalize its relations and reopen its border with Armenia. These steps 16, 17 years after the close -- disintegration of the Soviet Union would bring peace and prosperity of an unprecedented nature to the Caucasus region.
And in the wake of the AKP Party's resounding electoral victories, we believe it is time for Turkey to make this bold opening towards Armenia, but we also hope that Armenia will respond in the same spirit. And we are a friend to both countries and ally to one, Turkey, and we will be glad to help in that process.
I would just say, in conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, that the United States and Turkey have enjoyed a relationship of alliance, of friendship and cooperation. We have weathered a very difficult period over the last few years. It is now time to lift up this relationship. It's time for Americans to believe in it, to express our support for our ally, Turkey, and to work with him to resolve the problems of the Middle East and of the Caucasus and the Balkans. We will have no better ally in that region than Turkey. It's in that spirit that President Bush and Secretary Rice look forward to their meetings in the next few weeks with the Turkish leadership. You will have a good friend, Ambassador, as we proceed.
Thank you very much for listening, ladies and gentlemen. I'm happy to engage in discussion with you to take any questions, but also to hear your advice to our government as we work with this very important ally.
Thank you. (Applause.)
MR. GROSSMAN: Thank you all very much. This is also the new think tank thing, which is, instead of Nick having to stand up there and answer your questions, we make it look like a -- it's -- we're in somebody's living room, that's right. There's a lot of questions. I'm going to put the first one because I get to.
Nick, we appreciate the speech, and I appreciate also the focus on returning the primacy of Turkey as a strategic partner. I think that's really important.
As you go off to Turkey here next week in the face, as Fred said, of opinion polls from the German Marshall Fund and transatlantic trends that show a very hard, low number of Turkish people who think that the United States really is an ally of Turkey, why do you think that today is different than two years when Dr. Rice and Dr. Gul put together the vision statement of U.S.-Turkish relations, which I thought was a very good document and people worked hard on it? But why today? In other words, why do you think you can succeed today when two years ago a very good document sort of flopped?
MR. BURNS: Well, thanks, Marc.
I think that we -- the recovery in this relationship from the very, very difficult events of 2003 and 2004 began two years ago with the vision statement. And our relationship with Turkey in that sense mirrors our relationship with a lot of the West European countries, France and Germany in particular, with which we had a very difficult disagreement over Iraq in those years. And there are similarities among all those countries.
The fact is, I think that we have overcome the difficulties. I think we've rebuilt a relationship of trust with Turkey, certainly with France and Germany, but that's not been reflected in the public opinion polls. I sat down with the German Marshall Fund people last week here in Washington and they showed me the attitudes, at least from their polls, of the Turkish people toward the United States.
And I think in any relationship between democratic allies, popular trust is very important, and so we have to earn back that trust, both of us, in the respective views of our populations. I think that means that for the United States, we have to convey respect. We have to convey an interest in listening to the views of our allies, and, when we disagree, we find a way to do that in a civil fashion and we find a way to work through those disagreements.
I don't think you'll rebuild this the day after tomorrow. But with goodwill and with common approaches to difficult problems, I think we can rebuild public trust in Turkey. The responsibility to do that lies with us in our government, it also lies with the Turkish government, in the way that we talk about this relationship publicly. So it's no coincidence, frankly, that we're here at The Atlantic Council. We want to signal publicly what I said in the speech, that Turkey is vitally important to our country. It's our indispensable partner in the Middle East.
And I gave some advice, and the ambassador will excuse me and forgive me for doing that, but that's in the tradition of good friends, between allies. But I think that with goodwill, we'll rebuild it and the Turkish people and the American people will continue to believe in this relationship.
MR. GROSSMAN: Good. We have a lot of questions. Let me start out. Yes, sir?
Q Savas Suzal from -- (off mike). My question is, after the last election most of the U.S. press labeled the Ataturk follower as a secular minority. U.S. is the champion of the protecting the minority rights. How do you planning to protect the secular minority rights in Turkey?
MR. BURNS: Well, you know, you -- thank you. We used to see -- when I was State Department -- we used to see each other when I was State Department spokesman. So I'm -- thank you for the interest in the Turkish press in what we have to say today.
You know, it's not for the United States to interfere in the life of Turkish politics or in how the Turkish people relate to their government. That's for the Turkish government and people to decide. And I wouldn't pretend to interfere on an issue like that, except to say that, you know, it's going to -- we have faith in the Turkish government and in the record of the Turkish government and Turkish democracy. You've built a democracy that does safeguard the rights of all your people, and it's a tolerant, diverse democracy, unlike most of the other countries in your region. So we don't evince many doubts about the question you ask, but I don't think it would be very -- it wouldn't be very diplomatic of me to try and answer in a more detailed fashion.
Thank you. Good try. (Laughter.)
MR. GROSSMAN: Sir?
Q Umit Enginsoy, NTV Television. Two brief things. First of all, by calling on Turkey to open its order with Armenia, does Armenia recognize the border it wants to be opened? Do you think -- do you know that they recognize the very border they want to be opened? And secondly, at a time when the United States has been promising to work more against the PKK in the last two years, next to nothing has been done in visible form. Normal Turks haven't seen -- experienced anything major against PKK visible. Given this, how -- could you change this? And how could you assure the Turks that you would be doing something more?
MR. GROSSMAN: If I could just say, I think it's very important here to say that as you talked in your speech about the PKK, you made an assertion that there was progress. And I recognize that some of this may be hard to talk about in this forum, but I think for Turkish people and for those of us who are trying to support the U.S.-Turkish relationship, some examples of that progress would be quite useful.
MR. BURNS: Thank you very much.
I think you're right to ask about the PKK issue. We understand how important this is for Turks and how sensitive it is in Turkish politics. What I said was that the United States recognizes the problem. We have responded to Turkey's request for assistance by working with both the Iraqi and Turkish governments. I said that we've put in place the mechanisms that should bring us success. But in a session like this, I'm not able to talk about this in a very specific and detailed way, and you'll understand why.
But I can assure you of the commitment of President Bush and of our secretary of Defense and our secretary of State to work with Turkey effectively -- how and why and to what end -- to end the PKK attacks against the Turkish military and Turkish civilians, the cross-border attacks. And there we're going to have to rely on the goodwill and effectiveness of the Iraqi government. This is a very complex undertaking. We've been very fortunate over the last 13 months to have General Joe Ralston as the American emissary to the Turkish government, working closely with it and also with the Iraqi government. We have in Ambassador Ryan Crocker someone working the problem from the other side of the border. So I am confident that we have the right mechanisms in place and that we shall see progress.
On your question on Armenia, America doesn't want to get in between Turkey and Armenia. We're an ally with Turkey; we're a friend to Armenia. The fact is that there is no normal relationship, and there hasn't been since December 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated, and that shouldn't remain the case. And as a friend to both countries, we'd like to see that situation change.
Now, I said that Turkey ought to reach out to Armenia, but I also said that Armenia ought to respond in kind and in the same spirit, and we'll certainly push that point of view when we talk to the authorities in Europe on it.
MR. GROSSMAN: I might just say also, I think this is a question of self-confidence on the part of Turkey. And that -- the fact that there's, you know, a land border between a large country, Turkey, and a small country, Armenia, that's still closed -- the issues of whether, well, do we know exactly where it's demarcated? -- the most important thing is Turkey would show, I think, an amazing bit of self-confidence and openness to the future by opening that land border without any preconditions.
Yes, ma'am, please, and then I'll come to Mark Parris. Please.
Q Hello. April Bozajol (sp). I am a fellow SAIS graduate and currently working at the Export-Import Bank. My question also is related to PKK, particularly U.S. policy in northern Iraq. It is widely publicized that some weapons originally given to Iraqi security forces by the American military are now in the hands of PKK; as you said, it's the terrorist organization. Some Turkish authorities suggest that these weapons are given to terrorist groups by the local forces. And of course Turkish military and politicians on many occasions express frustrations about the U.S. policy and what is being done against the PKK activities, and they find it potentially damaging to U.S.-Turkish relations. What is your view about this particular issue? And do you believe that it is also damaging?
MR. BURNS: Well, thank you very much. I -- you know, I've said a lot today on the PKK issue; I probably shouldn't say much more. But I will say, just to let you remember how this cooperation began, it was a request to President Bush from Prime Minister Erdogan that the United States address this problem with Turkey and with the Kurdish Regional Government and northern Iraq and the Iraqi authorities in Baghdad, and that's what we've done. And we have one of the best people in our country, General Joe Ralston, who has made a supreme effort, and, frankly, sometimes against considerable odds to try to make progress.
And I think in answer -- I can't answer all your specific questions except to say if this problem is to be resolved, we will need to see cooperation from the Iraqi side of the border and the Iraqi government and the regional authorities, and we've been working that very hard. And so I am not going to be -- I can't possibly tell you where this is all heading or specifically what might happen over the next few months, but I can tell you that we're dedicated to trying to help Turkey resolve this problem. And we really do understand how important this is for average Turks, because we hear that. Our ambassador and our embassy in Turkey hear that from average Turks.
Thank you.
MR. GROSSMAN: Do you think that six months from now, if we're in this same situation, that there will be things that will have happened that Turkish people can point to and say I see the difference today that I didn't see before?
MR. BURNS: I certainly hope so. You know, Marc, as you know, in an enterprise like this, it's always -- it's impossible to predict what -- the specific advances that might be made. But I remember sitting in Athens, Greece, as American ambassador to Greece when Mr. Ocalan was captured, and I remembered the United States has been a good friend to Turkey on this question of PKK, of Ocalan all the way through the last decade.
So I hope that while Turks may question the effectiveness of what we're doing, I hope you don't question our good faith, because, you know, we're a country that was attacked by a terrorist group just several years ago, and we do have an understanding of what it means to have your citizenry exposed to terrorist attack by an organization that is dedicated to the destruction of your way life and of your government. And so there's a sympathy that Americans feel, that we and our government feel for the people of Turkey, and that's the basis for wanting to try to resolve this with you.
MR. GROSSMAN: Ambassador Parris.
Q (Off mike) -- two questions, two questions occurred to me as I was listening to it. One Marc has sort of preempted, but the question was, why now? Because so many of the American interests that you have described are by no means new, and they were with us 10 years ago, that to a large extent, they were with us four years ago.
In your answer, you talked a lot about the need to talk about the relationship and the importance of getting the message out as to why it's important. And you suggested -- I applaud the beginning of that process today.
I also know we all, as practitioners, know that words ultimately don't cut it. The vision statement of two years ago covered all the same ground. It has largely remained words.
Therefore, the second question that occurred to me I'll now put, which is, where's the beef?
You talked a lot about what Turkey can do for the United States. You talked a good deal about what we'd like to see Turkey do for itself, as well as indirectly for the United States. If I were a Turkish politician with approval ratings for the United States at 9 percent or so, I would be looking for a good argument as to why, at this point in the relationship, Turkey has an interest in re-engaging with an administration which has 16 months in office.
So I think it would be a contribution to the process that you're trying to set in motion if you could tell this and Turkish audiences, you know, what we're going to be doing for you soon.
MR. BURNS: Thanks.
Mark, thank you for the softballs. I really appreciate it! (Laughter.) You're a good friend. (Chuckles.) I expect that.
Mark was a great American ambassador to Turkey. He and I actually were subjected to our confirmation hearing together with Senator Jesse Helms back in 1997. (Soft laughter.) So I'm happy to go through that --
Q (Off mike) -- (everybody knows ?). (Laughter.)
MR. BURNS: -- (laughs) -- happy to go through that experience with Mark.
Your two questions -- why now? You know, there are junctures in relations between countries where it's important to stand up and say this country's important, and to say it to an American audience and to remind Americans of the strategic importance of one of our allies. It's important -- I think words are important in that respect.
And the vision statement was the first attempt to recover from the troubles of '02, '03 and '04, and it was successful, written by Foreign Minister Gul and Secretary Rice.
So I wouldn't agree that somehow words are meaningless or that a government standing up, as President Bush and Secretary Rice are doing now, to say, "This is our indispensable ally in the Middle East" -- those are -- that's a powerful description of an ally.
I would also agree with you that you have a right to ask the second question: So where is the beef? Here's the beef, I think: Turkey is a key connector on the energy question, oil and gas, from the Caucasus and Central Asia to the West. And Turkey, I think, values the concrete substantial support that our country is giving to it in trying to establish these alternative pipelines to relieve all of Europe from domination by one country of the oil and gas picture. That's a strategic interest of long standing. You were part of it. We're part of it in this administration. That's not just words. That's concrete.
Secondly, on Iraq and Iran, Turkey lives next door to both of them. The United States is the most powerful presence in Iraq, and we are the most powerful country focused on Iran today. And so the future of peace and security in the Middle East depends on the right decisions being made by Turkey and the United States and other countries concerning both. It's just not rhetoric. It's what we do every day to support stability in Iraq and to try to contain Iran. Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. That is absolutely against the interests of Turkey and the United States. We have specific concrete measures, sanctions measures, on the table that both of us need to implement to contain Iran. Iran is funding and arming Hezbollah, Hamas, the Shi'a militants in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. And it's in Turkey's interest to work with us on concrete measures to contain and push back against that, hopefully by diplomatic means, because that's our strategy.
So I would not accept the charge that somehow this is all a bunch of hot air. I think the rhetoric is important, but the actions on energy, the actions on Iran and Iraq -- and I would also say, because our troops are serving together in Kosovo, at THE most sensitive time in Kosovo's history, where it's poised to become an independent state, and serving together in Afghanistan, which is NATO's most critical mission and its first ground mission since 1949 -- these are real, these are tangible, these are concrete. So I think we're being effective in action as we are in rhetoric.
MR. GROSSMAN: Let me -- before I call on Mr. Lambros, let me just follow up, though, on one point that Mark makes, which is that I think your answer to the question of it's not just hot air -- fair answer -- the issue then is also one of urgency, and because one of the things that strikes me is, you were very clear in your speech to say to the Turkish government, "Don't be signing deals with Iran. Don't sign up for 35 billion BCUs of gas to go here and there."
But I think there's an argument to be made that one of the reasons that the Turks did that was they were sort of waving their hand and saying, "Excuse me, does anyone in the United States still care about the East-West Energy Corridor? And if you do, are you going to do anything about it?"
And so, you know, Turkey, I think, is at a point where there are a number of alternatives. And so it's not, I think, just to make a list, nor to say, as you, I think, very properly do, that these words matter, but then there's -- I think there's also a real sense of urgency here, and that's especially true on the energy issues.
MR. BURNS: I do too. I read Marc Grossman's recent article, by the way -- (laughter) -- as a board member of GMF, about the energy situation. I read it this afternoon, and I agree that there has to be a sense of diplomatic and economic urgency to that court. And there are real issues that need to be decided to create the southern corridor, and we've talked to the Italians about that, to the Greeks, as well as to the Azaris and the Turks -- specific issues. That's why I spoke to them today. But I would agree with you on that.
MR. GROSSMAN: Mr. Lambros.
Q Lambros Papantoniou, Greek correspondent. Secretary Burns --
MR. BURNS: (Speaks in Greek.)
Q (Speaks in Greek.) I have a question again for the Ecumenical Patriarchate. A Turkish prosecution is in process right now against Patriarchate Bartholomew on the basis of his using illegally, according to the documents, the title "ecumenical." Something could suspect this, as you know, since 6th century to the present. Could you please clarify once again the U.S. position on this issue?
MR. BURNS: Mr. Lambros, you're trying to get me into trouble, and I don't want to do that.
Q (Off mike.)
MR. BURNS: No, I would just say this. You know, the United States has been a great friend of the Ecumenical Patriarch. He was honored by our Congress with a Congressional Gold Medal. President Bush, President Clinton and President George H.W. Bush have all considered him a friend, and we support him. And we support his mission, and we support the Ecumenical Patriarchate. And we -- obviously, the Turkish government knows that, but I think the Turkish government has been also a good friend to the patriarchy and a good host to that patriarchate. And on sensitive issues, I think it's much better to leave this to the Turkish authorities and the Ecumenical Patriarch to work out. I think everyone knows how strongly we support and our Orthodox community here in America support his all holiness.
Thank you.
Q Thank you. (Name inaudible) -- for Washington Times. You said that Turkey now may be at a new historic turning point and it's to be in Ankara in EU. Yet before you accepted Greek Cyprus to the family, Turkish Cypriots voted for the unification of the island. Since then, Turkish Cypriot leadership raises concern that their promises, the EU's promises has not been kept, and yet you ask Turkey to open its sea and airports to Greek Cyprus. And if Turkey does not reciprocate to it -- Turkey wants it to be reciprocated to the Turkish Cypriot side, and if it does not, it is unlikely that Ankara is going to open its sea and airports. So -- and the time is approaching, and it is in December. So it is likely that accession talks might come to a freezing point, and in that -- you know, given the circumstances, how do you keep your hope that Turkey is going to stay on the EU track, and also with that, please include the sentiments of the Turkish population against not only to the United States, but also to the Western world.
Thank you.
MR. GROSSMAN: I'm going to pile on. I want to make sure too that -- in your speech, you talked about the -- Turkey getting a voice and a seat at the European Union. I want to make sure that that means full membership.
MR. BURNS: Absolutely. The United States supports full membership of Turkey in the European Union. I hope that was clear.
MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir.
MR. BURNS: Listen, all I can say -- you asked a very good question, also very technical and very detailed.
I'd say two things. It's been little noted by the American press that over the last 13 months, since the summer of 2006, there have been a series of positive gestures and positive events in Cyprus, and there have been some things done in the middle of Nicosia along the green line that ought to inspire us to believe that another effort by the new secretary-general of the U.N. has to happen. And the United States is going to support that, and we're calling for that to happen, for a U.N. envoy to be named, for a U.N. process to recommence. And I think that both President Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat have both signalled that they want to see this process begin, and we Americans should support it.
I don't want to get into the middle of all these complicated issues, that Olli Rehn and the other Europeans have to manage, except to say it is imperative that Europe decide FOR Turkey. I know I remember when Marc Grossman was assistant secretary and I was out in the field, and a number of times the United States tried to assert that in a very specific way. And this -- our administration, President Bush's administration, has been very clear to the newly elected leadership in European capitals that strategically it would be a huge mistake to leave Turkey out as a future member of the EU. And I'll let the Europeans and the Turks resolve some of the sticky problems regarding accession. Thank goodness we don't have to deal with those on a day-to-day basis. But they're important, and I believe with goodwill they can be overcome.
MR. GROSSMAN: We've got about 10 minutes left now. I owe you -- right there. Then I'm coming to Ambassador Catto.
Q (Name off mike) -- Voice of America. You spoke a couple times about the Kosovo issue. Is independence the likely outcome of the present process?
MR. BURNS: Well, the United States supports very strongly, and we may be the strongest supporter, Martti Ahtisaari's plan. That plan would be to engineer a process that would lead to the independence of Cyprus -- of Kosovo, excuse me. And now we're -- (laughter). Let's start all over again. (Laughter.) President Ahtisaari, Kosovo.
So what we've done is we've asked Ambassador Frank Wisner, a retired American ambassador, one of our finest diplomats, to lead an effort with the European Union, with Wolfgang Ischinger and with his -- their Russian colleagues to see if it's possible to make progress between Belgrade and between Pristina, between the Serb leadership and the Kosovo-Albanian leadership. If by December 10th it's possible to do that, we will respect the decisions that they make in those negotiations. If not, then on December 10th I'm quite confident that the United States will rearticulate in rhetorical and concrete terms our support for the Ahtisaari plan, and that plan is to lead to independence.
MR. GROSSMAN: Mr. Chairman.
MR. CATTO: Nick, if memory serves me, which frequently it does not, a decade or so ago there was a quiet but very real cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Events broke that cooperation down. Has there been any sign of a renovation of it?
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Ambassador. You're absolutely right that Turkey and Israel had a period of very good cooperation. I think Turkey and Israel still have a relationship that is rather unique in that part of the world. We support it. When I served at NATO with Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Turkish ambassador, he had just come from being the Turkish ambassador to Israel.
And we certainly count on that relationship continuing, because it's important to help normalize, after 59 years -- 59 years after the creation of the state of the Israel, Israel's relationships with its surrounding countries, including Turkey and the neighborhood, but also to see from the other side there are benefits that accrue to Turkey and other countries as they progress in their relations with Israel.
So we certainly support it, and I think it is continuing, maybe not with the same zeal and enthusiasm as in previous years, but it's an important factor in our attempt to try to normalize -- help Israel normalize its relations with all of its neighbors.
MR. GROSSMAN: We've got time for a couple more questions. Yes, sir, way in the back.
Q (Name and affiliation inaudible.) Will there be a new mission for Turkey and NATO in Iraq in the near future? And secondly, what is the latest U.S. position on ESDI defenses between Turkey and the EU?
MR. BURNS: Thank you very much. On the first question, as I think I mentioned in my speech, it's very important that Turkey's offered to host this neighbors conference. There was the first conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, and Turkey will host the next in Istanbul. Secretary Rice will be there; we hope all the other neighbors will be there as well.
And so I think Turkey is showing its great interest in the future of Iraq by offering to take a leading political role in trying to break down the barriers that the Iraqi government's experienced with a number of its neighbors and to ask those neighbors, Iran and Syria in particular, to be better neighbors to Iraq, to stop the flow of foreign fighters, for instance, and of technology like the EFP technology that flows across the Iranian border into Iraq, to stop that flow. So this neighbors conference is important for establishing all of that to happen.
On the second question, you're bringing Marc and I back to our attempt to make sure that as NATO developed its security relationship with the European Union, NATO of course would retain its pride of place as the essential security institution in the transatlantic realm and that the EU would be complementary to that. And when Marc and I -- together Marc and Washington and me and NATO were able to negotiate this back in March of 2003, we made sure that NATO and the United States would be open to cooperation with the EU but that NATO would have first right of refusal in entertaining any suggestions for future missions and that NATO's central role in uniting North America and Europe would not be diminished by the European Defense Project. And I think it's worked out pretty much that way.
I think most of the current European leadership -- it was interesting to see President Sarkozy say this in a speech a week ago Monday -- believe that NATO needs to remain the central institution. And we need to help encourage the EU to develop a complementary role. Turkey has always been a great partner of the United States in asserting that primacy of NATO.
MR. GROSSMAN: Last question. Just give it a shout.
Q (Name off mike) -- from The Atlantic Council. I wanted to follow up on that.
U.S. officials have been calling for more EU involvement in Afghanistan, as has the NATO secgen. And partly that has been stalled at least on the EU side by a lack of EU-NATO cooperation. And in part, that has stalled because of the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus.
Now, you already addressed Cyprus. But any of the solutions that we can see will probably be lengthy, unfortunately. And I wondered what, in the short term, advice you would give the Turks in terms of continuing the block on NATO-EU consultation.
MR. BURNS: Well, you know, I think the United States has always understood Turkey's concerns on this matter. And we've always been sympathetic to Turkey's concerns on this matter. And those of us who sat at that NATO table with our Turkish counterparts have given assistance to Turkey.
This is a very important theological issue of the type that only takes place in Brussels these days. (Laughter.) You've got two institutions that live about seven miles from each other. You'd think the gap sometimes was 700 miles. We used to go downtown to EU headquarters and sometimes we couldn't even convene meetings because of the esoteric problem that you just described. And I think especially as you kind of free yourself from that environment and come back across the Atlantic, you look back and say, surely we can resolve this problem.
I mean, you know, Europe and NATO look out at the world, and we see global climate change and we see trafficking and crime and narcotics. And we see the global war on terrorism. This is a small, little theological problem and with good will, it should be overcome. But we've also always been very kind of protective of our relationship with Turkey and understanding of the Turkish position. And I would hope that the European countries would take some steps towards Turkey and understand it's in their interest to have Turkey at that table, as it is to have Turkey at NATO, and to see the role and the burden that Turkey has put upon its own shoulders in Kosovo and in Afghanistan.
We all need Turkey. We should make it easier for Turkey to cooperate between NATO and the EU. So that's how I look at it since I've been liberated from Brussels over the last two-and-a-half years. And it's -- and I know that the Turks feel that friendship from the United States.
MR. GROSSMAN: Well, that's a good place to end it. I'm told 6:40 is it. It is 6:40 now.
Nick, we thank you very much for your statement. We thank you very much for your commitment to this U.S.-Turkish relationship. And we thank you for your service to the United States. (Applause.)
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